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Chancellor Kent's Abridgment of
Emerigon's Maritime Insurance
Charles E.Shields III*
It was the author's recent good fortune to have purchased a bound
volume of several sets of notes made by Chancellor Kent.' The volume
consists of three separate items, which are tightly bound together in a
small custom-made book. The pages measure almost precisely 10.5
centimeters by 17.5 centimeters, and for the most part the writing is in a
legible and strong hand.
The first of the three items is marked by Kent: "Notes taken from
Emerigon on Insurance. In August, September & October 1804." This
* J.D., The Dickinson School of Law, 1983; M.A., Shippensberg State College,
1977; B.S., Shippensburg State College, 1972. The author is indebted to and would like
to specially thank James Fox, Mark W. Podvia, and the rest of the always helpful staff at
the Library of the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University for their
always kind and courteous help; Shane Crosby and Thomas Fowler for help in obtaining
copies of assorted cases and articles; Jerry Dupont, of the Law Library Microform
Consortium; Lionel Epstein; John Rees; Peter Glose, of William S. Hein & Co.; Joe
Luttrell, of Meyer Boswell Books; James McCue, of Hudson House Associates; Robert
Rubin; Fenn Quigley and Deborah Nelson of Primary Source Microfilm, Research
Publications; Amoud Gerrits, of Gerrits & Sons, all of whom have kept the author
continually supplied with many fine books; Maxine Rhoads for extremely prompt and
good help with typing; Robert Glentzer and Abram Burnett for their persistent help with
citations and footnotes; Charles Donahue, Jr., of the Harvard Law School faculty, for his
help in tracking down several items on the great and famous case of Pierson v. Post; and
especially Victor Tunkel, Secretary to the Selden Society, who has been a constant source
of help, encouragement, and inspiration.
1. For the typed manuscript of the handwritten materials, see Appendix: James
Kent's Notes on Emerigon, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1219 (2004). Greg Talbot, of the
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 33 Terminal Avenue, Clark, New Jersey 07066, was kind
enough to sell me both the bound manuscripts and a magnificent and nearly pristine copy
of the first edition of Emerigon's Treatise on Insurance. The full title is Traite Des
Assurances Et Des Contrats A La Grosse, by Jean Mossy, and is in two volumes
published in Marseille in 1783. A second edition under the title TraiteDes Assurances Et
Des Contrats A La Grosse D'Emerigon, Confere Et Mis En Rapport Avec Le Nouveau
Code De Commerce Et La Jurisprudence; Suivi D'un Vocabulaire Des Termes De
Marine Et Des Noms De Chague Partie D'un Navire, was edited by P. S.Boulay-Paty,
and published in two volumes in Paris in 1827. Both of these editions are in the
possession of the author. Hereinafter, the first edition by Jean Mossy will be cited as
"Emerigon."
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consists of nearly 100 pages and is so extensive as to constitute an
Abridgment of Emerigon's two-volume work on Insurance.
This is followed by a series of notes on the "Law as to negotiable
Paper," which are divided into several subheadings. Each subheading
contains concise extracts and statements of leading legal principles from
a goodly number of court cases, the majority of which are English. This
second item consists of approximately forty pages and can be considered
a modified form of a commonplace book.
The third item is a series of notes listing Kent's volumes of
pamphlets. There are 140 volumes listed in all, with the pamphlet titles
listed as abbreviations rather than in full. The number of pamphlets
bound into each volume varies from in excess of twenty to five or less.
The author has prepared a typed copy of the first item, Kent's
Abridgment of Emerigon, and offers it to the legal profession and to
scholars at large as a payment in small part of that debt which every
lawyer owes to his profession and his almae matrae. The second and
thirds items-the notes on negotiable paper and the inventory of the
volumes of pamphlets-will be published in the future.
Neither Kent nor the Abridgment will need any introduction for
legal scholars or lawyers well versed in maritime law. It is hoped,
however, that it will have some interest for students and general
practitioners who wish to broaden their knowledge of the law and legal
history. Some reasonable amount of knowledge of maritime law, in
general, and maritime insurance law in particular, will help any lawyer
who wishes to obtain a broader and more polished understanding of the
2. "If these, or any other of my works, may, in any sort (by the goodness of
Almighty God, who hath enabled me thereunto), tend to some discharge of that great
obligation of duty wherein I am bound to my profession.... I shall reap some fruits of
the tree of life; for my desire shall be accomplished, and I shall receive sufficient
recompense for all my labours for their true and final end shall be effected." JOHN
FARQUHAR FRASER, THE SIXTH PART OF THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, xviii-xix

(London, Butterworth 1826). Bacon wrote:
I hold every man a debtor to his profession: from the which, as men of course
do seek to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavour
themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and an ornamentt thereunto. This
is performed in some degree by the honest and liberal practice of a profession,
when men shall carry a respect not to descend into any course that is corrupt
and unworthy thereof, and preserve themselves free from the abuses wherewith
the same profession is noted to be infected: but much more is this performed, if
a man be able to visit and strengthen the roots and foundation of the science
itself; thereby not only gracing it in reputation and dignity, but also amplifying
it in profession and substance.
IV THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 10 (London, Baynes & Son 1824). "I thought good to

mention, in remembrance of my love and duty almae matri academiae ..

"

I SIR

EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OR, A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 109b (Charles Butler ed., 18th ed. London, J.& W.T.

Clarke 1823).
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old "seamless web." 3
It is only with the utmost diffidence that the author undertakes to
provide some background information for the benefit of law students and
general practitioners who may be only vaguely familiar with the subjects
at hand. The author, a full-time real estate/estates attorney, must of
necessity beg the reader's indulgence and attempt to navigate
successfully between the Scylla and Charybdis of fatigue and haste. It is
necessary, therefore, that the introduction be more cursory than
exhaustive.
So far as the author may be permitted to do so, he wishes to
dedicate this publication and its introduction to Professor John Maher.
Professor Maher, a man of high and exalted talents, has chosen to use his
talents in the pursuit of teaching excellence. An excellence he has fully
attained.
3. A very good, concise, but full introduction to maritime law was prepared by
Professor William Tetley, of McGill University. William Tetley, Maritime Law as a
Mixed Legal System, 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 317 (1999). There are a number of hornbooks on
admiralty insurance law that are generally helpful. An excellent introduction to maritime
insurance law as it existed during Kent's era can be found in 2 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE
LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 391 (1969).

A working history of insurance in general can be obtained from reading: PETER L.
BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS, THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1996); C.F.
TRENERRY, THE ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF INSURANCE INCLUDING THE CONTRACT OF

BOTTOMRY (1926); Insurance, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 656 (11 th ed. 1910);
Lloyd's of London, in 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 883 (1 1th ed. 1910); Insurance, in
2 WILLIAM HENRY HALL, THE NEW ROYAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA: OR COMPLETE MODERN

UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (London n.d.); E. Chambers, Insurance,
in 2 CYCLOPAEDIA; OR, AN UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES (London
1779); Insurance, in 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA; OR, A DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND

SCIENCES, COMPILED UPON A NEW PLAN 844 (Edinburgh 1771).
A good basic knowledge of the legal development of insurance can be obtained by
reading, inter alia, the following: WILLIAM A. HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 526-73 (7th ed., rev. 1956); WILLIAM A. HOLDSWORTH, 5 A HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 11-12, 59-154 (3d. ed. 1945); WILLIAM A. HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH LAW 302-07, 333-38, 624, 634-36 (2d ed. 1937); WILLIAM A.
HOLDSWORTH, 8 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 1-107, 175, 245-300 (2nd ed. 1937);
WILLIAM A. HOLDSWORTH, 11 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 442-49 (1938); WILLIAM
A. HOLDSWORTH, 12 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 330-31, 383-91, 495, 515-42
(1952); WILLIAM A. HOLDSWORTH, 13 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 188,326, 330-32,
365-66, 378, 414-18, 432, 479-91, 506-11, 530-42, 668-96 (1952); WILLIAM A.
HOLDSWORTH, 15 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 275, 298-330, 393-94, 458-59, 503.
Holdsworth should be supplemented with I SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY:
A.D. 1390-1404 AND A.D. 1527-1545, at lxxii-iii (R.G. Marsden ed., London, Selden
Society 1892); 2 SELECT PLEAS INTHE COURT OF ADMIRALTY: A.D. 1554-1602, at xi, xvi,
lxviii, lxxvi, lxxx (Reginald G. Marsden ed., London, Selden Society 1897); Policies of
Insurance,in I SELECT PLEAS INTHE COURT OF ADMIRALTY: A.D. 1554-1602, at 45-57,
120, 143, 149 (R.G. Marsden ed., London, Selden Society 1892); 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR
JOHN SPELMAN, 47-48, 281, 285-86 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978); 108 HALE AND FLEETWOOD
ON ADMIRALTY

JURISDICTION,

xxix, xxxiii-xxxiv,

Prichard & D.E.C. Yale eds., 1993).

xlvii-xlix,

lxxx-lxxxi, cxxv

(M.J.
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Emerigon's Life, Career, and Writings

Balthazar Marie Emerigon was born December 4, 1716 in the city
of Aix in Provence, France.4 He was the second son of Honore
Emerigon, a man esteemed as an honest lawyer, though not rich.5 Aix
was a prominent city in southeast France, known for its trade in olive oil,
almonds, and quarry stone, as well as its courts of appeal, tribunals of
first instance for commercial disputes, and centers of learning.6
Young Balthazar quickly attained a reputation as an industrious and
talented student of the classics.7 He studied law at the University of Aix
where study soon became the business of his life. 8 After completing the
prescribed course of studies and receiving his degree from the university,
he was received as an advocate in the Parlement 9 of Aix, likely in 1737
4. The biographical details on Emerigon are, unless otherwise noted, taken from
Samuel Meredith's introduction to Emerigon, and from a work by Pierre Larousse. See
SAMUEL MEREDITH,

A TREATISE ON INSURANCES BY BALTHAZARD MARIE EMERIGON,

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH (London, Butterworth's 1850); Pierre Larousse,
Emerigon, in 7 GRAND DICTIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL Du XIX SIECLE 432 (Paris,
Administration Du Grand Dictionnaire Universel 1870). Working in the 1840s, Meredith
complained of the great paucity of information regarding Emerigon's life and career. The
great journals of the day, and even the renowned Dictionnaire de la Provence et du
Comtat Venaissin by Claude Francis Achard, the last two volumes of which contained
lives of the celebrated characters of Provence, contained little about Emerigon. For a
brief biography of Achard and details of his writings, see Achard, in 1 THE GENERAL
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY: CONTAINING AN HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE
LIVES AND WRITINGS OF THE MOST EMINENT PERSONS IN EVERY NATION 103 (Alexander

Chalmers ed., rev. ed. London 1812) [hereinafter GENERAL BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY].
Details vary from source to source. For example, Meredith gives Emerigon's date of
birth as December 4, 1716, Larousse lists it as 1725. Fortunately, for posterity, several
relatives of Emerigon were still living in the early nineteenth century and were able to
furnish information as well as access to some of Emerigon's papers.
5. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at vi.
6. For additional details regarding Aix, Provence, and this area of France, see I
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 448 (1910-1911), 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 503-06
(1910-1911), and 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 775 (1910-1911), respectively. This
was the last truly scholarly edition and contains articles and entries of a generally high
order. A particularly helpful and largely chronological history of France can be found at
pages 801 through 906 of volume 10, and details and explanations of the workings of the
French legal system and various government institutions can be found at pages 906
through 929. See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 801-906, 906-29 (1910-1911). For
those desiring a more in-depth history of the area from ancient times to Emerigon's era,
see generally M. L'ABBE F. PAPON, HISTOIRE GENERALE DE PROVENCE, DEDIEE Aux
The work was especially
ETATS (Paris, Moutard 1777-1786) (in 4 volumes).
recommended for its "interesting research.., relative to the ancient history of Marseilles,
and its Grecian founders." 59 LONDON MONTHLY REV. 65-66 (1778).
7. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at vi.
8. Id.
9. "Parlement" in the French system, signified not only a place for discussion or
debate, but a court. For a detailed account, see J. H. SHENNAN, THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS
83-85 (rev. ed., Phoenix Mill, Sutton Publishing 1988) (1968), and DAVID M. WALKER,
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 919-20 (1980) (addressing Parlement's development as
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or 1738. After several years of close and attentive study at the bar,
Emerigon pled his first case before the Parlement in 1741.' ° Although
only age twenty-four, he displayed rare qualities and talents in law, I I and
his practice quickly increased to full capacity. 12 Emerigon, however,
much preferred the peaceful and silent labors of study to the
contentiousness of the bar. 13
It was not long until his father arranged for Emerigon to go to
Marseilles, an ancient maritime city of great trade and commerce.' 4 At
that time Marseilles was the capital of southern France, renowned for its
learning and letters, and was the wealthiest port from the Straits to the
Black Sea.15 Emerigon rapidly attracted clients and business,' 6 and he
pled successfully in all three of the major jurisdictions of Marseilles: the
seneschal's court, 17 the court of judges and consuls, and the admiralty.' 8
He soon rose to a position of pre-eminence among the members of the
bar,' 9 and in his treatise he cites many cases in which he acted as
counsel, as well as many which he decided as an arbitrator.2 °
Emerigon's reputation continued to grow, and in 1748 the Admiral
notified his lieutenant at Marseilles that he wanted Emerigon called to
the office of Counsellor of the Admiralty in Marseilles. 2' This was the
highest court at Marseilles,2 2 and stood first among all the Admiralties of
France for learning and talents.23 The Admiralty of France at the time
formed a large body: political, administrative, and judicial. 24 Its

a judicial court and its influence on the development of French law). Also, A. R. MYERS,
PARLIAMENTS AND ESTATES IN EUROPE TO 1789 (1975) provides a good general history of
European parliaments. The Estates of France are covered at pages 10 1-05.
10. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at vii.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at viii.
15. Id. Marseilles had a long and storied history as a major port and trade center.
The Greeks called her "Massalia," the Romans "Massilia." For details of her ancient
history and development, see CHARLES ANTHON, A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY 803-04 (New
York, Harper & Bros 1889) ("Massilia"); id. at 1046 ("Phocaea"); id.at 111 ("Pontus
Euxinus").
16. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at viii-ix.
17. A "seneschal" is generally considered a steward of the royal household or of a
Lord of a manor. As such, he is also often considered a dispenser of justice within a
designated jurisdiction. A detailed explanation as to the development of the office and
the likely etymology of the word can be found in COKE, supra note 2.
18. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at ix.
19. Id.; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
20. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at ix.
21. Id. at xv; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
22. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xv-xvi, xviii.
23. Id. at xviii; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
24. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xv.
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jurisdiction embraced all aspects of navigation, maritime commerce, and
the policing of the harbors and coasts. 25 This was a most happy
appointment for Emerigon because his duties included sitting as a judge
in the Lieutenant's absence, and allowed him to continue to consult as a
lawyer on matters not falling within his decisions.26 In this position he
was also permitted to act as an arbitrator,27 but perhaps most importantly,
it afforded him more time for his studies.28 Emerigon's treatise indicates
numerous decisions and awards in which he had taken part both before
and after having been raised to the bench.29
During the years 1757 to 1758, Emerigon was often called upon to
sit as the presiding judge because of the Lieutenant's increasingly
frequent absences. 30 At this point in time no tribunal in France was in
the habit of giving reasons for its decisions. 31 Therefore, when a party
appealed a decision to a superior tribunal, the tribunal's only course in
determining the grounds of a decision was to invite the judge of the
inferior court to explain it in writing. 32 Emerigon's submissions were so
outstanding that superior tribunals soon requested him to give his reasons
in writing in all future judgments of his Admiralty.3 3 In the course of
time, this collection of decisions, and the reasonings upon which they
were based, formed an excellent body of jurisprudence well adopted to
perfect the French system of maritime law. 34 Indeed, in his treatise,
Emerigon several times mentions arguments in favor of such a practice
and points to its use by the English Courts.35
In 1760 or 1761, after twelve or thirteen years on the bench,
Emerigon resigned.3 6 Although his reasons are not fully clear, it appears
the resignation was the result of weariness from enduring petty
jealousies.3 7 This resignation gave him more time to pursue his various
studies and writings.38
Emerigon had lived frugally, and early on had prescribed for
himself a plan for study which would give him an overwhelming
command of human knowledge in general, and legal knowledge in
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at xv.
Id. at xvi.
Id. at ix, xvi.
Id. at xvi, xviii; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xvi.
Id. at xxiv.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxiv.
Id.
Id. at xxiv-v.
Id.
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particular. 39 He arose at four o'clock in the morning to begin his studies,
keeping his door closed until nine o'clock in the morning. 40 He then
opened his doors to those who wished to consult him.41 After a simple
meal, he took a relaxing walk about the port and gazed at the ships and
the ocean,42 and upon his return resumed his studies until nine o'clock in
the evening. 43 After a routine day of studying, Emerigon would seek
some amusement, relaxation, and rest. 44 He maintained this schedule for
the balance of his life. 5
This rigid schedule allowed Emerigon to amass over his lifetime a
large collection of voluminous notebooks and large folio volumes
dedicated to many aspects of the law.4 6 He developed particular
penchants and passions for the study of the maritime law, 47 and collected
many ancient ordinances, documents, and writings of eminent lawyers in
almost all maritime countries.48 This led him to search out and translate
the remains of many old treatises and collections of customs and usages
of the sea.49 Such work required a ready familiarity with several
languages and a number of old dialects,50 as nine-tenths of his maritime
law sources were unknown to even the most industrious of other
readers. 51
Among Emerigon's projects was a study and translation of the
Consolato del Mare, the "Consolate of the Sea.",52 Consolato del Mare
was an influential collection of European maritime customs often
referred to by consuls or commercial judges in the various ports of the
Mediterranean Sea. 5 3 The oldest copy known to Emerigon was in the
He
Catalan tongue,54 but its original language was unknown.5 5

39. Id. at vii-ix.
40. Id. at xii.
41. Id. at xii.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. A partial listing of Emerigon's notebooks and folios can be found in Meredith's
introduction, in the text at page xi and in note (c) at pages xi and xii. See MEREDITH,
supra note 4, at xi-xii n(c).
47. Id. at xii.
48. Id. at xviii.
49. Id. at xii, xiii, xiv, xv.
50. Id. at ix, xiii, xiv, xv, xviii, xx.
51. Id. atx.
52. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xiv, xv; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
53. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xiii-xv; WALKER, supra note 9, at 275.
54. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xiv.
55. Id. at xiv. For a fuller description of the Consolato, see J.G. MARvIN, LEGAL
BIBLIOGRAPHY 221-23 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1847). Perhaps the best edition is that
of Jean Marie Pardessus, infra note 60, wherein he reprints the edition of 1494.
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completed a translation of 171 of the 294 chapters, 56 and although
60
59
58
Valin 57 urged him to complete it, Emerigon never did.

Pardessus

61
later completed the translation with access to Emerigon's manuscript.
Even more important to posterity than Emerigon's translation of
Consolato del Mare was his work on the Ordonnance of 168 1.62 Louis
XIV and his Minister of the Marine, Colbert,6 3 carried out a scheme of
codification designed to centralize control of the economy and the courts
and to enhance France's standing in the commercial world.6 4 Two of the
most important of these codifications were the Ordonnance of Merchants
of 1673, and the Ordonnance de la Marine of 1681, which was designed
to regulate shipping. 65 Together the two works were designed to form a
complete code of commerce by land and sea.66
The work of a number of jurists from both within and without
France, these two Ordonnances formed a remarkable piece of legislation
as it embraced the entire commercial law then prevailing in France.6 7
The Ordonnance de la Marine was organized and arranged into separate
titles and articles, 68 and Emerigon labored long and hard on a
commentary to accompany it. 69 He arranged his notes by following the
56.

MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xiv.

57. Rene Josue Valin was born in
eminence as the King's attorney in the
esteem as an author and commentator.
authored a commentary on the Customs

1695 in Rochelle where he eventually rose to
Court of Admiralty. He was also held in high
In addition to his work on the Ordonnance, he
of Rochelle, published in 1750, and the TRAITE

DES PRISES, OU PRINCIPLES DE LA JURISPRUDENCE FRANCAIS, CONCERNANT LES PRISES QUI
SE FONT SUR MER (LaRochelle 1763) (2 vols.). He died in 1765. See WALKER, supra note

9, at 1270; MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704-05.
58. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xv.
59. Id.
60. Jean Marie Pardessus was born in 1772 and died in 1853. He was a French jurist
and judge of considerable note but best known for his highly regarded works on
commercial and maritime law. Perhaps his best known works were: COURS DE DROIT
COMMERCIAL (Paris 1825), and COLLECTION DE LOIS MARITIMES ANTERIEURES AU XVIII,
SIECLE (Paris 1828) (an exceptionally valuable collection of ancient documents from the
earliest times to the eighteenth century, the items are provided in their original language
with an accompanying translation into French). See also WALKER, supra note 9, at 916;
MARVIN, supra note 55, at 553-54.
61. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xv.

62.

Id. at xviii-xxiv; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.

63.

For details on Colbert, see his biographical entries in 10 GENERAL BIOGRAPHICAL

DICTIONARY, supra note 4. For a relatively full account of his work on the Ordonnances,
see his biography in GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 248-82 (Sir John Macdonell &

Edward Manson eds., 1914). As to the Ordonnances, see WALKER, supra note 9, at 906
("Ordinances"); MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704-05.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxi-ii.
WALKER, supra note 9, at 241.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxi-ii.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xviii; MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xviii & n.(e).

69.

Id. at xviii; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
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Ordonnance title by title and article by article, 70 and to each title he
appended a thorough comment examining the law, and when necessary
recommending adjustments, but always including multiple citations of
sources and authorities. 71 Emerigon's work was in such a condition that
with a bit more from his learned hand he could have easily made it ready
for publication.72
Valinhad had already been studying and admiring the Ordonnance.73
A commentary upon the Ordonnance had been published by Marville in
1714, 74 and despite its manifest short comings it had gone through six
editions.7 5 Valin became so disgusted with Marville's work that he
determined to prepare a commentary of his own for publication.76 As
part of his plan, Valin contacted a number of distinguished lawyers
throughout France,77 among them Emerigon.7 8 Emerigon assiduously
made his materials readily available to Valin, who reluctantly but most
gratefully accepted his help. 79 Valin utilized a great deal of Emerigon's
80
material and thanked him profusely both privately and publicly.
Valin's work was published under the title Nouveau Commentaire
sur l'Ordonnance de la Marine du Mois d'Aout 1681,81 and a second
82
1766.83
edition was published in two quarto volumes in La Rochelle in
Valin's Nouveau Commentaire is to the Ordonnance what Sir Edward
Coke's Commentary is to Littleton's Tenures.84 Indeed, other nations

77.
78.
79.
80.

MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xviii n.(e).
Id. at xviii.
Id.; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xix.
Id.; MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704-05.
Id. at 704.
MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xix.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; LaRousse, supra note 4, at 432.

81.

NOUVEAU COMMENTAIRE SUR L'ORDONNANCE DE LA MARINE DU MOIS D'AOUT

70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.

1681 (LaRochelle, Jerome Legier 1760) (2 vols in 4); see also WALKER, supra note 9, at
270.
82. "QUARTO. n.[L quartus.] A book of the size of the fourth of a sheet; a size
made by twice folding a sheet, which then makes four leaves. QUARTO. a. Denoting
the size of a book, in which a sheet makes four leaves." NOAH WEBSTER, 2 AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse 1828) (no
pagination).
83. MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704.
84. Id. at 705. Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) was the common lawyer. He early
made his reputation in every student's real property puzzle, Shelley's Case, 1 Salked 296,
91 Eng. Rep. 262 (K.B. 1581). His stature was such that his reports and institutes were
known simply as "The Reports" and "The Institutes." His commentaries upon Littleton
were among his best known works and were a necessary part of every law student's
training for many years. Sir Thomas Littleton (1415-1481) is best known for his treatise
on tenures, which is generally known simply as Littleton. It was the most successful
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have adopted many of the Ordonnance's sections into their own laws,85
and thus it came to be incorporated with the Law Merchant of the
world. 86 In fact, Valin's commentary, in the early days of the American
Republic, was constantly quoted in the Admiralty Courts in America and
England and often served as the basis for decisions.8 7 Thus Emerigon's
hand reached far despite his lack of public praise.
Some years later, in 1780, to Emerigon's surprise and utter horror
he discovered that many of his notes on the Ordonnance had been
abstracted from his study.88
These were published without his
permission and without attribution under the title Nouveau Commentaire
sur l'Ordonnance de la Marine, du Mois d'Aout 1681. Par M * * *
Avocat en Parlement in two volumes, duodecimo. 89
In the meantime, severe problems-precursors to the Revolution
and the fall of the ancien regime-were arising in most of France.90 In
1771 a decree was issued mandating the dissolution of all Parlements, 91
but by 1774 the State had reversed itself and reinstituted the
Parlements. 92
Shortly after this reinstitution, circumstances soon
developed that beckoned Emerigon to resume labors which would lead to
a lasting profit for an important branch of maritime law.93 By 1777,
problems within the jurisdiction of the reinstituted Parlement of Aix led
to loud and urgent complaints of corruption and improper judicial
English law book ever written. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW

315-17 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984). Coke's addition of a massive commentary gave
Littleton the distinction of being the only common law text to be printed in such a
manner, although such was common with the more renowned Roman law texts. A
perusal of an English translation of Littleton remains helpful to the struggling law student
even today. See id. at 117-230; see also WALKER, supra note 9, at 240-41 ("Coke"); id.
at 772 ("Littleton"); MARVIN, supra note 55, at 204-13 ("Coke"); id. at 467-70
("Littleton"). A modem edition of Littleton's tenures was prepared and published in
1903 by Eugene Wambaugh. Reprints of it are readily obtainable. This edition by
Wambaugh is highly recommended for serious students of law, as it at least rivals, and
most likely surpasses, any currently available hornbook regarding the feudal principles of
land law.
85. MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 705.
88. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xviii n.(e).
89.

Id.; NOUVEAU COMMENTAIRE SUR L'ORDONNANCE DE LA MARINE. DU MOIS

D'AOUT 1681 (Jean Mossy ed., 1780). For additional details concerning Valin's use of
Emerigon's materials and assorted references and quotations, see Meredith's
Introduction, id. at xviii-xxi; Larousse, supra note 4, at 432; and MARVIN, supra note 55,
at 704-05 ("Valin"). The purloined Commentaire of 1780 even made its way into
Thomas Jefferson's personal library. See Item 2221, in 2 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 409 (E. Millicent Sowerby ed., 1983).
90. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxvi.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at xxvii.
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decisions 94 concerning marine insurance. 95 It was feared some of these
decisions could lead to the ruin of merchants and commerce.9 6 These
complaints and concerns soon attracted the attention of the central
government, which sent one of its ministers to consult with the Chamber
of Commerce of Marseilles to ascertain the truth of the matter and to
fashion a suitable remedy.97
In 1778 Emerigon addressed a plan on the subject of insurance to
the Parlement at Aix. 98 Soon, a committee of certain advocates and
merchants of Marseilles was convened, and Emerigon was selected to
preside over it.99 Committee meetings were held at Emerigon's home,
where he took a most active part in its conferences. 00 The results of
these conferences were then communicated to the public prosecutor of
the Parlement who soon returned his own observations on the points
proposed to the Committee.' 0 ' These observations first suggested to
Emerigon the idea of gathering together various materials and composing
two treatises for public use, one on maritime insurance and one on
maritime loans. 10 2 On August 17, 1779, a Declaration was issued by the
Committee, which was intended as a corrective and supplement to the
Ordonnance de la Marine as it related to insurance. This declaration
gave added impetus10 3 to Emerigon's plans to complete his treatise on
maritime insurance.
Emerigon devoted the better part of 1780 and 1781 to developing
this treatise, 10 4 during which time no one near him was aware of his great
project. 10 5 Upon completion, he asked the opinion of other renowned
lawyers, 10 6 and the manuscript passed from hand to hand through
Marseilles and Aix. 10 7 After the process of review and criticism had
been completed, Emerigon took the manuscript to Jean Mossy, the
King's printer at Marseilles. 10 8 Upon examining the work, Mossy
maintained that he was frightened of the amount of work that would be
94. In France, these Parlements often take on the forms of courts and render judicial
decisions. See supra note 9.
95. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxvii.
96. Id.
97. Id. at xxvii-viii.
98. Id. at xxvii.
99. Id. at xxvii-viii.
100. Id. at xxvii.
101. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxvii-viii.
102. Id. at xxviii.
103. Id.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.

106.
107.
108.

Id.
MEREDITH,

Id.

supra note 4, at xxviii.
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required to set to print a manuscript that would surely comprise two
quartos well-marked with "scientific" citations and references as well as
assorted Latin and Italian quotations. 0 9 Emerigon then begged Mossy to
accept the manuscripts for publication as a free gift, 10 but Mossy refused
unless Emerigon could obtain the approval of several mutual friends who
were eminent advocates.111 These comrades examined the work and then
declared themselves opposed to any publication. 1 2 Emerigon became
alarmed at this and requested his brother, Laurent, to act as an
intermediary and find out the grounds of opposition.1 13 The answer was
blunt-if the work were to be published, there would be nothing more
for the advocates to do! 114 Mossy, upon ascertaining that this was indeed
the true grounds of their opposition, accepted Emerigon's gift.115 The
book issued from the press in early 1783 as Traite Des Assurances Et
Des Contrats A La Grosse, in English a "Treatise on Insurance," in two
16
volumes, the first containing 686 pages and the second 681 pages.'
Shortly thereafter, on April 2, 1784, Emerigon, aged 67, departed this
earthly life." 7
Emerigon's other treatise, his Essay on Maritime Loans, was soon
recognized to be of value to English-speaking lawyers." 8 It was
translated by the well-known law book publisher, John E. Hall of
Baltimore.119 Hall soon published the essay, along with some extra
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MEREDITH,

supra note 4, at xxviii.

Id.

115. Id.
116.
117.
118.

text.

See id.
Id. at xxix.
See the "Advertisement" bound with Hall's publication of a translation of the

EMERIGON, ESSAY ON MARITIME LOANS

(John Hall trans., 1811).

119. John Elihu Hall (Dec. 27, 1783-June 12, 1829) was born into a distinguished
family and married into the prestigious Chew family of Philadelphia. In 1804 he began
to study law under Joseph Hopkinson, a leading member of the Philadelphia bar. Hall
was admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1805, but quickly removed to Baltimore. In
1808, he there began the publication of the American Law Journal. From 1808 through
1817, six volumes were issued, and they likely comprised the first legal periodical in the
United States. The publication achieved rapid success, as it aimed primarily at merchants
and attorneys, and made comparisons of the laws of the various states and some foreign
nations affecting mercantile and commercial transactions. Hall published therein many
decisions and statutes that were difficult to obtain from any other source. The American
Law Journalalso contained translations of various portions of civil law codes and foreign
language treatises dealing with maritime and commercial law. Hall hoped the publication
would lead to more uniformity in state laws and the eventual creation of a more
systematic national jurisprudence. It was cited and quoted by the leading legal writers of
the day and was cited in arguments in both the state supreme courts and United States
Supreme Court.
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materials, under the title An Essay on Maritime Loans, from the French
of M. Balthazard Emerigon; to which is added an appendix containing
the Title De Exerciteria Actione, De Lege Rhodia De Jactu, and De
Nautico Foenore, Translatedfrom the Digests and Code of Justinian.
And the Title Des Contrats A La Grosse Aventure Ou A Retour De
Voyage, From the Marine Ordinance of Louis X!V. 120

Emerigon's

Treatise on Insurance was similarly recognized to be of value by the
bench, bar, and treatise writers. Among the better known treatise writers
who paid tribute to Emerigon were Sir James Allan Park12 1 and Samuel
Unfortunately, Hall was forced to suspend publication of the American Law Journal
in 1817 for lack of financing. He attempted to revive the publication in 1821 under the
new name of the Journalof Jurisprudence,but it failed after only one issue. In addition
to his translation of Emerigon's Essay on Maritime Loans, Hall published The Practice
and Jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty (1809); Tracts on Constitutional Law,
containing Mr. Livingston's answer to Mr. Jefferson (1813) (a discussion concerning
Jefferson's and Livingston's arguments and actions in the New Orleans batture case);
Office andAuthority of a Justice of the Peace in the State of Maryland, to which is added
a Variety of Precedents in Conveyancing (1815); Tracts on the ConstitutionalLaw of the
United States Selected From the Law Journal(1817); and a DigestedIndex to the Term
Reports, containing all the Points of Law arguedand determined in the King's Bench and
Common Pleas,from 1785 to 1818; continued to 1819 (J. B. Moore & Hall eds., Phila.
1819) (2 vols.). Hall finished his career as a man of letters, as was his brother James,
both perhaps inspired by their mother, Sarah Ewing Hall. See Hall's brief biographies in
4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 138-39 (1958); 9 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 863-64 (1999).
120. JOHN E. HALL, ESQ. (Philip H. Nicklin & Co., Baltimore 1811).
121. See SIR JAMES ALLAN PARK, A SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCES;
WITH THREE CHAPTERS ON BOTTOMRY; ON INSURANCES ON LIVES; AND ON INSURANCES
AGAINST FIRE (8th ed., rev. by Francis Hildyard 1987) (1842) (2 vols.) (the Preface to the

first edition, originally written in 1786 and published in 1787 is reproduced in the 8th
edition).
England had relatively few reported cases on maritime insurance until the second
half of the eighteenth century when Lord Mansfield took the bench and began to
systematically attempt to upgrade the commercial and maritime law of England.
Mansfield rapidly turned out a large number of cases on marine insurance. Mansfield is,
of course, William Murray (Mar. 2, 1705-Mar. 20, 1793), Lord Mansfield. He was an
eminent Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench and is still considered to be a giant in
the field of commercial and maritime law. He is especially credited with having laid
down the essential principles of the modem law of marine insurance. For a brief
biography, see BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 84, at 37884. It was the author's original intention to include a section in this Article tracing and
comparing Mansfield's use of Emerigon with that of Kent. However, upon a review of
available materials, it does not appear that Mansfield made any use of Emerigon's
Treatise although it had been published in French five years before Mansfield retired
from the bench in 1788. It is recommended that the interested student see Christopher P.
Rodgers, ContinentalLiterature and the Development of the Common Law by the King's
Bench: c. 1750-1800, in VITO PIERGIOVANNI, THE COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMERCIAL LAW, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 161-94 (1987). More details of Mansfield's life and a comparison of his
use of sources and principles concerning the law regarding negotiable paper will be
provided in the second article in this series.
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Marshall. 12 2 Within a few years after Mossy had published Emerigon's
Treatise on Insurances, Park, in 1786, writing the Preface to the first
edition of his work on Insurances, made a number of references to, and
quotations from, Emerigon, whom he called "a very celebrated French
Writer."' 123 Park went on to say:

M. Emerigon, in his work, confined himself to the consideration of
marine insurance, and to the contract of bottomry only. This being
the case, he has gone into those subjects much more at length than
any former French writer; and has, with infinite labor, unwearied
study and reflection, collected the decisions and authorities
applicable to the purpose of his work. This learned foreigner I
understand, holds a distinguished rank among the advocates of his
own country: and his treatise upon insurances will by no means
James Allan (a.k.a. Alan) Park (Apr. 6, 1763-Dec. 8, 1838) was a young barrister
with no real practice but plenty of time on his hands. Because advertising and solicitation
of clients were strictly forbidden, some young barristers occasionally made a public debut
by the publication of some work on an important legal subject. Park was fortunately a
close acquaintance of Mansfield's as well as Sir Francis Buller's. With their help, Park
produced a respectable treatise on insurance which went through a number of editions.
Despite Mansfield's apparent help, Park often inserted decisions at length with little
effort to set forth guiding principles from the cases-this is perhaps attributable to his
relative youth and inexperience. His work was nevertheless praised by, among others,
both Chanceller Kent and Joseph Story. See BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON
LAW, supra note 84, at 401; 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 430; 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF
JOSEPH STORY 310-11 (Boston, Little, Brown 1851) (Letter of Joseph Story to James
Wilkinson, Esq., of London, Jan. 22, 1839); MARVIN, supra note 55, at 555; 3 JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 293-95 (New York, 0 Halsted 1828); William
A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the JudiciaryAct of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance,97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1565 (1983).
122.

SAMUEL MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, IN FOUR BOOKS

(Boston, Daniel Johnson 1805). During 1802, as part of his ambitious reading program,
Kent read the first London edition of Marshall, published in two volumes earlier that
same year.
Marshall's work, like that of Park, suffered from a lack of doctrine or discussion
despite Marshall's profession to provide an examination and collection of principles, as
opposed to Park's collection of cases. Marshall's analysis of the cases was acute and
vigorous, but he seldom went beyond what the English decisions themselves furnished.
He did, however, cite foreign sources from France and Italy with liberality and seemed to
be familiar with them. Justice Story lamented that the great defect in Marshall's work, as
in all similar works to that time, was the lack of a practical treatise on averages and the
adjustment of losses. A later American edition by J. W. Condy, published in Philadelphia
in two volumes in 1810, with considerable annotation, was greatly preferred to all others.
MARVIN, supra note 55, at 500; 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 29495 (New York, 0. Halsted 1828); see also A Treatise on the Law of Insuranceby Willard
Phillips, in 20 NORTH AM. REV. 47, 72 (Boston 1823) (Joseph Story's anonymously
published review of a treatise on the law of insurance by Willard Phillips). This was later
republished in JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, LITERARY, CRITICAL,
JURIDICAL, AND POLITICAL, OF JOSEPH STORY, LL.D., Now FIRST COLLECTED 294

(Boston, James Munroe & Co. 1835).
123. PARK, supra note 121, at xlviii.
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24
diminish his fame. 1

Samuel Marshall, publishing his Treatise on Insurance just a few
years later, borrowed heavily from Emerigon's Preface125 to lay the
ground work for his own. 12 6 Kent points this out in the opening notes to
his abridgment. 127 Marshall opined that Emerigon wrote with both great
learning and great practical knowledge, 28 and goes on to say that
Emerigon's "book is, of all the 1foreign
publications on this subject, the
29
most useful to English lawyers."'
Likewise, Justice Story, 130 undoubtedly one of the foremost jurists
of his or any other day, remarked "Who has equalled Emerigon as a
theoretical and practical writer on the Law of Insurance? He has
exhausted every topic, so far as materials were within his reach; and
upon all new questions, his work, for illustration and authorities and
usages is still unanswered."'13' He further credited Emerigon as being
"the author of the most finished treatise upon insurance which has yet
132
appeared."'
In late 1817, Justice Story called for an English translation of

124. Id. at lxxxi-lxxxii.
125. Emerigon's Preface translated is found at MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxxi-xli.
126. This becomes readily apparent by comparing Emerigon's Preface with
Marshall's work. Compare id., with MARSHALL, supra note 122.
127. See Appendix: James Kent's Notes on Emerigon, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 1219
(2004).
128. MARSHALL, supra note 122, at 22.
129. Id.
130. Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1779-Sept. 10, 1845) was the son of a prominent
physician in Marblehead, Massachusetts. His father was a leading patriot who had
participated in the Boston Tea Party, Lexington, Concord, and other battles of the
Revolution. Story graduated from Harvard in 1798, second in his class, and took up the
study of law under Samuel Sewell, a congressman and later chief justice of
Massachusetts, and also under Samuel Putnam, a well-known lawyer. In 1801, Story was
admitted to the bar. Story's early political career as a Congressman largely resulted from
powerful Republican connections. By 1811 he had been nominated and appointed to the
United States Supreme Court by James Madison. Once upon the court he essentially
abandoned Republicanism and became a nationalist, finding a variety of implied powers
throughout the Constitution. Story also served as a professor at Harvard Law School and
was perhaps the nation's most prolific legal scholar, authoring many articles and treatises
on a large variety of legal subjects. He soon established himself as a genuine expert in
commercial law and greatly aided the process of Americanizing the English law. Many
attorneys relied on his various treatises and commentaries to build their law libraries and
to gain an understanding of the law. His influence was both great and pervasive. 9
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 102-08 (1958); 20 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 889-93 (1999).
131. Justice Joseph Story, writing anonymously at the time. A Treatise on the Law of
Insuranceby Willard Phillips,supra note 122, at 47, 64.
132. Review of the Laws of the Sea with Reference to Maritime Commerce During
Peace and War-from the German of FrederickJ.Jacobsen,Advocate, Altona, 1815, in
STORY, supra note 122, at 245, 264.
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Emerigon, and wrote:
Probably the most perfect theoretical work on insurance is that of the
learned Emerigon, which (strange to tell) has never been
translated.... We trust that the time is not far distant when
Pothier 133 and Emerigon and Valin will be accessible in our native
tongue to every lawyer, and will be as familiarly34known to them as
they now are to the jurists of Continental Europe.
Story was evidently not aware that John E. Hall, the translator and
publisher of Emerigon's Essay on Maritime Loans, had, as early as 1809,
a manuscript translation of Emerigon's Treatise on Insurance ready for
the press. 135 It apparently never made it. Story himself planned to
undertake the translation of the Treatise and the preparation of a brief life

133. Robert Joseph Pothier (Jan. 9, 1699-May 2, 1772) was born into a family of
prominent lawyers in Orleans. By age twenty-one he had become a counselor to the
presidial of Orleans. He sat on the bench in Orleans for nearly fifty years and generally
divided his time among the bench, a professorship at Orleans, and an exhausting schedule
of study and writing. Pothier had a particular taste for the study of Roman law with
especial attention to its arrangement and order. In 1748, in three large folio volumes, he
published Pandectae Justinianae in novum ordinem digestae, which contained a new
methodical order while at the same time preserving the former arrangements of the
various titles. This work quickly attracted the attention of Chancellor D'Aguesseau, who
appointed Pothier, without any solicitation, as professor of French law in Orleans in
1749. From 1761 onward, he published a large number of treatises on various branches
of the law. He also left a large number of unpublished manuscripts. WALKER, supra note
9, at 973.
Justice Story, in his well-known address to the Suffolk Bar, asked: "Where shall we
find the law of contracts so extensively, so philosophically, and so persuasively
expounded, as in the pure, moral and classified treatises of Pothier?" Joseph Story, An
Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar at their Anniversary
(September 1821), 1 AM. JURIST & L. MAG 1,29 (1829).
Sir William Jones, the famed writer of A Treatise on Bailments, first presented
Pothier to his English brethren, comparing Pothier, in the process, to Littleton for
luminous writing and for great authority. Pothier possessed a great gift for synthesizing
order from mass confusion. His simple, clear, and well-arranged treatises permitted even
the hurried reader to gain an understanding of the points and principles involved in any
particular question. Kent regarded Pothier as absolutely indispensable to anyone seeking
a working knowledge of the French code. MARVIN, supra note 55, at 578.
134. Review, A Course of Legal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students of Law
in the United States, 6 N. AM. L. REv. 45, 55 (1817) (Story, again writing anonymously).
135. JOHN E. HALL, AN ESSAY ON MARITIME LOANS, FROM THE FRENCH OF M.
BALTHAZARD MARIE EMERIGON (Bait., Philip H. Nicklin & Co. 1811). In the opening
"Advertisement By the Translator," it states:
Throughout the whole work, the translator has endeavoured to explain his
originals with perspicuity and accuracy. If he be found to have done this, he
has fulfilled his duty to the reader. If his labours be rewarded with this
approbation, it will be an encouragement to him to offer to the publick a
translation of the Treatise on Insurance by Emerigon and the Consolato del
Mare: which works are nearly ready for the press. Baltimore, October 1809.
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137
of Emerigon.136 This, likewise, apparently never came to fruition.
Finally, in 1850, Samuel Meredith, 138 an English lawyer, published
an English translation of Emerigon's Treatise, excepting the last three
chapters: chapter 18, on "Payment of the sums insured"; chapter 19, on
"Prescription"; and chapter 20, on "Judgements." 139 Although important,
Meredith deemed them to vary significantly
with local rules and customs
140
and therefore not strictly necessary.

It.

On Chancellor Kent

Although well-known to all academics and to most of the previous
generations of law students and practitioners, a few words on Kent may

I4 1
Kent lived from 1763 to 1847.142
prove helpful to today's students.

136. Meredith, in the Preface to his translation, relates: "M. Desolliers, an elderly and
honourable advocate at Marseilles, informs M. Cresp that in the year 1823 he received a
letter from Mr. Justice Story, of Salem, in the United States, urging him to collect and
send him materials for a notice of the life of Emerigon, which the writer desired to place
at the head of a translation he was then about to undertake and publish of Emerigon's
Treatise on Insurances. M. Desolliers now regrets that his own occupations at the time
prevented him from satisfying in any sufficient degree the object and wish of his
correspondent." MEREDITH, supra note 4, at vi.
137. The author has not been able to locate any other references to any such work or
to its publication.
138. The author found little readily available material regarding Samuel Meredith.
Both the British Museum Catalog and S. Austin Allibone's A Critical Dictionary of
English Literature and British and American Authors, list only Meredith's name and the
translation, the full title of which is A Treatise on Insurances. 2 S.AUSTIN ALLIBONE, A
CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE AND BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS
1267 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1870); A TREATISE ON INSURANCES BY BALTHAZARD
MARIE EMERIGON (Samuel Meredith trans., London, Henry Butterworth 1850). A word
of caution: there are instances where Meredith fails to include valuable cross-references
and even occasionally deletes primary references.
139. MEREDITH, supra note 4, at xxix.
140. Id.
141. There are numerous short biographies of James Kent. See, for example, his
entries in: 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 735; BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 84, at 294; 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 344 (1958); 12 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 596 (1999); GREAT
AMERICAN LAWYERS 489 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907); 3 THE NATIONAL
CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 55 (N.Y., James T. White & Co. 1893).
There are numerous law review articles on a number of aspects of Kent's life,
career, and decisions. An interesting one is Macgrane Coxe, ChancellorKent at Yale, 17
YALE L.J. 331 (1908) (later published separately). There are only two major works on
Kent. See WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, L.L.D., LATE
CHANCELLOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898); JOHN T.
HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY INCONSERVATISM 1763-1847 (N.Y., 1939). Kent's
letters, memos, book marginalia, and the like are scattered in a number of repositories
and in private hands. It is most unfortunate that no one, so far as the author is aware, has
undertaken a project to produce an edited and annotated version of all of Kent's letters
and writings.
142. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 84, at 294.
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His life spanned many of the critical episodes and events in the history of
the United States and its legal system, and his influence on both was
considerable.
Kent attended Yale College from 1777 through 1781.143 During a
break in his college routine, Kent came upon a volume of Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of
England, and after reading it, he
144
determined to become a lawyer.
Shortly after graduation, Kent apprenticed and read law with Egbert
Benson, 145 then a prominent and well-connected lawyer and later a
justice of the New York Supreme Court. 146 Among Benson's close
connections were John Jay, 147 Alexander Hamilton, 148 Aaron Burr, 149 and
143.
144.

supra note 141, at 15-30; Coxe, supra note 141, at 331.
For Kent's early and college education, see KENT, supra note 141, at 7-14;
HORTON, supra note 141, at 12-30. The reference to Kent's reading of and inspiration
from Blackstone's Commentariesappears in Horton. See id. at 21-23.
145. Egbert Benson (June 21, 1746-Aug. 24, 1833) had been a revolutionary war
leader, a member of a number of early congresses, and a staunch supporter of Alexander
Hamilton's Federalist programs. He also served as Attorney General of New York. In
1794 he was appointed a justice of the Supreme Court of New York, a position which he
used to try to bring about reform in the court's practices. In 1801 Benson was one of
President John Adams's "midnight appointments," when he was appointed Chief Judge
of the second United States Circuit. It is said Benson's reputation for legal learning was
second only to that of Alexander Hamilton. See 1 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
204 (1958); 2 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 602 (1999); KENT, supra note 141, at 19.
146. HORTON, supra note 141, at 33-36, 39.
147. John Jay's (Dec. 12, 1745-May 17, 1829) family was among the most influential
in the colony of New York. After his admission to the bar in 1768, Jay became
associated for a time with Robert R. Livingston and his law practice prospered, and in
1774 he married into the powerful and influential Livingston family. The Revolution put
an end to Jay's law practice and launched his career of public service. He helped draft
the revolutionary constitution of New York of 1777 and served from then until 1779 as
chief justice of New York. Jay next occupied various diplomatic offices and joined
Hamilton and Madison in authoring the Federalist Papers. Upon ratification of the
Constitution, George Washington nominated him as the first Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. In 1795 Jay was elected Governor of New York, where he served
two terms. As Governor he was in a position to and did aid his friend Kent. See 5
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 5-10 (1958); 11 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
891-94 (1999).
148. Alexander Hamilton (Jan. 11, 1757-July 12, 1804) was very early on recognized
as a brilliant student and speaker, when at a young age he attracted the attention of
leaders of the patriot movement. He soon attracted the attention of George Washington
and became almost indispensable to him. In 1782 he trained for the practice of law and
was admitted to the New York bar. He quickly rose to the top rank of New York
lawyers. His connections with the FederalistPapers and the United States Treasury are
well-known. In January of 1795 he returned to private law practice and became one of a
handful of attorneys who were transforming the commercial law and especially the laws
relating to Marine insurance. Kent and Hamilton found a fast friendship. Unfortunately,
Kent was involved in a conversation that ultimately led to Hamilton's fatal duel with
Aaron Burr. See 3 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 56 (N.Y. 1889); 1
NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 9 (N.Y., James T. White & Co. 1893);
4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 171 (1958); 9 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
HORTON,
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George Clinton.1 50 These Federalists all became well acquainted with
Kent, and some would play a prominent role in his advancement.
Kent studied and tried to learn the law in the usual manner of the
era. He read Blackstone and various older works on the English
common law. Unlike at least some other law students of the era, he does
not appear to have been studying the French language, or "Law
French."15'
Upon his admission to the bar at age 21 in 1785, Kent entered a law
15 2
partnership with Gilbert Livingston in Poughkeepsie, New York.
Either Kent was very efficient as a practitioner, or his legal work was
limited, because apparently he had plenty of time on his hands. 53 He
soon developed a time-consuming program of systematic reading,
taking
154
in classical and modem literature as well as works on the law.
Kent's connections with the leading Federalists would soon bear
fruit. John Jay was elected governor of New York in 1795 and resigned
from the Chief Justiceship of the United States Supreme Court. 55 Jay
905 (1999). According to Kent, Hamilton was a great favorite with New York merchants
and was "employed in every important and especially in every commercial case." KENT,
supra note 141, at 317.
149. Aaron Burr (Feb. 6, 1756-Sept. 14, 1836) made a brilliant record at the College
of New Jersey (now called Princeton), graduating in 1772. He undertook legal studies,
which were interrupted by the Revolution. At one point he was attached to George
Washington's military staff, however, ill health forced his resignation from the Army.
Soon thereafter, Burr was admitted to the bar and quickly became a successful lawyer.
He served in a number of public positions and took an active role in several pivotal
events in the early history of the Republic. Unfortunately, he is best known for his fatal
duel with Alexander Hamilton and for his trial for treason. See 2 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 314 (1958); 4 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 34 (1999).
150. George Clinton (July 26, 1739-Apr. 20, 1812) was governor of New York
between 1777-1795 and 1801-1804, and served as vice-president of the United States
from 1804-1812. After distinguishing himself in the French and Indian War, Clinton
studied law under Chief Justice William Smith, in the city of New York. In due time,
Clinton was admitted to the bar and had considerable success in general practice. He
soon became active in the patriot movement. Upon adoption of the first New York State
Constitution in 1777, he was elected the first governor. He eventually became viewed as
an obstructionist by the Federalists who worked hard to keep him from office. See 3
NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 41 (N.Y., James T. White & Co.
1893).
151. See AutobiographicalSketch of Chancellor Kent, I S. L. REV. 383 (Nashville
1872). This small article was evidently the first to publish a private letter from James
Kent to Thomas Washington, dated October 6, 1828, but it has since been republished a
number of times. Therein Kent mentions his method of study under Benson. See id. at
383-84.
152. HORTON, supra note 141, at 42-43.
153. See Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor Kent, supra note 151, at 384-85;
KENT, supra note 141, at 24-27.
154. See Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor Kent, supra note 151, at 384-85;
KENT, supra note 141, at 27 (noting Kent did not study French until 1789).
155. HORTON, supra note 141, at 67-68.
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quickly began to favor Kent with appointments to various offices in New
York City, which were designed to help Kent financially and to advance
his legal career. 156 However, it appears that the work associated with
these offices significantly decreased 157the amount of time Kent had
available for his reading and studying.
In 1798, Governor Jay appointed Kent to a vacancy on the New
York Supreme Court. 5 8 Kent then left New York City, where he had
been residing for several years, for Albany, where he renewed his
program of reading and study with vigor. 159
The justices at the time of Kent's accession to the New York
Supreme Court and those who shared office with him thereafter until
1814, when he was appointed Chancellor, have been described as not
"deficient in learning or ability."' 160 Upon Kent's accession, however,
their decisions were not formally written or reported.' 6 1 Kent set out to
remedy the situation by studying each case in detail and by making
studied references to authority. 162 These were then reduced to writing
and presented to the other judges. According to Kent, between January
1799 and 1804, he began implementing this new plan to routinely present
detailed written analyses and opinions. 163 As he stated:
156. Id. at 86, 110-11.
157. See Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor Kent, supra note 151, at 386-87;
KENT, supra note 141, at 98-99.
158. KENT, supra note 141, at 108; HORTON, supra note 141, at 112. Kent's
commission bears the date June 16, 1798. Id.
159. See KENT, supra note 141, at 108-10; AutobiographicalSketch of Chancellor
Kent, supra note 151, at 387.
160.

JOHN DUER, A DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF

JAMES KENT, LATE CHANCELLOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 33 (N.Y., D. Appleton Co.
1848). The full statement by Duer is: "The judges, although not distinguished by any
marked superiority, were by no means deficient in learning or ability; but it was in a very
imperfect and unsatisfactory manner that their duties were discharged." Id.
The names used in connection with the courts of New York's judicial system during
Kent's time can be somewhat confusing to any student not familiar with them. When
Kent was first appointed to the New York Supreme Court it had both original trial
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. ELLEN M. GIBSON, NEW YORK LEGAL RESEARCH
GUIDE 1-108 (2d ed. 1998). Kent and the other justices rode trial circuits in addition to
their duties related to hearing and deciding appeals from the trial circuits. KENT, supra
note 141, at 116-17.
The New York Supreme Court, however, was not the court of last resort. The Court
of Errors was the highest appellate court in New York. This court was composed of "the
president of the Senate, the senators, the chancellor, and the judges of the existing
Supreme Court." GIBSON, supra, at 1-108. The Court of Errors continued as the court of
last resort until 1846. Id. at 1-109. For the interested student, Gibson, in her chapter Six,
gives a history of New York's courts and an explanation of its present judicial system.
Id. at 1-105.
161. KENT, supra note 141, at 117.
162. Id.; An AutobiographicalSketch of ChancellorKent, supra note 151, at 387-88.
163. KENT, supra note 141, at 116-17; An Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor
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I read in that time Vattel and Emerigon, and completely abridged the
latter, and made copious digests of all the English law reports and
treatises as they came out. I made much use of the Corpus Juris, and
as the judges (Livingston excepted) knew nothing of French or civil
law, I had an immense advantage over them. I could generally put
my brethren to rout and carry my point by my mysterious wand of
French and civil law. The judges were Republicans and very kindly
disposed to everything that was French, and this enabled me, without
exciting any alarm or jealousy, to make free use of such authorities
and thereby enrich our commercial law.'16

Kent claims to have gradually achieved a commanding influence over his
Supreme Court brethren.1 65 To some extent this was accomplished by
laboring his fellow justices unmercifully in order to subdue their
opposition to his positions with "exhaustive research and overwhelming
authority., 166 If John Duer, in his eulogistic address after Kent's death,
can be taken at face value, the other judges, to maintain their 1own
67
character and dignity, were forced to follow Kent's modus operandi.
Kent, supra note 151, at 387-88.
164. See KENT, supra note 141, at 117; An Autobiographical Sketch of Chancellor
Kent, supra note 151, at 387-88. There is a discrepancy between these two published
versions of the letter to Washington. The original publication in The Southern Law
Review at page 387 says "Vattel and Emerigon," whereas the version published in Kent's
Memoirs at page 117 says "Valin and Emerigon."
"Vattel" refers to Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767), a Swiss Jurist who entered the
Saxon diplomatic service. His major work is Le Droit des Gens ou Principesde la Loi
Naturelle (1758), which helped to modernize international law. It became an especial
favorite in England and America. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 1272. Marvin gives a
somewhat reserved review of Vattel's work. MARVIN, supra note 55, at 704.
"Republican," of course, here refers to those favoring the French Revolution and/or wide
spread democracy as opposed to the Federalists' more conservative views on government
and property rights as well as the qualifications necessary to obtain the right to vote.
165. An AutobiographicalSketch of ChancellorKent, supra note 151, at 388.
166. Id.
167. See KENT, supra note 141, at 387; JOHN DUER, A DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE,
CHARACTER AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES KENT, LATE CHANCELLOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 33-35 (N.Y., D. Appleton Co. 1848).

John Duer (Oct. 7, 1782-Aug. 8, 1858) studied law with Alexander Hamilton. His
marriage to Anne Beford Bunner in 1804 linked him to the Hamilton family. He was
admitted to practice in 1805 and soon used his standing as a lawyer to make and multiply
important business connections. Duer was a leading Federalist. He played a leading role
in both the New York State Constitutional Convention of 1821 and the revision of New
York's statutory code which had begun in 1824. In 1828 he was appointed U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York but was quickly removed by Andrew Jackson upon
his election later that year. By 1834 he had established himself as one of the leading
Whigs in New York. Through Whig support he eventually rose to be chief judge of the
Superior Court of the New York, the state's chief commercial court. See 7 AMERICAN
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 13-14 (1999).
Of particular interest to our subject is this statement regarding Duer, Kent, and
marine insurance:
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After sixteen years on the New York Supreme Court, a decade of
them as Chief Justice, Kent was appointed Chancellor of New York
State. 168 He describes his appointment and its circumstances thus:
In 1814 I was appointed Chancellor. The office I took with
considerable reluctance. It had no charms. The person who left it
was stupid; and it is a curious fact that, for the nine years I was in that
office, there was not a single decision, opinion or dictum of either of
my predecessors, Livingston
and Lansing, from 1777 to 1814, cited
169
to me, or even suggested.

Before becoming a judge of the superior court, Duer wrote extensively on
marine insurance, which was essential, he believed, to the growth of trade-by
which humankind might be "bound together." His A Lecture on the Law of
Representations in Marine Insurance(1844) and the two volume A Treatiseon
the Law and Practice of Marine Insurance (1845-1846) made clear his
continuing respect for the vision and achievements of Roman and French
codifiers. Greatly admiring the jurisprudence of James Kent, Duer stated that
"in no country has the study of commercial law as a science, been more
thoroughly and successfully pursued than in our own." (A Treatise, vol. 1, p.
53). Yet he stressed that the insurance law of various European countries,
unlike that of the United States, favored commerce by avoiding litigation.
7 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 14 (1999).

168. AutobiographicalSketch of ChancellorKent, supra note 151, at 388.
169. Id.; KENT, supra note 141, at 157-58. The "Lansing" referred to is John Lansing,
Jr. See his biography infra note 329. The reader can draw his own conclusions as to
whether Lansing was "stupid."
The "Livingston" referred to is Robert R. Livingston, also commonly called
"Chancellor Livingston." He should not be confused with Brockhurst Livingston, a
justice of the United States Supreme Court. A brief biographical note concerning him
appears infra at note 236. Chancellor Livingston is the subject of a full-scale biography
by George Dangerfield.
See GEORGE DANGERFIELD, CHANCELLOR ROBERT R.
LIVINGSTON OF NEW YORK: 1746-1813 (1960). There are extensive biographical entries
regarding him. See 6 THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 320 (1933); 13
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 774 (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Curnes eds., 1999); 1
GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 433 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907).

A perusal of the above-mentioned biographical materials shows that Livingston
came from a distinguished line of able and influential lawyers and judges. It also shows
that he was highly regarded by most of his contemporaries as a lawyer, patriot, statesman,
and diplomat. It was he who administered the first Presidential oath of office to George
Washington. See 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 435 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907).

Livingston served as Chancellor from 1777 to 1801, having been elected to that office by
the New York Constitutional Convention. 6 THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
332 (1933); 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 774 (John A. Garraty & Mark C.
Curnes eds., 1999); 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 449-51 (William Draper Lewis ed.,

1907). He resigned from the Chancellorship in 1801 following Thomas Jefferson's
election as President and his request to Livingston's agreement to succeed Gouvemeur
Morris as Minister to France. 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 775 (John A. Garraty

& Mark C. Curnes eds., 1999).
Despite Kent's assertion, Livingston was held in high regard as Chancellor. See 6
THE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 323 (1933); 1 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS

451 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1907). Jefferson regarded him generally as "one of the
ablest of American lawyers." Id. at 440. In many ways this would be regarded as the
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Kent, as Chancellor, used his usual intensive approach to study and soon
He
began to systematize equity jurisprudence in New York. 170
generally
was
day
dying
his
until
developed a wide reputation and
17
referred to as "Chancellor Kent."' 1
In 1823, at age sixty, Kent was forced to retire from the bench, after
which he returned to New York City and held himself out as a consulting
"Chamber Counsel.' 72 It was at this time that he also began to prepare a
series of lectures, which soon led to the publication of his Commentaries
on American Law in four volumes. 173 The Commentaries won him both
fame and fortune, and he became best known as the "American
Blackstone."'

174

Kent spent his declining years in apparent good health and vigor,
on Sunday, December 12, 1847, with his
and departed this earthly life
175
side.
his
by
wife and family
III.

Early Use of French Language in Philadelphia and New York

Although getting a relatively late start in its establishment as a
colony, Pennsylvania was soon to become the largest and most
successful of the proprietary provinces. Its central position and liberal
ultimate compliment. Among other honors accorded to the great Cicero was the title of
"pater,patria,"or "the father of his country." 5 ENCYCLOPEDIAL OR A DICTIONARY OF
ARTS, SCIENCES, AND MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE 2 (Phila., Thomas Dobson 1798)
(more commonly called "Dobson's Encyclopedia"). For early American views on
Cicero, see id. at 1-6 and 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 190 (Phila., Caery Lee &
Blanchard 1835).
In Kent's younger days, he apparently had a tendency toward sharp, personal attacks
on others that could accurately and charitably be called mean-spirited. For just a few
examples of Kent's proclivities in this direction, see HORTON, supra note 141, at 70.
Barbed and defamatory statements allegedly made by Kent during discussions with
Alexander Hamilton helped precipitate Hamilton's fatal duel with Aaron Burr when they
were relayed to Burr by a third party. For a brief introduction to this episode, see KENT,
supra note 141 at 33-34. A check of the indices to both Horton and Kent will reveal a
goodly number of references to Kent's interactions with Burr and Hamilton. See id.;
HORTON, supra note 141.
As Kent grew more mature he apparently became more reserved in his open
discussions, but he continued to make occasional blunt exaggerations and overgeneralizations generally aimed at elevating his own importance. In fairness to Kent,
these later statements were generally made in assumedly private correspondence and
private notes, which were most likely never intended for general public consumption.
170. AutobiographicalSketch of ChancellorKent, supra note 151, at 388-89.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 390.
173. Id.
174. See KENT, supra note 141, at 193-205. For a brief history of these volumes, the
various editions, and the royalties earned, see John H. Langbein, ChancellorKent and the
History of Legal Literature,93 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 564-66 (1993).
175. For an account of Kent's declining years and death, see HORTON, supra note 141,
at 307-26
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government made it an attractive center for many Europeans. 76 No other
colony had so many races and religions. 177 Philadelphia served as the
seat of government for Pennsylvania. 178 The city was for a long period
the leading seaport and the most populous city in North America. 179 It
was long the third largest city in the British Empire behind London and
Edinburgh.180
By 1776 Philadelphia's freewheeling Atlantic and Caribbean trade
made it the leading seaport in the colonies. 181 During nearly the whole
colonial period and through 1800, it was the most important city
commercially, politically, and socially among all the colonies. 182 Two
Continental Congresses, 1774 and 1775-1781, met in Philadelphia and,
except for a brief period from 1787-1790, Philadelphia was the seat of
the federal government before it was removed to Washington, District of
Columbia. 83 The national convention that framed the Constitution sat in
Philadelphia in 1787, but more importantly for the purposes of this
Article, the United States Supreme Court met on the second floor of
Philadelphia's old City Hall from 1791 to 1800.184 Thus, Philadelphia
served as a point for gathering and exchange for the leaders of all the east
coast bars, including especially those of New York and Philadelphia.
New York City, formerly known as New Amsterdam under its
Dutch founders, was not by any means founded as a social or religious
experiment, but as a commercial outpost. 185 As such, it quickly became a
cosmopolitan trading center, and by 1643 eighteen languages were being
spoken in New Amsterdam. 186 The outpost had vibrant coastal and
overseas trade, and its conquest by the British and take over by the Duke
of York in 1664 did little to change this.
During the Revolution, however, the city's occupation by the
British military was to have disastrous effects as it rapidly lost
population. 187 By November 25, 1783, the official date of the British
evacuation of the city, requisitions and depredations had robbed the city
of its wealth and destroyed much of its business. 188 New York soon
176.
177.
178.
179.

21 ENCYCLOPEDIA
Id. at 112.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 367, 372.

180.

Willard S. Randall, Boom Town Grows Along the Delaware, in PHILADELPHIA

BRITANNICA, supra

note 6, at 105, 111-12 ("Pennsylvania").

INQUIRER'S BICENTENNIAL JOURNALS, THE FOUNDING CITY 19 (1975-76).

181.

Id. at 18,21.

182.

21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 112.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 112, 368, 372.
Id. at 105, 111-12, 367-68, 372; Randall, supra note 180, at 18-22.
19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 621 ("New York City").
Id.
Id. at 607, 622.
Id. For examples of the legal effects of British depredations and various efforts
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began a fast-paced recovery, however, when George Clinton, the
governor of New York State from 1777-1795, jealously guarded the
State's and City's commercial classes and interests.189 His refusal to
cooperate with various plans of the government established under the
Articles of Confederation helped lead to the rise of the Federalist
party. 190 New York City, preceding Philadelphia, served as the federal
capital in 1789-1790,191 and thus provided an even earlier site than
Philadelphia for bar leaders to gather and exchange ideas and
information.
Both Philadelphia and New York, by the late eighteenth century,
had large merchant classes which were often, through the accumulation
of vast amounts of wealth, developing into aristocracies. It was not
uncommon for lawyers to be members of these families by birth or by
marriage, and there were often close connections forged between lawyers
A1 92 goodly
and merchant-aristocrats without familial relationships.
extraction.
French
of
or
French
were
merchants
these
of
number
at retaliation against loyalist and British merchants, see 1 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 197.
189. For information on Clinton and his administration, see I APPLETON'S
CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

659-61 (James G. Wilson & John Fiske eds.,

N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1887-1889); 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 226-28
(1958); 5 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 82-83 (1999).
190. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 608 ("New York").

191. Id. at 594, 608, 618, 621-22. For examples of the legal effects of British
depredations and various efforts at retaliation against loyalists and British merchants, see
1 GOEBEL, SUpra note 3, at 197.
192. Randall, supra note 180, at 22 (merchant class and the French). An example of a
French merchant with a strong presence and substantial commercial interests in both
Philadelphia and New York is provided in the person of Louis Le Guen, a client of
Alexander Hamilton's. There are a number of references to him, to his presence in
Philadelphia and New York, and to his court cases in The PapersofAlexander Hamilton.
For just one
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
important example, see the June 16, 1796 letter from Alexander Hamilton to George
Washington, in which Hamilton relays "intelligence" information to Washington and lets
Washington know that Le Guen wishes to become a naturalized citizen so as to better his
chances of success in one of his law suits. Id. at 225-26. More detailed information as to
Hamilton and his client and some of his cases can be found at 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at
48.
The Le Guen case eventually involved four different courts and eight different
actions, including on promissory notes, misconduct by commercial agents, requests for
injunctive relief, and eventually for a writ of error and impeachment of the judgment.
Each party took over twenty depositions, there were three separate jury trials, and the
litigation finally reached its climax in a seven day, seven-lawyer oral argument before a
thirty-four member panel of the Court of Errors. Hamilton eventually won a $120,000
judgment for his client which, for its time, was considered phenomenal. See Hon. Judith
S. Kaye, Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts, in 2 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS 4 (Robert L. Haig ed., 1995). Kent regarded the Le Guen
case as the one in which Hamilton's "varied powers were most strikingly displayed." Id.
For interesting details of this complex litigation and the attendant arguments, see Le Guen
v. Gouverneur, I Johns. Cas. 436-524 (N.Y. Ct. of Errors 1800).
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Under Louis XIV and his long and domineering reign, the French
language had become the universal language of the era. 193 Paris had
opened itself to the cultured men of other European Countries and was
fast spreading its influence among men of letters. 194 Thus, being able to
speak at least passable French had become a must for many merchants
and for those who fancied themselves aristocrats. For lawyers dealing
with commercial and mercantile issues, it was quickly becoming a
requirement because many prominent legal treatises dealing with both
maritime commerce and the law of nations were written in Frenchmany without any English translations readily available or available at
all. 195
Philadelphia and New York both had burgeoning French
populations and many French tutors and instructors advertising their
services and schools. Book dealers in both cities had a brisk trade in
French books on a large variety of subjects, including politics and law.196
Although it was not uncommon for young gentlemen in Kent's era
to learn the French language, it was not universally received as a
For just three examples of Frenchmen who accumulated vast fortunes in early
America, see the biographies of Eleuthere Irenee Du Pont and his brother, Victor Marie
Du Pont. WHO WAS WHO INAMERICA, HISTORICAL VOLUME 1607-1896, at 160 (1963);
see also 2 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 264-65 (James G. Wilson
& John Fiske eds., N.Y., 1887-1889); 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 533-34
(1958); 7 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 115-17 (1999). For Stephen Girard, see WHO
WAS WHO IN AMERICA, HISTORICAL VOLUME 1607-1896, at 206 (1963); 4 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 319-22 (1958); 9 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 84-85 (1999).
There are a number of examples of lawyers born into and marrying into both the landed
and merchant "aristocracies" in Philadelphia and New York. These can easily be traced
by checking the entries in standard biographical dictionaries of the various lawyers
mentioned in this Introduction. The better biographical dictionaries provide copious
references and cross-references.
193. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 6, at 850 ("France").
194. Id.
195. See, for example, Alexander Hamilton's youthful admonition to study several as
of then untranslated French legal treatises: "Apply yourself, without delay, to the study of
the law of nature. I would recommend to your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui." 2 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 42 (J.C. Hamilton
ed., N.Y., 1850-1851). The quotation is from Hamilton's pamphlet, The FarmerRefuted.
Id.
196. Large numbers of Frenchmen had been coming to the American colonies from
both France and the French West Indies. By the late 1790s there were approximately
30,000 Frenchmen in the United States. JOHN MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION ACTS 42 (1951). For a broad-based review of the spread and usage of the
French language in the American Colonies and United States, see PAUL MERRILL
SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 1760-1801, at vii-ix, 4, 7, 13, 35-37, 41, 52-59
(Octagon Books 1969) (1940). For more specific details, see Howard Mumford Jones,
The Importation of French Books in Philadelphia,1750-1800, MODERN PHILOLOGY 15777 (Nov. 1934). William Cobbett, printer, journalist, translator, and bookseller, alone
listed approximately 500 French titles for sale in Porcupine's Gazette during just several
months in 1798. Id. at 176.
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necessity. 197 For lawyers, however, the situation was different. Many of
the more respected judges and lawyers regarded a command of French as
essential. In earlier days this was more specifically "Law French," but
and popular modem French were
by Kent's era, both "Law French" 198
lawyers.
would-be
any
for
necessities
Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and other lawyers of their
era had mastered both popular and Law French. 199 Although it is not
clear from materials available just how much exposure Kent may have
had to French speaking lawyers early in his legal career, it is known that
Kent idolized Alexander Hamilton, his elder by seven years, met him in
person in Albany in 1787, and quickly developed a devoted friendship.2 °°
Most likely at the behest of Hamilton, Kent began the study of French in
197.

See generally SPURLIN, supra note 196, at vii-viii.

198. Most of the better known instructors of the mid to late eighteenth century
regarded both Latin and French as absolutely necessary for a lawyer. See A TREATISE ON
THE STUDY OF THE LAW: CONTAINING, DIRECTIONS TO STUDENTS, WRITTEN BY THOSE
CELEBRATED LAWYERS, ORATORS, AND STATESMEN, THE LORDS MANSFIELD, ASHBURTON,
AND THURLOW, IN A SERIES OF LETTERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE YOUNG FRIENDS: WITH
NOTES, AND ADDITIONS, BY THE EDITOR X (Harrison, Cluse & Co., London 1797)

(Introduction by Benjamin L. Carroll III.
"Law French" is arguably still a must for any student with an historical bent. A
significant number of English case reports are still published without translation. For a

handy list of

these, see THE LAWYER'S REFERENCE MANUAL OF LAW BOOKS AND

CITATIONS 65, 85, 86, 104-08 (Boston, Soule & Bugbee, 1883); 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra

note 3, at 361-63; 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 552-54. A good starting point for any
student wishing to obtain some reasonable knowledge of "Law French" is 17 YEAR
BOOKS OF EDWARD II, VOL. I, at xxxiii-lxxxi (F.W. Maitland ed., 1903) (introduction "of
the Anglo-French Language in the Early Year Books"). This should be supplemented
with ROBERT KELHAM, A DICTIONARY OF THE NORMAN OR OLD FRENCH LANGUAGE;
COLLECTED FROM SUCH ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENT ROLLS, JOURNALS, ACTS OF
STATE, RECORDS, LAW BOOKS, ANTIENT HISTORIANS, AND MANUSCRIPTS AS RELATE TO
THIS NATION... To WHICH ARE ADDED THE LAWS OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, WITH

NOTES AND REFERENCES (London 1779). "Though far from being complete it is the best

work of the kind. The copy in the Harvard Law Library contains [miscellaneous]
additions by Mr. Justice Story, whose familiarity with the Yearbooks enabled him to
supply some of Kelham's deficiencies." MARVIN, supra note 55, at 453. For a more
modem dictionary, see ANGLO-NORMAN DICTIONARY (Stone et al. eds., 1977-1992). The

student should especially see and study Baker's Manual of Law French, which contains a
helpful introduction as well as numerous references to and comments on other helpful
books and dictionaries. See J.H. BAKER, MANUAL OF LAW FRENCH (2d ed. 1990).
199. For Jefferson and "Law French," see FRANK L. DEWEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON,
LAWYER 105 (1987); EDWARD DUMBAULD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 14 (1978).

Hamilton, on his mother's side, was of French blood and the French language evidently
played some part in his early education. I JOHN C. HAMILTON, THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 2-10 (N.Y., D Appleton & Co. 1840); 1 ROBERT HENDRICKSON, HAMILTON 7,
25,43 (1976). His early published writings while still in his teens show a full knowledge
of several French writers of renown. HENDRICKSON, supra,at 52.

200. As to their meeting in Albany, see HORTON, supra note 141, at 56-57. See
generally KENT, supra note 141, at 31-33, 143, 287. For just one example of Kent's
attendance at and observation of Hamilton in court before Kent became a judge, see 2
GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 66.
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1789 and had mastered it to the point where he could read it with facility
by 1793.201 As has been stated and as will be seen from the numerous
uses of Emerigon by others,20 2 he was hardly unique in this respect
among members of the bars or the benches of Philadelphia and New
York.
IV. On the Nature of Kent's Abridgment
Kent's abridgment of Emerigon was really nothing out of the
ordinary, as it was merely one of several common methods of studying
and learning the law in his era.20 3 It was generally recommended that
201. KENT, supra note 141, at 313, 318 (mentioning his ready access to Hamilton and
Hamilton's ongoing use of old materials and then-current French writers without
translations). Hamilton specifically mentioned Emerigon and Valin, as Duer states:
"Hamilton excelled in the knowledge of French literature, and it was by him that the
attention of his younger friend was first directed to the study of the French jurists-a
study from which, as all of us who have read his opinions and writings know, he derived
important and lasting benefits." JOHN DUER, A DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND
PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES KENT 24 (N.Y., 1848); see The FarmerRefuted, or, A more
Comprehensive and Impartial View of the Disputes Between Great Britain and the
Colonies, in I THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 53, 55, 61 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
n.d.) (recommending the study of several French authors on the law of nature and
government). For other examples of the use of French by a founding father, see CHARLES
PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON, FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-1798, at 195-96, 206, 248, 368
(1956); and 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES viii, x, xii, 3, 68, 71, 73, 82, 131,133,138, 197-98,
211, 289, 333 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896). As to Hamilton and his use of Law
French, see for example his use and citation of Jean Latch, Plusieurs tres bons cases,
come ils estoyent adjudgees es trois premiersans du raign dufeu Roy Charles le premier
(1624-1627) Bank le Roy, in 1 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 860. For biographical material
on Wilson, see 10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 326-30 (1959); 23 AMERICAN
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 586-89 (1999).
202. See infra Parts V, VI, VII, and IX.
203. There were numerous articles and instructions on these matters. For a few
examples, see I ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA; OR, A DICTIONARY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
COMPILED UPON A NEW PLAN 6, 7 (Edinburgh 1771) ("Abridgment," and "Abstract,"

respectively); id. at volume II, 241-42 ("Common-Place Book"). John Locke wrote a
very full essay on the best manner of common-placing in 1703. See A New Method of A
Common Place Book, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, A NEW EDITION 331-49 (rev. ed.,
London 1823). For a recommended method of abstracting or abridging an entire treatise,
see generally ABBE' GAULTIER, A METHOD OF MAKING ABRIDGMENTS; OR, EASY AND
CERTAIN RULES FOR ANALYSING AUTHORS. DIVIDED INTO Two PARTS; THE FIRST,
CONTAINING PRELIMINARY EXPLANATIONS, AND THE RULES FOR MAKING ABRIDGMENTS;
THE SECOND, THE APPLICATIONS OF THOSE RULES TO VARIOUS SELECTIONS FROM THE BEST

AUTHORS (W. & C. Spilsburg, London 1800). This substantial book contains 230 pages,
and its printed subscriber's list includes a goodly number of the nobility, ecclesiastics,
and Esquires.
For examples of Thomas Jefferson's instructions to would-be lawyers, including
specific references to common-placing, see Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Feb.10, 1814),
in XIV THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, LIBRARY EDITION 85 (Andrew A.

Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903); Letter to John Minor (Aug. 30, 1814), in
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 420-26 (comp. by Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905)
(also containing a letter written nearly fifty years before to Bernard Moore).
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law students and practicing lawyers learn the arts of abstracting,
abridging, and what is most frequently called common-placing, or the
keeping of a common place book.2 °4 The exact methodology could vary
from a simple statement of principle to one including the salient facts of
the case, and sometimes it included a capsule of any discussion on the
point at hand.20 5 Generally, the methodology was to read carefully a
case, essay, article, or even a book and to reduce its essence into a
concise and well-digested form.20 6 In the event of a large subject, the
digesting would take the form of a general condensation or abridgment,
and in the event of multiple cases, the principle of law would be phrased
concisely and put into a running series of entries under specified
heads. 20 7 The larger common-place books were often folios, and more
than a little unwieldy to carry. 20 8 However, some lawyers and judges,
particularly those who had to travel, made their abstracts and
abridgments on small sheets, which were more easily carried from place
to place. 20 9 This was the nature of Kent's abridgment of Emerigon, and
it is quite possible he even recited from it during discussions with other
judges.2 10
V.

Early American Usage of Emerigon in Philadelphia

As has been seen, a familiarity with the French language was not
uncommon among the members of the bar and bench, at least not in
coastal commercial centers and their courts. 2 1 1 As has also been seen,
Philadelphia was the key American seaport and center of commerce for
quite some time.212 It was also a judicial center of great import and was
generally recognized as having the strongest and best bar in America.213
It is apparent that Emerigon's Treatise on Insurance was being cited as

204. See sources cited supra note 203.
205. See sources cited supra note 203.
206. See sources cited supra note 203.
207. See sources cited supra note 203.
208. The author has seen a goodly number of common place books and abridgments
in his travels and owns several. The larger ones are typically heavy and to be used on a
large solid table. Some are small enough to easily carry in a standard-sized modem
trench coat pocket. The size of the writing found in these varies considerably.

209.

Id.

210. See sources cited supra note 203.
211. See supra Part III.
212. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
213. Among those who regarded the Philadelphia bar as America's strongest was
Oliver Ellsworth, who was appointed as the third Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court in 1796. See Horace Binney, Charles Chauncey, in THE LIVES OF
EMINENT PHILADELPHIANS, Now DECEASED, COLLECTED FROM ORIGINAL AND AUTHENTIC

SOURCES 197-98 (Henry Simpson ed., Phila., Wm.Brotherhead 1859). For a concise
biography of Ellsworth, see 7 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 457-58 (1999).
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authority in the Philadelphia courts before Kent began to abridge it, but
because of the nature of early American law reporting, there is no way
that the frequency of its usage in Philadelphia or anywhere else can be
accurately gauged. Law reports were often less than full or accurate, and
even the best of the reporters made occasional errors.214
At least as early as 1792, Emerigon's Treatise was being cited as a
principal authority. In Cupisino v. Perez, a case involving a captain's
right to hypothecate his vessel in a case of necessity, Charles Heatley,1 5
counsel for the plaintiff, used and directly quoted from Emerigon to
argue that the owner was bound by all the acts of the captain. 216 Jasper
Moylan, 217 arguing for the defendant, also cited Emerigon and argued
that the passage translated by Heatley was limited by another related part
of the Treatise.
219
218
In 1797, in Vasse v. Ball, William Lewis and Edward Tilghman
214. A very well-written and concise introduction to the early American law reports,
the methodologies used in their preparation, and Kent's favorite court reporter, William
Johnson, can be found in John Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal
Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 547, 571 (1993). For an example of the use of Emerigon's

Treatise in a written argument that did not make it into the report of the case, see Written
Argument by Hamilton, undated, Hamilton Papers, Nos. 9 4085-90 Library of Congress,
in 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 169.

215. Charles Heatley, (-. d. 1814) a minister's son from Dublin, Ireland, was
admitted to the Irish bar in 1776, to the bar of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in
March 1782, and to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania bar in 1783. He was a
Philadelphia attorney at the time of his admission to the United States Supreme Court
during the February 1791 Term. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 188, 343 (1985); THE PHILADELPHIA BAR: A
COMPLETE CATALOGUE OF MEMBERS FROM 1776 TO 1868, at 8 (Phila., Review Printing
House 1868).
216. Cupisino v. Perez, 2 Dall. (Pa.) 194, 195, 2 U. S., 194, 195, 1 L. ed. 345 (Mem.
Pa. Sept. Term 1792)
217. Jasper Alexander Moylan, a.k.a. Jasper Moyland, (ca. 1759-1812), was admitted

to the Philadelphia bar in 1782 and to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania bar in 1784.
He was a Philadelphia resident at the time of his admission to the Supreme Court of the
United States during the February 1791 Term. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 189,
PHILADELPHIA BAR: A COMPLETE CATALOGUE OF MEMBERS FROM

343 (1985); THE
1776 TO 1868, at 8

(Phila., Review Printing House 1868).
218. William Lewis (Feb. 2, 1751-Aug. 16, 1819) was a lawyer of Quaker Stock who
began studying law under Nicholas Waln, an eminent Quaker and highly respected
lawyer. Waln required him to master both Latin and French so that he could easily read
the old Entries and Reports. Lewis was admitted to the bar in November 1773 and again
in 1776, after the adoption of the Pennsylvania State Constitution. He served as counsel
for the defense in a number of the early and major treason cases in the United States and
was also the first professional counsel to address the United States Senate when he
argued against the election of Albert Gallatin to the United States Senate. He was well
learned in the law, often consulted by other counsel, and was generally acknowledged to
be one of the most eminent lawyers of his generation. See Horace Binney, Leaders of the
Old Philadelphia Bar, in ADDRESSES DELIVERED MARCH 13, 1902 AND PAPERS PREPARED
OR REPUBLISHED TO COMMEMORATE
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used Emerigon in argument, asserting that "Emerigon stands high as an
authority., 220 Opposed to them were the well-known and erudite Jared
Ingersoll,2 2 1 William Rawle,222 and Peter S. Duponceau.223
Both
ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA,

1802-1902, at 81, 87, 92, 96, 106 (Law

Ass'n of Phila. 1906) (1859); 6

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 225-26 (1958);
DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM, OR FORTY YEARS FULL PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA

BAR 444-68 (Phila. 1856).
219. Edward Tilghman (Feb. 11, 1750-Nov. 1, 1815). In 1767 he graduated from the
College, Academy, and Charitable School of Philadelphia, now the University of
Pennsylvania. On June 24, 1772, he was admitted to study at the Middle Temple in
London. His time in London was spent in serious study and hard work, including careful
attendance at the Courts of Westminster Hall. He was admitted to the Philadelphia bar
in1774. His severe and rigid training led him to develop "the most accurate legal
judgment of any man of his day" at the Philadelphia bar. He was highly feared by
opposing lawyers. See Binney, supra note 213, at 106-23; 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 542-43 (1959).
220. Vasse v. Ball, 2 Yeates (Pa.) 178, 182 (Pa. Mar. Term 1797) (also reported at 2
Dall. (Pa.) 270, 2 U. S. 270, 1 L. Ed. 377 (1797) (mem.) (arguendo).
221. Jared Ingersoll (Oct. 27, 1749-Oct. 31, 1822) was a graduate of Yale College,
class of 1766. He later moved to Philadelphia to be with his father, Jared Ingersoll the
elder, who was there organizing and presiding over the Vice-Admiralty Court. Upon
arrival in Philadelphia, the young Ingersoll took up the study of law. He soon left for
England to further his studies and, on July 16, 1773, was admitted to the Middle Temple.
He went to the continent in 1776 and spent two years in travel and study, including in
France. Upon his return to Philadelphia he soon became one of the most distinguished
lawyers there in an age when the city boasted the finest legal talent in America. Among
his clients was the French merchant, Stephen Girard. He was opposed to Alexander
Hamilton in the 1796 case of Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 556
(1796), which was the first case involving the question of the constitutionality of an act of
Congress. Ingersoll exhibited "extraordinary excellence as an advocate." 3 APPLETON'S
CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 347 (James G. Wilson & John Fiske eds., N.Y.,
Appleton & Co. 1887-1889); 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 468-69 (1958);
Binney, supra note 213, at 125; DAVID PAUL BROWN, THE FORUM, OR FORTY YEARS FULL
PRACTICE AT THE PHILADELPHIA BAR 470-89 (Phila. 1856).
222. William Rawle (Apr. 28, 1759-Apr. 12, 1836), attended the Friends' Academy at
Philadelphia until 1778 when he went to New York City and began the study of law
under John Tabor Kempe, a former Attorney-General of the province of New York. In
1781 he left for England and enrolled as a student in the Middle Temple. He was aided
by his in person observation of Lord Mansfield. After the Revolution he returned to
Philadelphia and was admitted to the bar in September of 1783. In 1786 he became a
member of the American Philosophical Society. President Washington, having his
residence in Philadelphia, became well acquainted with Rawle. Rawle's View of the
Constitution of the United States, appearing in 1825, was one of the most discussed
works on that subject. His learning was extensive and encompassed not only the laws of
England and America, "but extended much deeper into that of the ancient and modem
law of the Continent of Europe than was usual .. " He was especially well-versed in
Maritime Laws. See T.I. Wharton, A Memoir of William Rawle, L.L.D., in ADDRESSES
DELIVERED MARCH 13, 1902 AND PAPERS PREPARED OR REPUBLISHED TO COMMEMORATE
THE

CENTENNIAL

CELEBRATION

OF

THE

LAW

ASSOCIATION

OF

PHILADELPHIA,

PENNSYLVANIA, 1802-1902, at 240, 262 (1906) (originally prepared for and read at a
meeting of the Council of the Pennsylvania Historical Society, Feb. 22, 1837); 8
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 400-01 (1958); 7 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF

AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 442-43 (N.Y., James T. White & Co. 1893); 9 THE TWENTIETH

1154

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:4

Ingersoll and Rawle were well acquainted with French authors, and
Duponceau was a native Frenchman noted for his linguistic abilities and
translations. 4
In 1802, Emerigon was cited by Jared Ingersoll and Robert Buell
Porter 225 for the plaintiffs as authority in a case involving a question over
the insurability of seamen's wages. 2 26 Arguing contra were William
Rawle and Walter Franklin.2 27
It is known that volume two of Dallas's Reports, published before
Kent's abridgment of Emerigon was undertaken, formed a part of Kent's

Johnson ed.,
1904) (no pagination); BROWN, supra note 221, at 499.
223. Pierre Etienne Du Ponceau, a.k.a. Peter Stephen Duponceau, (3 June 1760-1
Apr. 1844), a well-known scholar and lawyer, was born at St. Martin, lie de Re, France.
His first training was for the Roman Catholic priesthood. However, he eventually
abandoned that idea and soon thereafter came to America as secretary and aide to Baron
Von Steuben, the Prussian army officer who helped train Washington's troops. Due to
his early work with Von Steuben and later work with Robert R. Livingston, the first
American secretary for foreign affairs, he developed a series of high and valuable
connections, including with Washington and Hamilton. While working for Livingston,
he also studied law with Philadelphia lawyer, William Lewis. After the Revolution,
Duponceau's linguistic and translational abilities, knowledge of international law,
American law and numerous high connections allowed him to quickly establish a
lucrative practice in Philadelphia. He often represented French merchants, commercial
agents, and Consular officials. He wrote on many scholarly and legal topics and quickly
gained an international reputation. For a reminiscence involving William Rawle's
examination of Duponceau on several continental writers and works, see Letter of Peter
S. Du Ponceau to Thomas I. Wharton, Philadelphia, 3d June 1837, in ADDRESSES
DELIVERED MARCH 13, 1902 AND PAPERS PREPARED OR REPUBLISHED TO COMMEMORATE
CENTURY BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF NOTABLE AMERICANS (Rossiter

THE

CENTENNIAL

CELEBRATION

OF

THE

LAW

ASSOCIATION

OF

PHILADELPHIA,

PENNSYLVANIA, 1802-1902, at 265 (1906); 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 525
(1958); 7 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 112 (1999).
224. See sources cited supra note 223.
225. Robert Buell Porter (1768-1842) was admitted to practice at the Philadelphia bar
in 1789 and to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania bar in 1791. At the time of his
admission to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States during the February Term
of 1796, Porter lived in Philadelphia. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 257 (1985).
226. Galloway v. Morris, 3 Yeates 445, 449 (Pa. 1802) (arguendo).
227. Walter Franklin (1773-1838), a New York born Quaker, was admitted to the
Philadelphia bar in 1793. He lived in Philadelphia at the time of his admission to the bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States during the February Term of 1797. Franklin
quickly rose to prominence. In 1809 he was appointed Attorney-General of Pennsylvania
by Governor Simon Snyder. On January 26, 1811 he was appointed Presiding Judge of
the Second Judicial District where he became ranked as one of the ablest jurists in
Pennsylvania. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, at 314 (1985); ALEXANDER HARRIS, A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF
LANCASTER COUNTY: BEING A HISTORY OF EARLY SETTLERS AND EMINENT MEN OF THE
COUNTY; AS ALSO MUCH OTHER UNPUBLISHED HISTORICAL INFORMATION, CHIEFLY OF A

LOCAL CHARACTER 214-15 (Lancaster, Elias Barr & Co. 1872); I GEORGE R. PROWELL,
HISTORY OF YORK COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA 487-88 (1907).
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reading program. 228 Volume two of Yeates's Reports, 229 however, was
not formally published until 1818. It is fairly plausible and arguably
likely that knowledge of these and other unreported usages of Emerigon
in both argument and decision was making the rounds among the
Philadelphia and New York bars. 230 There was a considerable interplay
between the more eminent members of both bars, especially regarding
commercial and maritime cases. 23 I All of these facts led to a
considerable proliferation of Emerigon's treatises throughout
the benches
232
and bars of the commercial centers of the United States.

228. HORTON, supra note 141, at 147 n.73 (a listing of Kent's readings-included in
the year 1799 is volume 2 of Dallas's Reports).
229. Regarding the Reports of Jasper Yeates, see CHARLES C. SOULE, THE LAWYER'S

REFERENCE MANUAL OF LAW BOOKS AND CITATIONS 49 (Boston, Soule and Bugbee

1883). For a brief biography of Yeates, a Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see
10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 453-54 (1958).

230. The author, being a practicing lawyer himself, is well aware of how often
lawyers exchange information and thoughts among themselves. This is sometimes done
formally through seminars and addresses to the bar, and sometimes informally through
personal discussion and correspondence.
Additionally, the author's mentor and
predecessor, the late George M. Houck, Esquire, often discussed the frequency with
which lawyers of yesteryear exchanged information and shared notes and manuscripts
with each other in an effort to maintain high standards of practice.
It should also be noted that most seaport cities and towns had newspapers and
gazettes, which made frequent and detailed reports of court cases dealing with commerce,
shipping, and insurance. For examples of such reporting and the reliance by courts
thereon, see Rhinelander v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 29 (1807) (citing and
quoting in extenso from a report of the case of Dutilgh v. Gatliff, decided on January 17,
1807). See also the reference in Rhinelander to Mumford v. Church as being then
unreported but obviously known to the various counsel and the justices
The reversal of Mumford is reported sub nom Church v. Bedient, 1 Cai. Cas. 21
(N.Y. 1804) along with the companion case, sub nom Hallett v. Peyton, 1 Cai. Cas. 28
(N.Y. 1804). This report may well have been available in a formal report. See I THE
CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 290 (1909).
For an example of a lawyer as far from Philadelphia as Boston, having considerable
knowledge of an as yet unreported case then pending in Philadelphia, see the argument of
the solicitor-general in the case of Dorr v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 4 Mass. 221,
224-25 (1808).
231. For an example of Hamilton's connections with William Rawle, see 1 GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 785. For an example of the involvement of William Rawle, Edward
Tilghman, and William Lewis in the LeGuen Case in 1798, in opposition to Hamilton,
see id. at 74. An even better example is the direct involvement of William Lewis in an
important commercial case in New York City where he is opposed to both Kent and
Hamilton. See BROWN, supra note 221, at 453-54.
232. It is considerably beyond the scope of this work to analyze the many usages of
Emerigon made by the bench and the bar over the years. However, the interested student
who runs a search for Emerigon in the various general databases will quickly find many
examples of his citation in both argument and decision.
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On the Usage of Emerigon in the New York Supreme Court from
1799 Through 1804

A number of early New York case reports make reference to
Emerigon, and charting the data shows that Emerigon was cited and
argued about at least sixteen times.233
Among the attorneys citing Emerigon, reading from his Treatise to
the court, and arguing pro and con about the meaning of the quotations
made, were: Alexander Hamilton, Richard Harison,2 34 Josiah Ogden
Hoffman, 235

Brockholst

Livingston, 236

Robert

Troup, 237

David

A.

233. It should be kept in mind that these sixteen instances are only the now known
reported instances. In all probability, based on the nature of early court reporting, there
would have been more usages which remained unreported.
234. Richard Harison (? -1829) was a leader of the New York bar and heavily
involved in land speculation. He graduated from King's College (now Columbia) in
1764. In January of 1769 and in November of 1771, he was licensed to practice in the
Supreme Court of New York province and in the courts of New Jersey, respectively. As
a noted loyalist, his license was suspended. It was reinstated, however, in early 1786. In
1785, before the reissuance of his license, he entered into a three year partnership with
Morgan Lewis, a soon to be appointed Justice of the New York Supreme Court. Harison
abandoned his loyalist ways and became a Federalist. He was a delegate to the
Constitution's ratifying convention of 1788. In 1789 he was appointed U. S. Attorney for
the District of New York. Harison served as Recorder of the City of New York from
1789 to 1801. He departed this earthly life in 1829. This biographical sketch is taken
from 1 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 311 n.76. There are numerous references to Harison, his
involvement with Hamilton, and his work in the New York Courts in volume II of
Goebel. See id. at 942.
235. Josiah Ogden Hoffman (Apr. 14, 1766-Jan. 24, 1837) was a prominent lawyer
and politician. He was a devoted Federalist and was twice elected to the New York State
legislature where he was leader of the Federalist party there. He was long regarded as
one of the most prominent members of the New York bar. His practice was one of the
most extensive of his day. He was especially successful in handling cases pertaining to
commercial and maritime law. He argued a number of important and famous cases in the
United States Supreme Court, including The Nereide, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 388, 3 L. Ed.
769 (1815), and Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheaton (16 U.S.) 246, 4 L. Ed. 381 (1818). See 5
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 114-15 (1959).

236. Brockholst Livingston, a.k.a. Henry Brockholst Livingston, (Nov. 25, 1757-Mar.
18, 1823) was the son of William Livingston, a noted attorney and later the first governor
of New Jersey. The Livingstons were an economically and politically prominent and
powerful family. Brockholst attended the College of New Jersey (now Princeton) and
was a classmate of James Madison. He was a brother-in-law to John Jay. He was
admitted to the bar of New York in 1783. He soon developed a varied law practice and
early in his career he often served as co-counsel with Alexander Hamilton and Aaron
Burr before their break and subsequent duel. He often took prominent roles in leading
commercial and maritime litigation. He was appointed a puisne Judge on the New York
Supreme Court in 1802. Livingston soon developed a judicial expertise in the area of
commercial law. In 1806 he was appointed to the United States Supreme Court. Of
especial interest for law students is Livingston's dissent in the famous fox hunting case of
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 180 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. 1805). 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
BIOGRAPHY 312-13 (1959); 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 764-66 (1999). The

interested student should especially read Charles Donahue, Jr.'s Animalia Ferae Naturae
Rome, Bologna, Leyden, Oxford and Queen 's County, N. Y. See Charles Donahue, Jr.,
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Ogden,2 38 Aaron Burr, Caleb S. Riggs,23 9 Nathaniel Pendleton,24 ° James
Emott, 241 Mr. Gold,242 Mr. Henry,243 and Mr. Gaines.244
Animalia Ferae Naturae Rome, Bologna, Leyden, Oxford and Queen's County, N.Y., in
STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR SCHILLER 39-63 (Roger S. Bagnall &
William V. Harris eds., 1986). Donahue carefully analyzes the Roman and civil law that
was arguably applicable and finally concludes that the court had no need to refer to
anything other than the English common law to make a proper and full decision in
Pierson. This essay by Donahue should be supplemented by his later essay on Pierson.
See Charles Donahue, Jr., Noodt, Titius, and the Natural law School: the Occupation of
Wild Animals and the Intersection of Propertyand Tort, in SATURA ROBERTO FEENSTRA,
SEXAGESIMUM

QUINTUM ANNUM AETATIS COMPLENTI AB ALUMNIS COLLEGIS AMICIs

OBLATA 609-30 (J.A. Ankum et al. eds., 1985). This essay emphasizes the pursuit of the
sources used to justify the decision in Pierson.
237. Robert Troup (1757-Jan. 14, 1832) was the son of a celebrated sea captain and
privateer who left him a large estate. He went to King's College (now Columbia) in New
York City and graduated in 1774. While at college he formed close friendships with
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. He later began his legal studies with Jay. But these
were interrupted by his military service in the Revolution and were later resumed with
Aaron Burr under the guidance of William Patterson of New Jersey. They both soon left
Patterson, however, and became students of Thomas Smith, of Haverstraw, New York.
Troup quickly prospered in post-Revolutionary New York, becoming one of the best-paid
lawyers in New York. Kent considered him to be on a par with Hamilton and Burr as an
attorney. He later gave up his law practice to manage the Pulteney estate lands for Sir
William Pulteney, a wealthy Englishman. See 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
651-52 (1958); 21 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 845-46 (1999).
238. David A. Ogden. The author has found little information on Mr. Ogden. It may
well be that he was a member of the well-known and influential Ogden family of New
York and New Jersey. It is apparent that Ogden was a prominent member of the New
York bar and often appeared as counsel in commercial and maritime cases. There are a
goodly number of references to him in Goebel's work, frequently as co-counsel with
Hamilton. See GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 943.
239. The author has found little information on Mr. Riggs. He appears as counsel in a
number of important commercial and maritime cases as can readily be seen by a perusal
of the early New York Reports. He was admitted to the New York Bar on April 24,
1790. There are a goodly number of references to him in Goebel's work. See GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 944. Kent, in his necrologies, describes Riggs as: "an accurate, strict,
diligent and untiring Practitioner at the Bar.... He was a sound lawyer." Donald Roper,
Kent's Necrologies, 56 N.Y. HIST. SoC'Y Q. 212, 213 (1972). He passed away June 26,
1826.
240. Nathaniel Pendleton (1756-Oct. 20, 1821) was born into a most prominent
Virginia family. He was distinguished for his gallantry in the Revolutionary war.
Pendleton afterwards settled in Georgia and studied law there, where he became a district
judge. He removed to New York City in 1796 and quickly attained a pre-eminent
position at the bar. Pendleton became close personal friends with Alexander Hamilton,
served as his second in his fatal duel with Aaron Burr, and served as one of his executors.
See 4 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 709 (N.Y. 1887-1889); 2
GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 65 n.74.
241. James Emott (Mar. 14, 1771-Apr. 7, 1850) was descended from James Emott, an
attorney in England's Court of the King's Bench. His family was wealthy and owned a
large amount of land in and around Poughkeepsie, New York. Emott was largely selfeducated. Upon his admission to the New York Bar, he immediately gave indications of
great legal ability and soon became a leader of the bar in Albany where he devoted much
of his time to commercial business. Emott later became a prominent judge. See 3
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 154 (1958).
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The New York Supreme Court cases citing or discussing Emerigon
begin in 1799 and end in the November Term of 1804.245 In the first
242. If there were no restrictions on holding New York State Senatorial office and
practicing law at the same time, this is possibly Thomas R. Gold, a New York State
Senator from Utica. He took a prominent part in the discussions and decision-making
process in the High Court of Errors of New York. Gold is referred to in connection with
several high profile cases involving Hamilton in Goebel's work. See 2 GOEBEL, supra
note 3, at 623-25, 650, 686-87, 694.
243. This is likely a reference to Michael D. Henry. He appeared as co-counsel with
Hamilton in the case of Graham v. Low. See 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 488-90, 492503, 506-10, 511. This case has not been found by the author in any standard editions of
court reporters.
244. This author has found no information pertaining to Mr. Gaines.
245. The cases are, in chronological order (for the convenience of the reader cases in
the High Court of Error are included in the same listing herein and throughout the text):
(1) Seton, Maitland & Co. v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799). (J. 0.
Hoffman and Brockholst Livingston for plaintiff, R. Harison and A. Hamilton, for
defendants); see also 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 420-21, 546, 652, 654, 656-58.
(2) Lodge v. Phelps, 1 Johns. Cas. 139 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799) (Brockholst Livingston for
plaintiff; R. Harison for defendant).
(3) LeRoy v. Gouverneur, 1 Johns. Cas. 226 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800) (D. A. Ogden and R.
Harison for plaintiff, R. Troup and Brockholst Livingston for defendant); 2 GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 482-84.
(4) United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, I Johns. Cas. 377 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800) (R. Troup and R.
Harison for plaintiff; Brockholst Livingston for defendant); 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at
421, 423, 476, 544-46.
(5) Murray v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 263 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801) (Brockholst
Livingston and A. Burr for plaintiff; A. Hamilton and R. Troup for defendant).
(6) Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801) (A.
Hamilton and Brockholst Livingston for plaintiff, R. Harison and R. Troup for
defendants); 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 423-24, 432, 487, 613, 616, 620-27, 677, 693,
776.
(7) United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 2 Johns. Cas. 443 (N.Y. 1801) (R. Troup and R.
Harison for plaintiffs in error; Brockholst Livingston for defendant in error); 2 GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 421, 423, 476, 544-46.
(8) Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Cai. Cas. 217 (N.Y. 1802) (Brockholst
Livingston for plaintiff; R. Troup for defendant) (Appeal from the decision below in 2
Johns. Cas. 127 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801).
(9) Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451 (N.Y. 1802) (This is another
and fuller report of the proceedings in the High Court of Error in that, inter alia, it
includes the speech of Van Vechten, whereas the report in 2 Cai. Cas. 127 does not.)
(10) Barnewall v. Church, 1 Cai. R. 217 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803) (R. Harison and A.
Hamilton for plaintiff, N. Pendleton, J. Hoffman, and R. Troup for defendant); 2 GOEBEL,
supranote 3, at 444, 559-71.
(11) Nash v. Tupper, 1 Cai. R. 402 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803) (Mr. Gold for plaintiff; J.
Emott for defendant).
(12) Kendrick v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 67 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803) (J. Hoffman and C.
Riggs for plaintiff; A Hamilton and N. Pendleton for defendant); 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3,
at 769.
(13) Church v. Bedient, 1 Cai. Cas. 21 (N.Y. 1804) (R. Harison and N. Pendleton for
plaintiff, Mr. Henry and Mr. Gaines for defendant).
(14) Leavenworth v. Delafield, 1 Cai. R. 573 (N.Y. 1804) (C. Riggs and A.
Hamilton for plaintiff, unclear who appeared for defendant); 2 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at
474-82.

2004]

CHANCELLOR KENT'S ABRIDGMENT

1159

case, Seton Maitland & Co. v. Low (1799), Kent makes no reference 246
to
Emerigon, although he delivers the first of several seriatim opinions.
Justice Morgan Lewis 247 points out that although much reliance was
placed on the authorities cited from Emerigon and other French authors
on the argument, they simply did not apply to the case.248
The second case, Lodge v. Phelps (1799), is a per curiam opinion,
perhaps influenced by Kent. 249 Emerigon is cited, along with a handful
of other treatises and cases, in connection with the lex loci of a contract
to show that it is not to govern as to the mode of enforcing the
contract.25 0
The third case, LeRoy v. Gouverneur (1800), is a per curiam
opinion, which may or may not have been influenced or written by
Kent.25 ' It makes a general reference to Emerigon, as well as to Pothier
and Valin, relating to clauses in insurance policies and how much or little
they may operate
to protect underwriters from a partial as opposed to a
252
loss.
total
In the fourth case, United Insurance Co. v. Lenox (1800), Kent
delivers the second of the seriatim opinions and makes no reference to
Emerigon. 253 However, Justice Jacob Radclifft 54 does; in a question as to

(15) Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. R. 203 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804) (R. Harison for plaintiff;
N. Pendleton for defendant).
(16) Watson v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 224 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804) (C. Riggs and J. Hoffman
for plaintiff; R. Harison and N. Pendleton for defendant).
246. Seton, Maitland & Co. v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1, 5 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799).
247. Morgan Lewis (Oct. 16, 1754-Apr. 7, 1844) was born in New York City, the son
of Francis Lewis, a prominent merchant and political figure in New York, and a signer of
the Declaration of Independence. Morgan Lewis graduated with high honors in 1773
from the College of New Jersey (now Princeton). He studied law with John Jay. His law
practice was interrupted by the Revolutionary war. After the war he resumed his law
practice, in the meantime having married one of the daughters of Robert R. Livingston, a
marriage which brought him powerful connections and wealth. In November 1791 he
was named Attorney General of New York. In December of 1792 he was appointed to
the New York Supreme Court, becoming Chief Justice in 1801. In 1804 he left the court
to serve as governor, having been supported by the Livingston-Clinton branch of the
Republican party. He was later elected a State Senator. As an attorney, he was plodding
and solid. As a justice and chief justice "his record was perhaps not especially
distinguished, but certainly respectable." See 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
222-23 (1958); 13 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 594-95 (1999).
248. Seton, Maitland & Co. v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1, 10 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799).
249. There is no definitive evidence as to just how much Kent did influence his
brethren on the bench in this early stage of his career as judge. As becomes apparent as
the rest of the article is read, Kent was somewhat prone to exaggeration as to his
influence and the alleged lack of abilities of his brethren.
250. Lodge v. Phelps, 1 Johns. Cas. 139, 140 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799).
251. LeRoy v. Gouverneur, I Johns. Cas. 226, 227 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800).
252. Id.
253. United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377, 380 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800).
254. Jacob Radcliff (Apr. 20, 1764-May 6, 1844), attended the College of New Jersey
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whether freight was accessory to the ship, Radcliff not only points out
that the authorities collected by Emerigon appear to be inapplicable, but
shows considerable erudition in analyzing Emerigon's sources and
Emerigon's derivation of the rules and principles therefrom.255
In the fifth case, Murray v. United Insurance Co. (1801), Kent
delivers an opinion and makes what is perhaps his first official use of
Emerigon.256 The case deals with the liabilities of an insurer for a ship's
capture and the insured's subsequent abandonment.257 Kent held the
general rule to be that the insured ship owner had a right to abandon the
ship to an insurer immediately upon hearing of its capture and
detention.25 8 The ship owner's right to claim his indemnity was not
suspended by the mere chance that he might be able to eventually
recover the ship.259 Upon the abandonment, the insurer was to pay the
indemnity, and if perchance the ship was recovered in the future, the
insurer had the rights to the recovered ship. 260 Kent then pointed out that
the English law did not require any delay to allow the determination of
the likelihood of a future recovery. 261 Rather, the activity of trade
demanded a decisive certainty so that the capital and business of the
merchant should not be kept in suspense.262 He then asks whether there
were any circumstances to exempt the case at hand from the operation of
the general rule, and opined that if there was no warranty or
representation made by the insured as to the neutrality of the shipped
goods being insured, then the risk of a capture, regardless of whose
property it may be, would be on the insurer.263 Kent then refers to
Emerigon as support for the statement: "The practice we have gone into
(now Princeton), graduating in 1783. He, like Kent, studied law with Egbert Benson and
was admitted to the bar in 1786. He began practice in Poughkeepsie but later moved to
New York City. A Federalist, he was appointed by Governor John Jay to the New York
Supreme Court in 1798, the same year as Kent. Kent remembered their relationship as
"intimate" and remarked that Radcliff "stood very high as a judge." Radcliff's stay on
the bench was brief, however. In January 1804 he resigned from the court and resumed
his law practice. His resignation was perhaps motivated by jealousy of Kent, weariness
of being one of the Federalist minority then on the bench, or a desire to earn more money.
He twice served as Mayor of New York and was one of the founders of Jersey City, New
Jersey. See 13 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 471 (N.Y., 1893);
8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 318-19 (1958); 18 AMERICAN NATIONAL

BIOGRAPHY 56-57 (1999); Donald Roper, James Kent's Necrologies, 56 N.Y. HIST.
SOC'Y Q. 212,236-37.
255. United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377, 380 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800).
256. Murray v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 263, 263, 265 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801).
257. Id. at 263-67.
258. Id. at 264, 266.
259. Id. at 264.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 265.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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of warranting, or representing the property to be neutral, can have no
this construction; and the same construction
rational solution but upon ' 264
prevails in the French law.
In the sixth case, Vandenheuvel v. United Insurance Co. (1801),
Kent makes no reference to Emerigon. 265 However, both Justice Egbert
Benson, Kent's former mentor, and Justice Jacob Radcliff, his friend and
fellow Federalist, do.266 Although later reversed,2 67 the decision in
Vandenheuvel set forth the following legal principles regarding actions
on policies of insurance:
(1) When the insured has warranted to the insurer that the property
being insured is American property; and
(2) A foreign court of admiralty issues a sentence condemning such
property as lawful prize;
(3) Such sentence will be held to be conclusive as to:
(4) The character of the property; and as to
(5) The breach of the warranty by the insured.268
Radcliff distinguishes and dismisses the French authorities
supporting a contrary holding:
In France the law is undoubtedly otherwise settled.... Their courts
have adopted a different rule, at an early period, and the authorities
on which they proceed, in cases of new impression, would merit great
attention and respect; but, independent of the circumstance that they
impose no obligation on our courts. I think they do not comport with
of the contract, nor our system of
the sound interpretation
269

jurisprudence.

Justice Benson, by contrast, goes through an elaborate analysis of
French law, quotes in the French from Emerigon in several instances,
makes his own explanatory translations, and refers to a number of the
authorities Emerigon relied upon to draw his conclusions and state his
principles. 270 Benson then, after a detailed explanation as to what his
analysis really shows, concludes:
Thus it is manifest that the practice in France is erroneous; and there
is reason to suppose that it proceeded from a misapprehension of the
264. Id.
265. Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127-68 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801).
266. Id. at 127, 140, 159-63.
267. This decision was reversed. See Vandenheuvel v. United Insurance Co., 2 Cai.
Cas. 217 (N.Y. 1802).
268. Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127, 140 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801).
269. Id. For the reader's immediate convenience, the various citations of foreign
authorities by the various judges have been left in their original form and in their original
placement unless otherwise noted.
270. Id. at 149-68; see also id. at 159-64.
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very authorities cited to prove it to be warranted by law or principle.
It, however, having obtained, and being established in fact, in the
nature of a custom, or usage, it ought, perhaps, not to be changed
there; for both parties being apprised of it, they can make their
calculation as to the risk of the premium accordingly; and in that
view no injury will be produced by it; but it certainly can have no
influence on the present inquiry, which is, as to the true interpretation
of the contract, according to universal law, independent of any
27 1
positive local practice whatever.
In a revisitation of United Insurance Co. v. Lenox, 272 this time in the
court of Errors a year later, Brockholst Livingston, arguing vigorously
for the defendant in error, fashioned an argument by saying Emerigon
seemed to lack any adjudged case in his Treatise on the point at issue.273
There is no reference to Emerigon in the ultimate decision.
Vandenheuvel (1801) is also revisited in the Court of Errors in the
case reports numbered eight and nine.274 In the report by Caines, the
original judgments and citations are repeated.275 Brockholst Livingston's
argument to the Court of Errors is vigorous and relies heavily upon
Emerigon, referring to Emerigon as an "author, not less celebrated for a
pure and unblemished life than for his professional labors and skills,
evidently supposes no property in time of war should be deemed neutral
unless expressly so stated in the policy. '276 Livingston then laments that
some American judges have fallen into the mistaken opinion that all
property in time of war must be taken as belonging to neutrals, unless
otherwise called in the policy of insurance. 77 Livingston further states
that an enforcement of such a judicial error would work a mischief to
American merchants and commerce which would surpass all
calculation. 278 He sums up the principle that it is the abandonment, not
the judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal on the capture, that fixes the
liability in the matter, and the right to abandon is conferred on the
insured by the capture.279
271.

Id. at 164.

272. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
273. United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 2 Johns. Cas. 443 (N.Y. 1801).
274. See Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Cai. Cas. 217 (N.Y. 1802);
Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451 (N.Y. 1802).
275. See Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Cai. Cas. 217, 220-43 (N.Y. 1802)
(Benson's); id. at 232-39 (Benson's French practice); id. at 243-57 (Radcliff s); id. at
256-57 (Radcliff's French practice).

276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Livingston's principal argument using Emerigon appears at 2 Cai. Cas. at 269-

270, and his summary is based primarily upon and literally quoted from Emerigon. See

id. at 279.
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In Vandenheuvel (1802),28 o Senator Dewitt Clinton,28 s citing
Emerigon, refers to the French policy, as distinguished from the English
policy, on the question of captured and abandoned ships. 282 He points
out that many foreign tribunals are inherently corrupt and that the
position taken by the New York Supreme Court in deciding the case
below would lead to catastrophic results for American maritime
commerce. 283 In Barnewall v. Church (1803), Messrs. Hamilton and
Harison cite Emerigon as to the necessity, or lack thereof, for certain
disclosures when the insured has made no express warranty.284
In the next case, Nash v. Tupper (1803), Brockholst Livingston,
having become a Justice of the Supreme Court by this point,285 cites
86 Livingston quotes from him at length in French and
Emerigon. 286
287
As per Emerigon, the
provides some further comment on his own.
court held that the lex loci contractus governs the nature, validity,
construction, and effect of foreign contracts.2 88
In the twelfth case, Kendrick v. Delafield (1803), a case involving
the alleged barratry of a ship's captain, Messrs. Hoffman and Riggs refer
to Emerigon: "[who] says, the captain, though consignee, may, whilst he
continues acting as Captain, be guilty of barratry against the cargo
consigned, but not after they are on shore. 289
In the next case, Church v. Bedient (1804), the Court of Error had to
deal with a hard case caused largely by a lack of readily obtainable and
280. Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451 (N.Y. 1802).
281. DeWitt Clinton (Mar. 2, 1769-Feb. 11, 1828) came from a distinguished English
family on his father's side and an old Dutch family on his mother's side. He graduated at
the head of his class at Columbia College in 1786. He studied law with Samuel Jones, Jr.
in New York and was admitted to the bar in 1788, but practiced little, preferring instead
to be active in Republican party politics. He opposed the Federalist policies of both
Governor John Jay and President John Adams and assailed the Federalists in general for
their hostility to France. In 1797 he was chosen for the lower branch of the legislature.
He was a New York State Senator from 1798 to 1802 and was elected to the United
States Senate in 1802 but soon resigned to take office as Mayor of New York, then an
important position as the Mayor also acted as Chief Judge of the Court of Common Pleas.
His Presidential ambitions were thwarted when the Republicans nominated James
Madison. See 1APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 660-61 (N.Y., 18871889); 2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 221-25 (1958); 5 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 77-80 (1999).
282. Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 451, 462 (N.Y. 1802).
283. Id. at 463.
284. Bamewall v. Church, 1 Cai. R. 217, 221, 229 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803).
285. Livingston became a Justice on January 8, 1802. There is a convenient listing of
the various justices of the New York Supreme Court from 1777 through 1808 on the page
immediately after the preface and immediately before the first page of the reported cases
inJohnson's New York Cases. See 1JOHNSON'S NEW YORK CASES (1808).
286. Nash v. Tupper, I Cai. R. 402, 413-14 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803).
287. Id. at 414-15.
288. Id. at 416.
289. Kendrick v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 67, 70 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803).
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current information. 290 The brig John, insured for $5,000, was captured
on January 19. However, by February 20, it had been restored to its
captain with freight amounting to $2,000. The captain promptly repaired
and refitted the ship for a mere $800; he then proceeded on his planned
voyage. On March 5, the assured, having no knowledge of the ship's
restoration to its captain, abandoned the ship to the underwriter. After
the abandonment, the John arrived. The assured then tendered the John
to the underwriters who refused the tender; the assured then sold the
ship. With the proceeds money in their hands, the assured sued the
underwriter, the captioned plaintiff, for a total loss based on the
information received regarding the initial capture, despite the eventual
restoration.
The case had been tried before a jury, Justice Radcliff presiding. He
had instructed the jury that because the assured, when they chose to
abandon on March 5, were wholly unaware that the ship had been
restored on February 20 and were acting on what was believed to be
accurate intelligence: "[T]hey had a right to abandon, and claim for a
total loss; that being so entitled, they were by law warranted in
demanding the whole amount without deducting anything for the
proceeds of the [sale of the] brig.,' 29'
Pendleton argued for the underwriter that the assured could only
recover an indemnity on the policy "according to the nature of the case at
the time of the action brought, or (at most) at the time of his offer to
abandon. 292 In support of this proposition, Pendleton cited several cases
and treatises, including Valin. 293 Messrs. Henry and Gaines used
Emerigon to override Pendleton's argument based on Valin:
The opinion of Valin, in his second volume, pages 143, 144 has been
cited as to the effects of subsequent events on a prior abandonment;
but in the notes to a former page in the same volume, he himself cites
a French decision to the contrary of what he lays down. Emerigon, a
weightier and more recent authority, in his second volume (chap. 17,
sect. 6),4 answers the points insisted on by Valin, and is clearly against
9
them.
The Court of Errors, however, makes no reference to Emerigon in its
opinion.29 5
290. Church v. Bedient, 1 Cai. Cas. 21 (N.Y. 1804).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 22-23.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 26.
295. Id. at 21. However, to fully address the issues at hand and the court's attitude
toward foreign treatises and jurists generally, it is necessary to peruse the companion
case. See Hallet v. Peyton, 1 Cai. Cas. 28 (N. Y. 1804). Lansing delivered the opinion
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In Leavenworth v. Delafield (1804), the New York Supreme Court
dealt with whether seamen's wages and provisions, during the detention
for the court and stated that the defendants were not entitled to recover for a total loss:
In forming this opinion, I have not brought into view those of the foreign
jurists, cited in argument. In many instances, it is useful to resort to the, to
elucidate general principles; but the occasional infusion of the spirit of local
codes into their general system, renders it sometimes difficult to discriminate
accurately the degree of weight which ought to be attached to these opinions,
on the principles they treat of. In these cases, I do not think it necessary to
enter into an examination of their doctrines, as the court can repose themselves
on judicial opinion, derived to us as authority. But if it were necessary, from
the slightest glance which has been offered, I am persuaded they are capable of
being reconciled, and that they would tend to corroborate the general result
drawn from the cases adjudged in the English courts.
Id. at 42. The reference to Lansing in the original report as Chief Justice most likely
reflects the fact he was then Chancellor and the apparently presiding judge in the Hight
Court of Error.
The companion cases of Church and Hallet, although not stating so in terms,
overruled a chain of New York cases which had stood for the proposition that an insured
was free to abandon to the underwriters upon the receipt of information that the ship had
been captured regardless of whether the ship had been recaptured or recovered in fact by
the date of the abandonment. The new rule now established by Church and Hallet based
the right to abandon not on the receipt of information, but upon the actual state of facts as
of the date of the attempted abandonment by the insured.
The line of cases establishing the old rule apparently begins with Mumford v.
Church, 1 Johns. Cas. 147 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799), a case tried before Kent on the circuit. The
decision of the Supreme Court was rendered by Lansing. The court's primary concern
was that there be some definiteness and certainty in the law so as to better guide
merchants and insurers. With that objective in mind, the court allowed abandonments
based on the knowledge available to the insured at the time of tendering the notice of
abandonment to the insurer. Mumford v. Church, 1 Johns. Cas. 147, 151 (N.Y. S. Ct.
1799). Mumford was then followed in Slocum & Burling v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns.
Cas. (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799), a case likewise tried before Kent with a decision likewise
rendered by Lansing. For an additional case based on this reading, see Murray v. United
Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 263 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801) (opinion by Kent). This case contained
what is perhaps Kent's first official use of Emerigon. The first substantial crack in a link
in this chain occurred in the case of Muir v. United Ins. Co., 1 Cai. Rep. (N.Y. S. Ct.
1803) (per curiam), wherein information was received simultaneously as the ship's
capture, recapture, and complete safety. In view of the simultaneous receipt of such
multiple informations, it was held that the insured could not abandon. Muir was then
followed by the companion cases of Church and Hallet.
It should be pointed out that the questions involving captures, recaptures, releases,
and abandonments were much more vexatious than Lansing's oblique reference to
English cases in Hallet would lead one to believe. The doctrines and principles to such
questions had a prolonged and tortured development. There were, during this process,
some substantial and strong disputes and disagreements between the House of Lords and
the Court of King's Bench. The doctrines of most American courts and the English
courts were nowhere near as consistent as Lansing's statement seems to indicate. The
author, in making a preliminary assessment of this development in England and in the
early days of the American Republic has studied in detail in excess of 100 case reports.
For the interested student, it should be pointed out that a simple resort to the Digests
will only uncover a small number of these cases. Considerable cross-citation searching
and shepardizing will be necessary to locate all or even most of the truly pertinent cases.
There are almost thirty pertinent English cases alone from 1750 through 1829.
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of a captured vessel being carried into port for an adjudication, were
subjects for general average.2 96 Livingston, in delivering the opinion of
the court, refers to Emerigon for support:
In France the extra wages of a crew, when a vessel puts into port and
remains there to avoid an enemy, are a gross average .... The same
author informs us that all bonafide expenses to obtain the release of a
vessel become a general average if the property be released; and...
he observes that in France the question has been uniformly thus
297
decided whenever it occurred.
In Lawrence v. Sebor (1804), the court was forced to deal with
whether an insurance obtained by a short-term partner covered only his
portion of a joint interest in cargo shipped, or the whole combined
interest of both himself and the other short term partner.298 Lawrence,
the partner in charge of taking care of the details of the voyage, including
obtaining the insurance, argued that the policy covered only his
interest. 299 He made this argument because the ship had been captured
and, after a claim was made to have the cargo exonerated from capture,
only Lawrence's share of the cargo had been condemned.3 °° If this
argument was found meritorious, Lawrence would recover twice as much
as he would otherwise. 30 1 Harison, arguing for Lawrence, pointed to the
French law as supporting him.30 2 Justice Livingston, however, being
well versed in French law, pointed out that Valin and Emerigon were at
variance.30 3 Emerigon was of the position that an insurance obtained by
one partner, unless expressly specified otherwise, would be taken to
cover only that partner's separate interest.30 4 Valin, however, along with
several other writers, considered the insurance obtained by the acting or
procuring partner to extend to and cover the entire cargo or both short
term partners' interests therein.30 5 Livingston also pointed out that
Emerigon freely admitted the question had been much agitated and that a
judgment had been rendered in France contrary to the opinion he set
forth.30 6
Kent, however, in dissent, after admitting the question had been

296. Leavenworth v. Delafield, 1 Cai. R. 573, 574-75 (N.Y. 1804).
297. Id. at 577-78
298. Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. R. 203, 207-08 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804).
299. Id. at 204, 205.
300. Id. at 204.

301.

Id. at 205.

302.
303.
304.

Id. at 204.
Id. at 207.
Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. R. 203, 207 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804).

305. Id.
306. Id. at 207 (Livingston).
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much discussed and litigated by the French and Italian writers and that
different opinions had been entertained on the subject, referred to
Emerigon:
Emerigon, (vol. I., page 293, 294, 295), after stating the various
opinions on the point, says that the general rule is, that each copartner is presumed not to insure but for himself; and if one insures,
it will inure only
and the insurance be declared to be for his30account,
7

to the extent of the interest of such partner.

Kent then goes on to say: "This opinion is entitled to the more weight,
considering that the general principles of the law of insurance are the
30 9
30 8
Justice Livingston received concurrences
same in every country.,,
311
3 10
from Justice Spencer and Justice Tompkins.

307. Id. at 209 (Livingston).
308. Id. (Kent).
309. These concurrences are made without separate written opinion. See id. at 207.
310. Ambrose Spencer (Dec. 13, 1765-Mar. 13, 1848) was born into an old and
prominent Connecticut family. His father was a successful iron dealer who furnished the
patriots with cannon and supplies during the Revolution. He graduated from Harvard
with honors in 1783. He then studied law under John Canfield, a Sharon, Connecticut,
attorney, until 1785. In December 1788 he was admitted to the New York bar. He was
elected as a Federalist to the State Assembly and later to the State Senate. Spencer
served loyally in the Federalist party until 1798 when he astounded nearly everyone by
switching his allegiance to the Republican party. As a Republican, he was generally a
leader of the strongest faction. In tandem with DeWitt Clinton, he inaugurated the spoils
system in New York and exercised nearly dictatorial powers in New York politics for
close to twenty years. Spencer was appointed to the New York Supreme Court in
February 1804. He became Chief Justice in 1819 and remained on the court until 1823
when the Senate rejected him by an almost unanimous vote. His furious and vehement
political actions obscured his great ability and integrity as a jurist. No in-depth student of
the law, he based his opinions on common sense and simple logic. He made few citations
and frequently disregarded apparently settled dicta. A number of his dissents gave the
first expression to what eventually became settled doctrine. He occasionally dissented
from the opinions of Chancellor Kent and was sustained in the Court of Errors. Perhaps
his greatest contribution was in domesticating the English common law to the
circumstances of New York. He did this by guiding the law along the lines he believed
would be most beneficial and avoided slavishly following judicial precedent. See 9
DICTIONARY

OF AMERICAN

BIOGRAPHY

443-45

(1958);

20 AMERICAN

NATIONAL

BIOGRAPHY 441-42 (1999).
311. Daniel D. Tompkins (June 21, 1774-June 11, 1825) graduated from Columbia
College in 1795 as class valedictorian. As an undergraduate he had attended Kent's law
lectures and had worked in the law office of Peter Jay Munro, a Federalist lawyer. He
was admitted to the New York bar in 1797. Aided by a wealthy and influential father-inlaw, he advanced rapidly in New York politics. He was appointed to the New York
Supreme Court in 1804. His relatively uneventful judicial career ended in 1807. He was
then elected governor and was re-elected to that office for three year terms in 1810, 1813,
and 1816. He was a consistent and vigorous Jeffersonian Republican. His Presidential
ambitions denied, he was nominated for and elected as Vice-President with James
Monroe. See 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 583-84 (1958); 21 AMERICAN
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 738-39 (1999).
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In Watson v. Delafield (1804),312 a case likely decided
contemporaneously with Lawrence (1804), 3 3 Mr. Pendleton, arguing on
behalf of the defendant, referred to Emerigon in reference to whether an
agent who could have known that a loss had occurred had a duty to
withdraw an application already made for insurance.3 14 He contended
that the agent of the plaintiff at hand, being within easy distance of
revoking the insurance before it was issued and presumably having
knowledge a loss had occurred, was bound to withdraw the application
and that failure to do so meant the policy was void.31 5
Livingston, delivering the opinion for the majority, analyzed French
law and Emerigon's comments thereon in detail and pointed out that the
French law minutely set forth a number of presumptions that would
mandate a finding of knowledge of loss by the agent and of fraud
working to void the policy.316 He then pointed out that presumptions to
the extent prescribed by the French had not been adopted in England or
the United States.31 7 A new trial was awarded.31 8
A review of the above listed cases shows several things, among
them that the quality of education and legal training of the attorneys
involved was very high by any standard. This is readily shown by the
details supplied in the accompanying notes. It should also be apparent
that despite what Kent may say or insinuate, he was far from being the
only erudite and learned member of the bench during the years from
1799 through the end of 1804. Perhaps most importantly, Emerigondespite being a very valuable source of information, references for
further researches, and synopses of the principles of the French law-did
not, in and of himself, sway the Republican or pro-French members of
the court. In several instances they adhered to the principles of the
English law and flatly refused to even consider the French law or its
principles as relevant. 31 9 This is readily noticeable in the statements of
312. Watson v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 224 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804).
313. Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. R. 203 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804).
314. Watson v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 224, 227 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804). Pendleton's
reference to Emerigon is to vol. 2, page 137. Id.
315. Id. at 227.
316. Id. at 229-30.
317. Id. at 230. Livingston then analyzed the principles of the English common law
and proceeded to apply those principles to the void the policy. Id. at 230, 233.
318. For the earlier history of this case, see Watson v. Delafield, 1 Johns. 150 (N.Y.
S. Ct. 1806); Watson v. Delafield, 2 Johns. 526 (N.Y. 1807) (whereat both courts upheld
the position taken by Livingston, J., in the original report of the case).
319. See Seton, Maitland & Co. v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1, 10 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799) (per
Lewis); United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377, 380 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800) (per
Radcliff); Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127, 140, 164 (N.Y. S. Ct.
1801) (per Radclff and per Benson, respectively); and Watson v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 224,
230 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804) (per Livingston). Also, see the comments of Lansing about
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Morgan Lewis and Brockholst Livingston.
In Nash v. Tupper, Livingston followed Emerigon but only because
he enunciated a principle of generally accepted law based on common
sense. 320 This is also true of the Federalist judges, Benson and Radcliff,
who were obviously familiar with Emerigon but nevertheless chose to
reject his application to American legal problems and even went so far as
to point out Emerigon's errors.32'
It is likely that Kent sensed early on that he had to study the French
law thoroughly in the often used treatises of Valin, Pothier, and
Emerigon. His abridgment of Emerigon would certainly make it easier
for him to locate the various principles in Emerigon, and he no doubt
used it in Lawrence.322 It might have also made him feel more able to
compete with the mostly erudite, well-connected, and influential counsel
and judges, with whom he had to deal routinely. One thing is certainKent did not pioneer the use of Emerigon, as it was already being used
by the more prominent members of the Philadelphia and New York bars.
VII. Kent and Emerigon: 1805 Through 1814
As has been seen in the brief biographical sketch of Kent provided
above, Kent believed that, excepting Brockholst Livingston, the other
Judges of the New York Supreme Court knew nothing of the French or
the civil law. 323 From 1799 through 1804, this belief was demonstrated
to be false, at least if statements made in the written reports can be
considered to be a reliable guide.
Morgan Lewis seemingly
demonstrated some ability to discuss Valin, Pothier, and Emerigon and to
distinguish their asserted principles.324 Egbert Benson, Kent's old
mentor, showed an obvious ability to not only comprehend the French
principles and practices, but was also able to point out that some of them

foreign jurists in general, in a case in which Emerigon had been cited in the argument to
its companion in Hallett v. Peyton, 1 Cai. Cas. 28, 42 (N.Y. High Court of Errors 1804).
320. Nash v. Tupper, 1 Cai. R. 402, 414 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1803) ("This is a dictate of
common sense, and is become a principle of general law.").
321. See United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377, 380 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800);
Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127, 140 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801); id. at 164.
322. Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Cai. R. 203, 209 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1804). This speculation by
the author is base upon the fact that Kent worked on his outline/abridgment of Emerigon
during the months of August, September, and October of 1804 and that Lawrence was
heard during the November 1804 Term of Court. A comparison of the salient parts of
Kent's statement in Lawrence; "Emerigon ... says that the general rule is, that each
copartner is presumed not to insure but for himself..." with Kent's own wording and
translation in his outline: "Emerigon says the general rule is that each copartner is
presumed not to insure but for himself," apparently confirms the speculation. Id.
323. AutobiographicalSketch ofChancellor Kent, supra note 151, at 387-88.
324. See Seton, Maitland & Co. v. Low, I Johns. Cas. 1 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1799).
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were based on misapprehensions as to their sources.325 Likewise, Jacob
Radcliff, also mentored by Benson and a fellow
student with Kent,
326
seemed to be familiar with French and French law.
The make up of the court, as to political inclination, changed several
times during Kent's tenure, and a brief review may be helpful. In 1798,
John Jay nominated to the court Kent and Radcliff, both of whom were
committed Federalists. 327 From 1798 through 1801, thanks to Jay's
appointments, the Federalists had a brief ascendancy.32 8 Benson, Kent,
and Radcliff were Federalists, giving them an at least theoretical majority
of three to two over John Lansing, Jr.3 29 and Morgan Lewis, who were
Republicans or Jeffersonian Democrats-assuming that judicial decision
making was, in fact, often politically motivated. 330 That is, perhaps, an
assumption more often imagined than real in the vast majority of cases.
That assumption did, however, have some validity when it came to
whether or not to extend the power and sway of the English common law
and English precedents.
The theoretical majority met its fate in 1801 when Lansing was
appointed Chancellor and Morgan Lewis replaced him as Chief
Justice. 331 Benson resigned his seat on the bench, being appointed a
judge of the circuit court of the United States in March 1801.332
325. See Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801);
Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Cai. Cas. 217 (N.Y. 1802).
326. See United Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Cas. 377 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1800);
Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1801); Vandenheuvel v.
United Ins. Co., 2 Cai. Cas. 217 (N.Y. 1802).
327. HoRTON,supra note 141, at 112.
328. Id. at 139.
329. John Lansing, Jr. (Jan. 30, 1754-Dec. 12, 1829) was descended from an old and
prominent Dutch family. He studied law with Robert Yates in Albany and James Duane
in New York. He was admitted to the bar in 1775. He was six times a New York
Assemblyman, two as Speaker. Among numerous other offices he held were: a member
of Congress under the Articles of Confederation; Mayor of Albany; delegate, along with
Robert Yates and Alexander Hamilton, to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
(from which he withdrew); and member of the New York ratifying convention, wherein
he opposed the new Federal Constitution. In 1790 he was appointed to the New York
Supreme Court. He was made Chief Justice in 1798. In 1801 he was appointed
Chancellor and held that position until reaching mandatory retirement age in 1814. He
was succeeded by Kent. Lansing then returned to practice in Albany and assumed a
position as one of the leaders of the bar. He died a strange and sensational death. On a
trip to New York in December of 1829 he left his hotel room to post some letters and was
never seen again. Foul play with political overtones was most likely involved. See 5
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 608-09 (1959);
13 AMERICAN NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY 180-81 (1999).
330. See Horton's references to the political situation and its possible effect on
decision making with regard to the English common law. HORTON, supra note 141, at
139-42.
331. Id. at 139.
332. Id.
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Brockholst Livingston and Smith Thompson,33 3 staunch Republicans,
were appointed to the places left vacant by Lansing and Benson.334 That
reduced Kent and Radcliff to a minority of two.
In 1804, Lewis was elected Governor of New York and Kent
replaced him as Chief Justice.3 35 Jacob Radcliff resigned his seat in
January 1804,336 and Lewis and Radcliff were replaced by Ambrose
Spencer and Daniel Tompkins, both Republicans. 337 Thus from 1804
through 1807, the Republicans outnumbered Kent four to one.
Daniel Tompkins was elected governor and his judicial seat
333.

Smith Thompson (Jan. 17, 1768-Dec. 18, 1843) graduated from the College of

New Jersey (now Princeton) in 1788. He subsequently studied law for three years under
Chancellor Kent and his then law partner, Gilbert Livingston, in Poughkeepsie, and was
admitted to the bar in 1792. When Kent's active Federalist politics made the partnership
with Livingston somewhat uncomfortable, Thompson replaced Kent in 1793. The
following year, Thompson married Livingston's daughter. Helped by Livingston's
influence and connections to Governor George Clinton, Thompson served a term in the
New York State Assembly and served as a delegate to the state constitutional convention
in 1801. In 1802 he was appointed to the New York Supreme Court. He served there as
an associate justice until 1814 and from then until 1818 was Chief Justice.
James Monroe appointed him to his cabinet as Secretary of the Navy where he
served from 1818-1823 when he was appointed to succeed Brockholst Livingston as a
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He served on the Supreme Court until 1843.
Thompson has been referred to as "a man of great learning, both legal and general." The
reputation he made for sound legal learning on the New York bench was sustained on the
United States Supreme Court. However, some regarded him as a follower of Kent with
regard to cases involving commerce and property. See 6 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 94-95 (N.Y. 1887-1889); 6 THE NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 86 (N.Y. 1893); 10 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF NOTABLE AMERICANS (1904) (no pagination); 9 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 471-73 (1959); 21 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 578-80
(1999). For a more detailed biography, see DONALD M. ROPER, MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON

AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
Kent, however, gave a more limited view on Thompson's learning and abilities in
his necrology:
Without much varied reading or knowledge, was a strict Common Lawyer. He
knew nothing of the civil or French law, but followed closely Co[ke on]
Littleton and the modem Reports and law Books. He was very little of a
scholar.... But he was honest, acute, quick at repartee.... He was originally
a narrow Antifederalist. ... In January 1802, he and Brockholst Livingston
were appointed Judges of the Supreme Court ... thus my former Clerk became
my associate on the Bench, we had always been on friendly Terms.... We
remained Brother Judges together on the Bench of the Supreme Court from
January 1802 to February 1814 when I was appointed Chancellor.... He and I
approximated in confidence and opinion more and more, so that from 1809 to
1814 Judge Van Ness and he and I almost always concurred in opinion and
carried the Court....
Donald M. Roper, James Kent's Necrologies, 56 N.Y. HIST. Soc'Y Q. 212,234-35 (1972).
334. HORTON, supra note 141, at 139.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 139-40.
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replaced by Joseph C. Yates 338 in February 1808. 33 9 In the meantime,
Brockholst Livingston had been appointed a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, being replaced by William Van Ness.340 Thus from
1808 through 1814, the New York Supreme Court was divided as
follows: the three Republicans of Smith Thompson, Joseph C. Yates,
and Ambrose Spencer; and the two Federalists of William Van Ness and
34
James Kent. It would remain so until Kent was appointed Chancellor. 1
To see whether Kent's claims to have overborne his fellow justices
with the "wand" of French law hold any weight, one can make a review
of his use of Emerigon. Further analysis is left for a student with the
time and inclination to undertake a broader project of examining all of
Kent's uses of French law and French treatises.
After 1804, the use of Emerigon by counsel in arguments to the
court increased. 342 For the next two and one-half years, Livingston
remained on the bench and made his own use of Emerigon on a number
338. Joseph C. Yates (Nov. 9, 1768-Mar. 19, 1837) was the son of a well-known
Schenectady merchant. He was sufficiently educated by a series of tutors to enable him
to undertake a three-year legal clerkship with Peter Yates, his father's cousin. He was
admitted to the bar in 1791. With the help of considerable family connections his law
practice soon prospered and he began to advance politically. He was soon elected to the
New York State Senate where he served several terms. He had strong ties to Governor
Clinton and the Republican party. In 1809, with DeWitt Clinton's support, he was
selected to replace Justice Daniel D. Tompkins on the New York Supreme Court. In
1822, he was elected Governor. As a judge he received strong criticism from Federalists.
See 24 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 113-14 (1999).

Kent was particularly stinging

in his condemnation: "He was an associate judge with me from 1808 to 1814, and there
was never a more dull and ignorant man advanced to that high office. His opinions as a
Lawyer and a Judge were below Contempt."
Donald M. Roper, James Kent's
Necrologies, 56 N.Y. HIST. Soc'y Q. 212,227-28.
339. The dates of the appointments of Yates and the other justices can be readily
found in vol. 1 of Johns. Cas. (N.Y.) (1808) following the Preface.
340. William W. Van Ness (1776-Feb. 27, 1823), the son of a farmer, came from an
obscure background. Whatever the source of his education, he did not attend college. He
studied law under John Bay of Claverack and completed his studies with James Kent in
New York. He was admitted to the bar in 1797 and soon became a dominant power in
New York Federalist politics. Van Ness served several terms in the State Assembly. In
1807, he was selected to replace Livingston on the State Supreme Court. Van Ness's rise
in the legal profession was due to innate abilities and talents. As a justice, he was
essentially conservative but was willing to countenance legal change when it would
promote commerce. For example, he aided the development of the doctrine of caveat
emptor which restricted the manner in which fraud and deceit could be pleaded. He
wrote fewer opinions while on the court than was reasonably expected. This was perhaps
a result of his political activities which continued in earnest. Van Ness resigned from the
Supreme Court in 1823 and went back into private practice in New York City but ill
health impeded his practice. 22 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 231-32 (1999).

341. The general information as to the various Justices and their terms of office was
taken from the introductory materials to various editions of Johnson's New York Reports
and from Horton's works. See HORTON, supra note 141, at 112, 139-42.
342. The listing of all the cases involved would be unduly tedious and not necessary
to the analysis undertaken in this section.
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of occasions. 343 However, once Livingston left the bench in mid-I 807, it
does, indeed, appear that Kent had virtually the whole use of Emerigon
to himself as far as overt use in written opinions.344 A review of the
343. The cases and Livingston's uses are:
(1) Walden v. LeRoy, 2 Cai. R. 263, 273 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, cites
Emerigon, vol. I, page 624, in opposition to Kent and the balance of the court. Kent had
been relying on Emerigon, among others, to say that the French law conformed to a key
holding of Ricard, an Amsterdam merchant. Livingston, however, pointed out that a
close and proper reading showed that Emerigon actually limited how far the French law
conformed to Ricard's positions).
(2) Penny v. N.Y. Ins. Co., 3 Cai. R. 155, 159 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, in
delivering the opinion of the court, cites Emerigon. Vol. I, page 631, as showing that
diversity of opinions existed among foreign writers as to averages and consequential
damages and exposures to losses and charges during embargoes).
(3) Schmidt v. United Ins. Co., I Johns. 249, 263 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806) (Livingston
cites Emerigon, vol. I, page 509, to justify the idea that certain fears, whether later proved
to have been well founded or not, could justify an abandonment. In this case, Kent also
cited Emerigon to justify basically the same proposition and holding)
(4) Suydam v. Marine Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 181, 191 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806) (Livingston
cites Emerigon, vol. II, page 197, in delivering the opinion of the court that when making
an abandonment, the assureds relied on a matter which was not a justifiable cause, and
must be bound by the cause given, and shall not be permitted to avail themselves of a
subsequent accident without making a new abandonment).
344. Again, for the convenience of the reader, a case report from the High Court of
Errors is included herein.
(1) Walden v. LeRoy, 2 Cai. R. 263, 266 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805) (Kent, in delivering the
opinion of the court, cites Emerigon, vol. I, page 625, among other foreign sources, to
bolster his argument that the Law Merchant is a general commercial law of nations and
that when our own positive institutions and decisions are silent, such law is to be
expounded by having recourse to the usages of other nations. Livingston, however, used
Emerigon to argue the foundational principle derived from Ricard, a Merchant of
Amsterdam, was actually limited by Emerigon.)
(2) United Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 2 Cai. R. 280, 285 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805). (Kent,
delivers the court's majority opinion. The majority held that when an abandonment was
made after a capture by a French privateer and condemnation by a French Court, and the
abandonment was accepted and a payment of the loss made, a purchase of the condemned
insured property by the agent of the underwritten, although made after the condemnation,
is a purchase for the benefit of the insurer. Therefore, the insurer, if he so elects, may
chase the proceeds of such a purchase and any cargo in which the proceeds were then
invested. Such cargo then becomes the insurer's property and he may maintain a trover
action against the assured to recover it. To justify such a holding, Kent relied on the
French Ordonnance of the Marine, articles 66 and 67 and commentaries thereon by Valin.
He also referred to Emerigon, vol. I, page 464 and sect. 21. Livingston penned a
vigorous dissent, being of the opinion that the basic propositions underlying Kent's
majority opinion were faulty).
(3) Smith v. Williams, 2 Cai. Cas. 110, 121, 122 (N.Y. 1805) (Lansing, delivering a
per curiam opinion for the court that bears strong marks as having been influenced by
Kent, points out that no express authorities could be found on the subject at hand in
American or British courts, and that the position laid down by Emerigon, vol. II, pages
386, 396, as to whether certain values covered by bottomry could be considered an
insurable interest or not, would fully rule the issue. He goes on to state: "To the
objections which have been urged against receiving the law from... Emerigon, on [his]
authority, it may be observed, that [his] positions on this subject appear untinctured by
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local considerations; and if the mind assents to their correctness, there can be no reason
for resisting Truth from; whatever source it may be derived." He goes on to point out
that English courts consult the French authors on maritime law).
(4) Davy v. Hallett, 3 Cai. R. 16, 18, 21 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805) (Kent delivers the
opinion of the court in a case involving the interpretation of a policy insuring freight
separately from the vessel and its cargo on a round-trip voyage. The voyage had been
more than half completed when a capture and abandonment of the vessel and cargo took
place. However, because some freight had been earned and some had been lost as a
result of the capture, an issue as to credits and pro-rations regarding the earned freight
quickly arose. The defendant insurer, through his counsel, Nathaniel Pendleton, argued
that the insurers should only have to pay one-half the claim because the insurer should be
entitled to a pro-rated credit for freight already earned on the out part of the voyage
before capture. Pendleton based this argument on Emerigon, vol. II, page 222. Kent,
however, quickly distinguished the case at hand and cited another part of Emerigon's
Treatise, vol. 2, pages 39-40, which stood for the opposite conclusion, on similar facts.
The insurer was ordered to pay the full amount of the policy).
(5) United Ins. Co. v. Scott, 1 Johns, 106, 114 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806) (This case
involved the abandonment of a ship and its operation and effect on the shares and
responsibilities of a number of underwriters. Kent, writing a separate opinion, cites
Emerigon, vol. II, 194-196, generally, along with a New York case, for the proposition
that by an abandonment which is accepted, the underwriters become part owners of the
ship insured, and such ownership is to be computed from the time of the loss.
Abandonment has a retrospective effect and amounts to a complete transfer of the
property to the insurer).
(6) Schmidt v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 249, 265 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806) (Kent here cited
solely Emerigon, vol. I., page 542, for the principle that the interdiction of commerce
with the port of destination is considered a peril of the sea as generally understood under
a policy of insurance, and if it happens after the risk commences, as it did in the case at
hand, the insurer is responsible for the consequences of it. But, if it existed before the
voyage was commenced, then the insurance contract was considered dissolved. Kent
then went on to state: "In a question upon which the English books and decisions are
silent, and when the opinion of Emerigon is founded, not upon local ordinances, but upon
general principles of insurance, I cannot but consider him a great authority.").
(7) Patrick v. Hallett, I Johns. 241, 249 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806) (Kent, in dissent, cites
Emerigon, vol. I, pages 374, 576 to 591, in regard to seaworthiness or "innavigability"
and how presumptions are raised here as compared to France. He points out that in
France there was a presumption of seaworthiness at the time of a departure. The insurer
had to prove otherwise. In France, this presumption led to abuses and fraud against
insurers. To counteract frauds, the Ordonnance of 1779 was passed requiring a survey or
inspection of the vessel before every voyage. Since that time, in France, the presumption,
either way, depends upon the survey previous to sailing. Emerigon lists a number of
cases where the fact of a survey was the basis for over-turning the presumption). This
case and its quoted material particularly furnishes an excellent example for a student to
contrast the text in Emerigon, or in Meredith's translation, with Kent's abridgment of the
pages in question and his final usage thereof in his opinion.
(8) McBride v. Ins. Co., 5 Johns. 299, 307 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810) (This case dealt with
an issue involving a voyage that had been insured and that had already commenced when
the vessel was detained along the coast and the ship's Master was read the Embargo Act.
The ship was forbidden to proceed on the voyage. It was held that the insured had a right
to abandon and recover for a total loss. Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court,
points out that no decision in the English books precisely covers the question. The
language in those books, however, generally seems to favor a right of abandonment in the
insured and makes no distinction between a foreign and domestic embargo. "The French
writers are more explicit. They consider an embargo laid by the French government, on
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their own vessels in their own ports, as a detention within the policy, if laid after the
commencement of the risk. Valin, Emerigon, and Pothier concur in this opinion. Under
the law of insurance, as they lay it down, the question before us would not be open for
discussion.").
(9) Mumford v. Commercial Ins. Co., 5 Johns. 262, 267-68 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810) (In
this case a ship was captured but soon released. The goods on board, which were
insured, were detained until further proof as to whether they were contraband could be
obtained. The goods were subsequently released to the owner. The owner, however, was
obliged to hire another vessel to carry the goods to their destination. Kent, writing for the
court, cites Emerigon, vol. I, page 432, in holding that the insurer was liable to pay this
additional freight, it being an expense necessarily incurred in consequence of the capture.
Kent goes on to say: "In a case in which no English decisions are to be met with, it is
usual and proper to listen with attention and respect, to the foreign jurists: for where
positive regulations do not intervene, the law of insurance is part of the general law
merchant of Europe....
The French Ordonnance of the Marine leaves the point
doubtful; but Emerigon is decidedly of the opinion that the increased freight, arising from
the necessary change of ship, ought to fall upon the insurer of the goods, and this, he says
is the language of the new Ordonnance of 1779. We have nothing to do with the
municipal regulation of the ordonnance, but the opinion of the French writer is of high
and deserved authority.").
(10) Craig v. United Ins. Co., 6 Johns. 226, 250-252, 255 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810) (In this
case a vessel was insured from New York to Barcelona. During the voyage a series of
events led the ship's captain to fear an immediate capture. Upon being informed that
Barcelona was occupied by French troops, he abandoned the voyage, returned to New
York and abandoned to the insurer, claiming a total loss. Kent delivered the opinion of
the court. He pointed out that the cause of abandonment was a fear of capture while in
transit. To allow such fear as a justification would confound the distinction between real
and imaginary dangers. Emerigon, vol. I, pages 507-12, had been referred to in the
argument. Kent pointed out: "In the cases cited by Emerigon, in which a just fear of one
of the perils insured against was held equivalent to force majeure and sufficient to charge
the loss upon the insurer, the danger was imminent, apparently remediless, and morally
certain." Kent then surveys the cases in Emerigon which make it clear a just fear is one
of "being made a slave or a prisoner, or of perishing in a case of extremity, or when
defense becomes impossible.").
(11) Jumel v. Marine Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 412, 426 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1811). (The issue in
this case was whether the insurers were bound to agree to and enter into a composition
among a debtor and his creditors. Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court that the
insurer need not do so refers to a passage in Emerigon (vol. I, page 470): "The insurers
are not bound to avail themselves of a composition. It is sufficient that they pay the total
loss when demanded. If they will not take to themselves the profit of the composition,
they are still bound to pay the total loss, and in such a case they have no right to the
subject repurchased; so there is no foundation for a claim upon them to contribute to the
expense of the repurchase, as it is an act to which they are strangers, and which they are
at liberty not to adopt, lest it might expose them to still greater loss.")
(12) Barker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 8 Johns. 307, 317 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1811) (This case
dealt with whether the requisite proof of loss to justify an abandonment was timely and
sufficiently communicated. It had been argued that the bare allegation of the insured was
not sufficient and that reasonable proof had to be communicated virtually simultaneously.
Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, uses Emerigon to point out that the requisite
documents and proofs of interest and loss may be communicated at any time after the
abandonment. The act of abandonment, under the general law of insurance and the
furnishing of the preliminary proofs, under a special stipulation in a policy, are to be
considered distinct acts and must not be confounded).
(13) Schieffelin v. N.Y. Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 21, 26 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812) (Kent, in
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cases in which Kent delivered the opinion and one in which he may well
have heavily influenced the opinion shows five cases in which Kent
specifically states that there were either no English cases or no English
books that addressed the issue in question.345 In the balance of the cases,
Emerigon was either cited to support general rules upon principle, or to
support other authorities already given as a grounds of decision by

delivering the opinion of the court, cited Emerigon to lay down the rule that "an
abandonment, when found upon a statement of facts justifying it, relates back to the time
of the loss and renders the insurer proprietor of the subject from that time, with the rights
and risks attached to that relation.").
(14) Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 14-16 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812) (This
case involved a ship, in extremity, run ashore deliberately. Kent says that when there are
no English decisions on point, there can be no better source for principles of Marine law
than Emerigon. He states that "Nothing can be more clear and explicit than the language
of Emerigon: 'the damage (he observes) resulting from the stranding of the ship, if the
stranding be done voluntarily, for the common safety, are general average, provided
always, that the ship be again set afloat; for if the stranding be followed by shipwreck,
then it is save who can.' [This] authority [is] founded on sound principles, for the loss of
the ship in these cases, is more imputable to casualty than design." It was therefore held
that no contribution to a general average was necessary in the case).
(15) Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 1, 9 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813) (Kent, writing for the court,
used Emerigon to lay down a rule regarding liabilities of ship's masters carrying goods
for hire. "Emerigon, Vol. I, pages 373, 377, says, it is so difficult to discover the faults of
a master of a vessel, that he is held responsible for very slight negligence. He is in fault,
if he has not foreseen what he ought to have foreseen, with due diligence. In short, he
says, the master, in consequence of his compensation, is answerable for all damage which
the cargo receives, unless it proceeds from an accident which he could not foresee or
prevent." Kent also points out that the English law, the custom of the realm, and the
marine law, which has its source in the civil law, held masters of vessels and innkeepers
to the same responsibility and liability).
(16) Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 73 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813) (The plaintiff in the case
was a British subject who sued an American citizen for non-payment on a promissory
note. Kent, for the court, stated the law to be that so long as an alien was permitted to
remain in the United States, the alien was to be protected in his person and property.
Relying on Emerigon, he went so far as to say that even if the Executive power orders an
alien to leave the country, he shall still be entitled to leave a power of attorney, and to
collect his debts by suit).
(17) Deidericks v. Commercial Ins. Co., 10 Johns. 234, 235 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813) (In
this case, a policy of insurance on a cargo of sugar, mace, and logwood, specified each
separately by quantity and value. When over half of the sugar was damaged, the insured
abandoned the sugar but not the mace or logwood. The insurance company argued the
insured had to abandon all the cargo, including the undamaged mace and logwood. Kent,
writing for the court, pointed out that the issue was entirely new with American courts
and did not appear to have ever been discussed by the English courts. After reviewing
the basis of the French law, largely through Emerigon's comments and explanations
thereon, Kent states that because there is nothing unreasonable in the French doctrine and
in the absence of all authority to the contrary, the court adopts the French doctrine).
345. See Schmidt v. United Ins. Co., 1 Johns. 249, 265 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806); McBride v.
Ins. Co., 5 Johns. 299, 307 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810); Mumford v. Commercial Ins. Co., 5 Johns.
262, 267-68 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810); Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 14-16 (N.Y.
S. Ct. 1812); Deidericks v. Commercial Ins. Co., 10 Johns. 234, 235 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813).
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Kent.346 It would thus appear that Kent's claim to have used French law
to carry his opinions over his brother justices is at least plausibly true.
After Livingston left the bench in mid- 1807, 34 7 excepting one per curiam
opinion by Lansing which was likely influenced by Kent, 348 no other
Judge referred to or quoted Emerigon during the entire balance of Kent's
tenure on the bench.
VIII. Post-1814: Kent as Chancellor and Commentator
In 1814, Kent was appointed Chancellor. 349 As Chancellor, Kent
went approximately five years without citing Emerigon in any opinion.
In 1819, in Searle v. Scovell, Kent cited Emerigon 350 several times in
addressing the duties of a ship's master when a ship under his command
is disabled. 351 He also used Emerigon in laying down rules as to the
obligation of the payment of extra freight when another ship is hired to
carry the cargo.352 Kent next cited Emerigon,35 3 in Skinner v. Dayton,
regarding the limits upon a special agent's power to bind his principal.3 54
These appear to be Kent's only uses of Emerigon as Chancellor.
Kent held his position as Chancellor until 1823 when, at age sixty,
he was required to retire by the New York Constitution.355 In Kent's
absence from the New York Supreme Court, in the period from 1814
through 1823, Emerigon continued to be cited in argument by various
counsel. However, the only New York Supreme Court Justice who cited
or used Emerigon in any decision was Jonas Platt.356 In Walden v. New
346. See Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 73 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813); Elliott v. Rossell, 10
Johns. 1, 9 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1813); Schieffelin v. N.Y. Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 21, 26 (N.Y. S. Ct.
1812); Barker v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 8 Johns. 307, 317 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1811); Jumel v. Marine
Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 412, 426 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1811); Craig v. United Ins. Co., 6 Johns. 226,
250-52, 255 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1810); Patrick v. Hallett, 1 Johns. 241, 249 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806);
United Ins. Co. v. Scott, 1 Johns, 106, 114 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1806); Davy v. Hallett, 3 Cai. R.
16, 18,21 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805); Smith v. Williams, 2 Cai. Cas. 110, 121, 122 (N.Y. 1805);
United Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 2 Cai. R. 280, 285 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805); Walden v. LeRoy, 2
Cai. R. 263, 266 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805).
347. See HORTON, supra note 141, at 140.
348. Smith v. Williams, 2 Cai. Cas. 110, 121, 122 (N. Y. 1805).
349. HORTON, supra note 141, at 199.
350. See Emerigon, supra note 1, at 427, 428, 429, 433.
351. 4 Johns. Ch. 218, 222-26 (N.Y. Ch. 1819).
352. Id. at 225-26.
353. See 2 Emerigon, supra note 1, at 384, 443.
354. 5 Johns. Ch. 351, 365 (N.Y. Ch. 1821).
355. HORTON, supra note 141, at 261-62.
356. Jonas Platt (June 30,1769-Feb. 22, 1834) was born in Poughkeepsie, New York.
His father was a well-known land speculator and lawyer. He studied law under Richard
Varick, a prominent New York City lawyer and was admitted to the bar in 1790. He
soon became an ardent Federalist. Platt was elected in 1810 to three straight terms as a
New York State Senator. In 1814 he was appointed to the New York Supreme Court. 17
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 585-86 (1999).
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York Firemen Insurance Co., 35 7 Platt cited Emerigon, 358 along with
Valin, Pothier, and Le Guidon, for a definition of "Barratry." 359 In
Buchanan v. Curry,360 Platt again referred to Emerigon 361 regarding the
right of a resident alien to sue or be sued during a war between his
country and the United States and his rights to receive payment without
6
3
suit. 1

Upon Kent's retirement from the Chancellorship, he took up
residence in New York City and began to offer opinions to other
attorneys, as well as to some select clients, as a "Chamber Counsel. 363
He was offered the newly revived position of law professor at Columbia
College, and began lecturing there in February of 1824. 36
Soon
thereafter, he was giving careful consideration to publishing his lectures
in book form.36 5 After presenting a series of revised lectures in the 1825

to 1826 academic year, Kent ceased lecturing at Columbia.36 6
Kent's Commentaries are numbered in "lectures" rather than
chapters.367 Volume three of the Commentaries contains the "lectures"
on maritime law and related subjects. 368 The relevant lectures are XLV
"of Title to Merchant's Vessels;" XLVI "of the Persons Employed in the
Navigation of Merchant's Ships;" XLVII "of the Contract of
Affreightment;" XLVIII "of the Law of Insurance;" and XLIX "of
Maritime Law." 369 This material "was written expressly for publication,
and was not part of the Columbia lecture series.

37 °

In these "lectures," Kent makes very frequent references to French
law and French writers in general. Emerigon is referred to often, both in

357. 12 Johns. 128, 137 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1815).
358. In this instance, Platt made a general reference to Emerigon without specific
volume or page.
359. Id. ("Barratry comprehends every fault of the master by which a loss is
occasioned, whether arising from fraud, negligence, unskillful ness, or mere
imprudence.").
360. 19 Johns. 137, 142 (N.Y. 1821).
361. See Emerigon, supra note 1, at 384, 443.
362. Buchanan, 19 Johns. 137, 142 (N.Y. 1821).
363. HORTON, supra note 141, at 263.
364. Langbein, supra note 214, at 564.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 564-65.
367. For readily accessible and well-written materials dealing with the Commentaries
and their publication, see id.; FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW
147(1921).
368. Volume III appeared in 1828. See 3 KENT, supra note 14 1.
369. Lectures XLV through XLIX appear at pages 93-306 of vol. III of the
Commentaries. See 3 KENT, supra note 141, at 93-306.
370. For quoted material, see Langbein, supra note 214, at 565 n.90. The edition of
the Commentaries used herein for illustrative references is the first edition, it being the
closest in time to Kent's judicial usages of Emerigon. 3 KENT, supra note 141, at 93-306.
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the text and notes. 37 1 Emerigon's Treatise on Insurance is most heavily
used, but Hall's translation of Emerigon's work on maritime loans is also
used.372 In the main, Kent's use of Emerigon is more careful than it had
been in some of his judicial opinions. 373 In a goodly number of
instances, he pairs Emerigon with Valin and/or Pothier.374 His analysis
in these instances varies from merely citing the three as cumulative
evidence of a principle to a careful examination of the grounds of their
concurrence or disagreement.37 5
Kent continues to maintain his praise for Emerigon in his
Commentaries. He points out that it is Emerigon's usual manner to
collect and exhaust all the learning appertaining to the particular
subject.376 In his review of the various writers on marine insurance, Kent
refers to Emerigon as compared to all of his predecessors:
But the treatise of Emerigon very far surpasses all preceding works,
in the extent, value and practical application of his principles. It is
the most didactic, learned and finished production extant on the
subject. He professedly carried his researches into the antiquities of
the maritime law, and illustrated the ordinances by what he terms the
jurisprudence of the tribunals; and he discussed all incidental
questions, so as to bring within the compass of his work a great
portion of international and commercial law, connected with the
doctrines of insurance. In the language of Lord Tenterden, no subject
in Emerigon is discussed without being exhausted, and the eulogy is
as just as it is splendid. Emerigon was a practical man, who united
exact knowledge of the details of business with manly sense and
consummate erudition. He was a practising lawyer at Marseilles, for
perhaps forty years, and the purity of his private life corresponded
with the excellence of his public character.
IX. The BradhurstCase: Emerigon and General Average
As mentioned above, the case of Bradhurstv. Columbian Insurance
Co. is most important in the development of the American law of
maritime insurance as it relates to the concept of "general average."
Kent took a very strong position that a voluntarily stranded ship which
371. See3KENT, supranote 141, at 19.
372. See id. at 169, 194.
373. A complete listing of the many pages where Emerigon is cited would not only be
extremely tedious but would serve no useful purpose. The student should read these
materials and compare his conclusions to those of the author.
374. For example, see 3 KENT, supra note 141, at 119, 127, 166-67, 211, 221, 227,
241,271,272, 276, 304.

375.
376.
377.

See id. at 119, 127, 166-67,211,221,227,241,271,272,276,304.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 292.
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was lost would not be a subject for general average. He based his
interpretation largely on Emerigon.
However, Kent's leading contemporaries of both bench and bar
were of a decidedly different opinion. This controversy and the
arguments and decisions which resulted are well worth the student's
detailed study. What follows is an introduction to the American law of
general average and the now settled debate, in the hope that it may
encourage students to learn by observing the various modes of analysis
and interpretation used by some of the great giants of the legal
profession.
A.

GeneralAverage and Contribution

The term "general average" has been described in a variety of ways.
The law relative to it regards the ship, the goods on board or cargo, and
378
sometimes the freight, as lumped together in one combined adventure.
The various interests therein, whether simple or complex, and few or
many, are regarded as being jointly exposed to the perils of the sea.37 9
378. When reading the text that follows, the technical and legal distinction between
"cargo" and "freight" should be kept firmly in mind. Bouvier's Dictionary respectively
defines the terms: "CARGO, mar. law. The entire load of a ship or other vessel.
[citations omitted]." And "FREIGHT. Mar. law, contracts, is the sum agreed on for the
hire of a ship, entirely or in part, for the carriage of goods from one port to another;
[citation omitted]; but in its more extensive sense it is applied to all rewards or
compensation paid for the use of ships. [citations omitted]." 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW
DICTIONARY 237, 592-93 (2d ed., Phila., T. & J. W. Johnson 1843).
379.

2 DAVID MACHLACHLAN, ARNOULD ON THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE 755 (4th

ed., London, Stevens & Sons 1872). Sir Joseph Arnould (1814-1886), heir to the White
Cross estates in Berkshire, England, was educated at Wadham College, Oxford. While at
Oxford he won a number of prizes and one of the principal speakers when the Duke of
Wellington was installed as chancellor of the university. He entered the Middle Temple
in 1836 and was called to the bar in 1841. His principal employment was as a special
pleader although he wrote for several newspapers while a practicing barrister. From 1859
until his retirement in 1869, he sat on the bench of the supreme court of Bombay, India.
Upon his retirement he returned to England. "A fruit of his leisure ... was the memoir of
the first Lord Denman, in two volumes, published in 1873." 22 THE DICTIONARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 78 (Leslie Stephen & Sidney Lee eds., Supp. XXII 1917). "Lord
Denman" refers to Thomas Denman (1779-1854) the notable barrister and judge perhaps
best know for his arguments regarding the correct application of the rule in Shelley's
Case, in the case of Doe dem. Earl ofLindsay v. Colyer, 11 East 548, 103 Eng. Rep. 1115
(K.B. 1809), and for his spirited representation "of Queen Caroline in her dispute with
the King." BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 84, at 47-48.
"[Iln 1848 [Amould] gave to the world a work in two volumes on the Law of Marine
Insurance and Average. It was so well received as to be reprinted at Boston, in America,
two years later with some additions." 22 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 78
(Leslie Stephen & Sidney Lee eds., Supp. XXII 1917). The work was quickly to become
"[t]he standard book on this subject." HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 326 (1965). The
American Law Journal, in a review of the 1850: "The student will here find, within a
convenient compass, the learning of the Continental jurist; the just and politic judgments
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Such joint or unified interests are regarded as equally concerned in any
common danger and any steps or actions that are taken in an effort to
avert a total loss or complete disaster to the adventure or voyage.
In general, the rules and principles associated with "general
average" prescribe that when a part of the common adventure is
sacrificed so that the balance not sacrificed may be preserved for the
benefit of the whole group of adventurers, then any loss, which occurs by
reason of the loss or damage of the part or thing sacrificed, shall be
assessed upon the value of the parts or things not sacrificed, which have
been saved by virtue of the sacrifice.380 This assessment is made upon
the value of the remaining saved parts or things, together with the value
of the parts or things sacrificed and lost. 381 The objective is to make
some reasonable compensation to the person or persons holding the
ownership interests in the items sacrificed.382 If properly applied, the
rule should place all the interests on an equal footing as co-adventurers
83
as to a fair and a proportional share in any losses via sacrifice.
As a practical matter, "general average" is usually used to denote at
least three things which are distinguishable from each other: (1) the act
of making the sacrifice; (2) the loss sustained as a direct consequence of
the sacrificial act; and (3) the "contribution" levied on the adventurers or
de facto partners to recompense the loser(s).38 4 This rule is believed to
have originated with the ancient Rhodians. 385 The ancient Romans, in
their turn, adopted it and devoted the 14th book of the Digest to it under
the title Lex Rhodia de Jactu.386 It has since been adopted by all the
38' but is relatively unknown
maritime peoples of Europe and America,388
adventures.
except to seafaring commercial
The general average rule was no doubt originally introduced and
of the first intellects of England, in Westminster Hall, and the clear and satisfactory
determinations of the American commercial tribunal and judges, at once eminently
scientific and practical." 1 S. AUSTIN ALLIBONE, A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH
LITERATURE, AND BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS 70 (Phila., Childs & Peterson 1859).
Amould's work has gone through numerous editions and continues to be well received.
A CATALOGUE OF THE LAW COLLECTION AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY WITH SELECTED
ANNOTATIONS 271 (Julius J. Marke ed., 1953). The sixteenth edition of 1981 by Sir
Michael J. Mustill and Jonathan C. B. Gilman has recently been cited with approval in
the report for the case of Ultramar Canada v. Mutual Marine Office, 1 F. C. 341 (T2535-88) (1995).
380. MACHLACHLAN, supra note 379, at 755.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 756.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 756-57.
388. Id. at 756.
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justified by expediency and sanctioned by the principles of natural
equity.389 In a more modern view, it is favored by commercial policy
because it encourages
behavior designed to save lives and property to the
390
extent possible.
1.

The Sacrifice Must Be the Result of a Deliberate Choice of an
Available Alternative.

A mere chance result of circumstances arising from the natural
elements will not qualify. 39' By way of example, if a strong gale swept
cargo overboard and snapped off the masts and rigging of a sailing ship,
such losses, even if they could arguably be said to result in a savings of
and benefit to the common adventure, would not qualify for general
average-rather these would be considered "particular average" losses.
On the other hand, a jettison undertaken in the face of an imminent
peril, as a conscious effort to minimize the likely losses, would constitute
a choice between a greater, maybe even a whole, loss and an expected or
hoped for lesser lOSS. 3 92 Although human will and deliberate action is the
proximate cause of the sacrificial loss, the insurer, who contracted only
to indemnify against losses specified as "perils of the sea," will
nevertheless be held responsible to pay such losses up to the limitations
and amounts of his policy. 393 This is in direct contradiction to the usual
rule that one cannot take advantage of his wrong or tortious action
because the circumstance and action are considered special and outside
the usual boundaries of the rules of indemnity, and because the sacrificial
act, if successful in whole or in part, most likely resulted in a savings to
394
the insurer.
2.

The Sacrifice Must Also Be Made Outside of the Ordinary
Course of the Duty of the Ship's Master or Its Owner.

An act typically falling within the generally prescribed and
recognized duties of a ship-owner or the ship's master cannot be
regarded as a general average act.395 Efforts to escape a danger that
come within the usual duties of the carrier, even though they result in
injury and loss, are deemed to fall only on the ship-owner. 396 For
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 758.
392. See id. at 758-59.
393. Id. at 758.
394. Id; see also Mutual Safety Ins. Co. v. Cargo of the George, Olcott 89, 8 L. Rep.
361, 3 New York Leg. Obs. 260, 17 F. Cas. 1082, Cas. No. 9,981 (S.D.N.Y. 1845).
395. MACHLACHLAN,supra note 379, at 760-61.
396. Id. at 761.
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example, an armed ship attacked by enemy corsairs, which determines to
fight and is heavily damaged in the process, will have to bear its own
losses.397 This is because it was the ship's duty to fight off enemies.3 98
3.

The Sacrifice Must Be Made for the Intended Good of the
Common Adventure.

This is an inference which is necessarily drawn from the right of the
loser to be recompensed by and in proportion to the whole common
venture. 399 Thus, if no common danger was in existence, or if no
common benefit was planned or expected, the sacrificial act leading to
the loss is one in name only, and the losses resulting from such an act
will not give a right to any contribution in general average. 400 Ultimate
success, however, is not a condition.40 '
4.

The Sacrificial Action Must Be Undertaken To Avert a Total
Loss of the Whole.

Such a loss must be clearly imminent.40 2 The idea is that if the
ship's captain throws cargo overboard, the loss of that particular
adventurer or de facto partner results in a gain to the other co-adventurers
397. Id.
398. Id. at 758-59. Emerigon provides an interesting example of a wartime maneuver
which was successful and resulted in the payment of a general average contribution:
If a boat launched from the ship for the common safety is lost, and the vessel is
saved, it shall enter into general average. A vessel called the Victoire,
commanded by Captain Demoulin, of Marseilles, coming from Port-au-Prince
to Marseilles, on the 16th February, 1782, at nine o'clock in the morning,
described two frigates on her quarter bearing down for her with the wind free,
at two and a half leagues distance. About mid-day another sail, that was taken
for an enemy, appeared in the opposite direction; and shortly after a third was
made out in chase. In the lapse of some hours, the captain was losing distance;
at five o'clock in the evening, he prepared his ship's launch, placed in it a mast
with a foresail, and attached to the top of the mast a lantern. A soon as it was
quite dark, the lantern was lighted, and the boat put into the water to go where
the wind might carry her. The vessel then changed her course, sailing up the
wind, close hauled. On the following morning there was no enemy to be seen,
and she arrived safely in Marseilles.
It is not doubtful that the boat, thus sacrificed for the common safety, entered
into general average. But if the boat had been put into the sea for any other
object than that of the common safety, and it had been necessary to abandon it
from the occurrence of bad weather, this would have been particular
average. ...
A TREATISE ON INSURANCES BY BALTHAZARD MARIE EMERIGON, TRANSLATED FROM THE

FRENCH 480 (London, Butterworth's 1850).

399.
400.
401.
402.

2 MACHLACHLAN,
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id.

supra note

379, at 762.
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whose interests are thus saved.40 3 Therefore, they must not expect their
co-adventurer to have to suffer the loss all by himself and will have to
contribute their proportional share to the general average.40 4
5.

The Sacrificial Action Must Be the Only Alternative to a Total
Loss of the Whole.

If there is no real alternative to or practical chance to avoid a total
405
loss, any effort to avert it will be regarded as willful and worthless.
Accordingly, it will not be recognized by the law.40 6
B.

General Average Losses

There are two general categories that qualify for general average
losses: sacrifices and expenditures.4 7 Examples of sacrifices giving rise
to general average losses include: jettisons; the putting of goods into
lighters; the bargaining with and payment of ransoms to pirates; the
40 8
physical sacrifice of a part of the ship; and voluntary stranding.
C. The Principlesof Contribution andAdjustment
Arnould succinctly states the leading principles of a general average
contribution:
That all the parties interested in the adventure, for the benefit of
which the loss was incurred, should be sufferers by the loss in exact
proportion to the extent of their respective interests on board at the
time, but no further. This object is attained only when the party
whose property has been sacrificed, or money disbursed, or credit
pledged for the general benefit, is placed by the adjustment exactly in
the position he would have stood in had the sacrifice been made, not
by himself, but by some other of his co-adventurers. In the
403. Id. at 763-64.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 764.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 765.
408. Id. at 765, 779. Lighters are defined as:
small vessels employed in loading and unloading larger vessels. The owners of
lighters are liable, like other common carriers, for hire; it is a term of the
contract on the part of the carrier or lighterman, implied by law, that his vessel
is tight and fit for the purpose or employments for which he offers and holds it
forth to the public: it is the immediate foundation and substratum of the
contract that it is so: the law presumes a promise to that effect on the part of the
carrier without actual proof, and every reason of sound policy and public
convenience requires it should be so.
2 BOUVIER, supra note 378, at 57-58 (citation omitted).
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application, however, of this principle to practice, there is an
important distinction to be observed as to the mode by which the
object is sought to be obtained, in the case
of losses arising from
409
sacrifice and losses founded on expenditure.

This case involved sacrifice, and concludes this background
introduction with the principles as they relate to sacrifices in particular.
Arnould sets forth the practical rule:
The property sacrificed for the general benefit is regarded as though
it had never been lost, but actually were a portion of the whole mass
of property on which the contribution is assessed, at the time the
adjustment is made; its supposed balance is assumed, and, in
proportion to that amount, it takes its full share with the rest of the
adventure for the benefit 4of10 which it was sacrificed, in contributing to
the loss thereby incurred.
A simple calculation should suffice. The sacrificed property, if it
had been saved, would have had a value of $100. It was sacrificed to
save property having a value of $900. The sum upon which the
contribution is to be levied is an aggregated value of both the property
sacrificed and the property saved by the sacrifice. In this example, the
aggregate is $1,000. The amount of the sacrificial loss to be made good
is $100 or one-tenth of $1,000. The property saved must contribute onetenth of its value of $900, or $90, and the property sacrificed must also
contribute one-tenth, or $10. To put the matter another way, the overall
loss was at a proportion to the whole of 10%. The sacrifice to be made
good will be $90 and the contributory value saved is $900, of which 10%
is $90. This is the sum required to be paid to the owner of the sacrificed
property.41 1
These explanations supply the basic background to understand the
issues at hand and the monetary stakes involved in the Bradhurstcase.
D. Kent's Analysis of the Principlesand Doctrines of General Average
as Related to the Voluntary and SacrificialStrandingof a Ship
Kent's detailed analysis of the issues surrounding the voluntary and
409.
410.

2 MACHLACHLAN,supra note 379, at 794.
Id. at 795. For a detailed discussion of the adjustments to be made in computing

a general average, see WILLIAM BENECKE, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEMNITY
IN MARINE INSURANCE, BOTTOMRY AND RESPONDENTIA, AND ON THEIR PRACTICAL
APPLICATION IN EFFECTING THOSE CONTRACTS, AND IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF ALL CLAIMS

ARISING OUT OF THEM 286-335 (London, Baldwin, Cradock & Jay 1824). Benecke, a

member of Lloyds and a practical businessman, wrote well on the most useful and
practical parts of the law of insurance. See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN

LAW 351 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1867); MARVIN, supra note 55, at 111-12.
411. 2 MACHLACHLAN, supra note 379, at 795.

1186

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:4

sacrificial stranding of a ship, which is then lost, can serve as a valuable
learning tool for the student. This is especially so when Kent's frame of
reference, citations, and the inferences drawn therefrom are compared to
those of his contemporary judges of similar learning and erudition.
In Bradhurst,4 12 the plaintiff sued for payment on a policy of
insurance on the ship Dean, traveling from New York to Bremen, with
liberty to touch at several Dutch ports for a market.413 The policy was
valued at $3,000, which was one-half the value of the ship.4 14 The
insured "warranted American property; if captured or detained, the
insured not to abandon, if the property is released in six months 4after
15
advice is received here and notice thereof; free from seizure in port."
At the trial, abandonment by the insured was admitted, as was the
fact that the property was American as had been warranted.4 16 When the
Dean left New York, it was seaworthy and carrying a cargo of sugar,
coffee, cotton, drugs, medicines, and other articles.417 The ship soon met
gales and rough seas, which caused it to spring a leak that worsened until
the captain was obliged to seek the nearest port, which happened to be
Dutch. Upon arrival, the captain found that an embargo had been laid.41 8
The ship's leak was there immediately repaired, but it could not continue
on the voyage because of the embargo.419 While detained, a violent
storm arose which caused the ship to drift from the anchors and be put in
danger of running afoul of several other ships in similarly dire straits.42 °
In an effort to save the lives of the crew and to preserve the ship and
cargo, the captain, after consultation with the pilot, officers, and crew,
cut the cables and ran the ship aground, and, without anchors or cables,
the ship was driven by high winds far onto the shore. 42'
From the time of the stranding, the crew began discharging the
cargo onto lighters. About fifty hogsheads of sugar were damaged and
412. Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. "Warranted American property" means that the insured was guaranteeing that
the property he was carrying on board or shipping out was owned by an American
citizen. Depending upon whether there was a capture and by whom it was made, the
nationality and/or citizenship of the owner of the property could determine whether it was
legitimately subject to seizure and forfeiture. This was an important and enduring
problem in the early days of the Republic as American shipping was frequently captured
by British, Spanish, and French privateers or warships as will be readily apparent to the
student who wishes to read cases in the various jurisdictions during the formative years of
the Republic. See BOUVIER, supra note 378, at 622-23.
416. Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 9 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 9-10.
420. Id. at 10.
421. Id.
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partly dissolved by sea-water as a result of the leaks.42 2 Some of the
drugs were also damaged.4 23 The lighters and their cargoes were
detained and seized by the Dutch government on account of the
424 In any event, some of the goods were saved and some were
embargo.
25
4

lost.

The stranding caused great damage to the ship, and it was
determined by an inspection by the Dutch government that there was
almost no possibility the ship could be recovered.426 It was further
determined that if by happenstance there should be a sufficient rise in the
water level to extricate the ship, the damage was so great that the cost of
any repairs would far exceed any value of the ship.427
Kent, in delivering the opinion of the court, pointed out that "the
loss of the ship [was] attributed to the perils of the sea., 428 It was forced
into port by "distress and danger" arising from the tempests and, when
ready for departure, had to be stranded as a result of a severe storm.429
Kent further pointed out that the real issue "in the case is, whether the
loss of the ship is to be borne as a general average, to which the
plaintiffs, as owners of a portion of the cargo, as well as of ship and
freight, are to contribute. ' ,43 0 Kent held that the case was not one for
contribution.43 1
After repeating a portion of the above facts in the case, Kent pointed
out that there was no doubt of a total physical loss of the stranded ship
432
He then
and that the bulk of the cargo was saved from destruction.
stated what he interpreted to be the general rule:
If a ship, in a case of extremity, and to avoid impending danger, be
voluntarily run ashore, and she is afterwards recovered and performs
the voyage, the damages resulting from this sacrifice are to be borne
as general average. There cannot be a doubt as to the existence of
this rule; for it is to be met with in all the books that treat of

422. Id. at 10-11. A hogshead today typically contains 63 gallons or 238.5 liters.
However, in days gone by some hogsheads were so large as to contain 140 gallons. See,
for example, the extended definitions in: 4 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA
2852-2853 (1901);

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

423.

Bradhurst,9 Johns. at 11.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.

431.

Id.

432. Id. at 14.

774-291 (2d ed. 1993).

1077 (1986);
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433

Kent next pointed out another and more difficult issue in the case:
"Whether there is to be a contribution from the surviving cargo, if the
ship should happen (as in this case) to be destroyed and lost by the act of
running her ashore. 434
Kent next set forth the reasons why he would have recourse to
foreign writers: "The question does not appear ever to have arisen in the
English courts, and we must have recourse to those foreign works which,
in the absence of English decisions, are the best and most authentic
evidence of the maritime law. 43 5 He then went on to give a capsule
summary of the analysis and conclusions:
The books, in general, have not treated this point with sufficient
perspicuity and precision, but from a view and comparison of them, it
is pretty evident that the weight of authority, no less than the reason
of the rule, is against the contribution. The marine ordinances and

writers on maritime law mention general average as being confined to
the damage which the vessel so run ashore may have sustained, and
the expenses of setting her afloat; and it seems to be assumed as a
settled principle,436
that there is to be no contribution, unless the ship is
eventually saved.

433. Id.
434. Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 14 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
435. Id.
436. Id. It will no doubt be helpful to the student to have readily at hand a
contemporary definition of the terms that Kent and his contemporaries are using to
explain their reasoning processes.
AUTHORITIES, practice. By this word is understood the citations which are
made of laws, acts of the legislature, and decided cases, and opinions of
elementary writers. In its more confined sense, this word means, cases decided
upon solemn argument which are said to be authorities for similar judgments in
like cases. These latter are sometimes called precedents.
It has been remarked that when we find an opinion in a text writer upon any
particular point, we must consider it not merely as the opinion of the author, but
as the supposed result of the authorities to which he refers; but this is not
always the case, and frequently the opinion is advanced with the reasons which
support it, and it must stand or fall as these are or are not well founded. A
distinction has been made between writers who have, and those who have not
held a judicial station; the former are considered authority; and the latter are not
so considered unless their works have been judicially approved as such. But
this distinction appears not to be well founded: some writers who have
occupied a judicial station do not possess the talents or the learning of others
who have not been so elevated, and the works or the writings of the latter are
much more deserving the character of an authority than those of the former.
PRECEDENTS, are the decisions of courts of justice: when exactly in point
with a case before the court, they are generally held to have a binding authority,
as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, as because the law in that
case has been solemnly declared and determined. To render precedents valid,
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It is most important to look closely at how Kent arrived at this
conclusion. He states emphatically: "The language of the Rhodian
Law,43 7 leads very strongly to this conclusion, and this is the text upon
they must be founded in reason and justice; must have been made upon
argument, and be the solemn decision of the court; and in order to give them
binding effect, there must be a current of decisions. According to Talbot, it is
"much better to stick to the known general rules, than to follow any one
particular precedent, which may be founded on reason, unknown to us"....
STARE DECISIS. To abide or adhere to decided cases. It is a general maxim
that when a point has been settled by decision, it forms a precedent which is not
afterwards to be departed from. The doctrine of stare decisis is not always to
be relied upon, for the courts find it necessary to overrule cases which have
been hastily decided, or contrary to principle....
BOUVIER, supra note 378 (citations omitted). Kent, in his Commentaries,after reviewing
the English position, states:
But I wish not to be understood to press too strongly the doctrine of stare
decisis, when I recollect that there are one thousand cases to be pointed out in
the English and American books of reports, which have been overruled,
doubted or limited in their application. It is probable that the records of many
of the courts in this country are replete with hasty and crude decisions; and
such cases ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance,
rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty and
harmony of the system destroyed by the perpetuity of error.
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 444 (N.Y., 0. Halsted 1826).
REASON. By reason is usually understood that power by which we
distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; and by which we are
enabled to combine means for the attainment of particular ends .... Reason is
called the soul of the law; for when the reason ceases, the law itself ceases. In
Pennsylvania, the Judges are required in giving their opinions, to give the
reasons upon which they are founded. A similar law exists in France, which
Toullier says is one of profound wisdom.. . ; judgments are not as formerly
silent oracles which require a passive obedience; their irrefragable authority,
for or against those who have obtained them, is submitted to the censure of
reason, when it is pretended to set them up as rules to be observed in other
similar cases.
2 BOUVIER, supra note 378 (citations omitted).
437. The "Rhodian Laws" or "Sea-law of Rhodes" is variously described as having its
origin in approximately 900 B.C. or else sometime between 600 and 800 A.D. Included
in it is the lex Rhodia de Jactu or the Rhodian law of jettison. This law holds "to the
effect that where goods are jettisoned to save the ship and the rest of the cargo all the
owners of the ship and cargo must share the loss." This rule is regarded as "the basis of
the modem law of general average." WALKER, supra note 9, at 275.
As to a basic discussion and history of the Rhodian Laws, see THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 3-7 (1987); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. ET AL,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3-5 (2d ed. 1975); JOHN E. HALL, AN ESSAY ON MARITIME
LOANS, FROM THE FRENCH OF M. BALTHAZARD MARIE EMERIGON 279-87 (Baltimore,

Philip H. Nicklin & Co. 1811) (providing a translation of "The Second Title of the
Fourteenth Book of the Digests, entitled ....De lege Rhodia de Jactu. Digest, Lib. XIV.
Tit. II. Of the Rhodian Law concerning Jettison.") Hall translates the most pertinent part
for our purposes in a succinct manner: "The Rhodian law ordains, that if goods are
thrown overboard for the purpose of lightening the vessel, as it is done for the good of all,
all must come into a contribution for the same." HALL, supra note 4. For a detailed
history and analysis, see W. ASHBURNER, THE RHODIAN SEA LAW (1909).
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438
which most of the authorities are founded.,
Kent next cites to and quotes from Justinian's Digest 14.2.5:
"Amissa navis damnum collationis consortio non sarciturper eos qui
merces suas naufragio liberaverunt: nam hajus oequitatem tunc admitti
placuit, cum jactus remedio coeteris in communi periculo, salva navi,
consultum est" [Those who save their goods in a shipwreck need not club
together to pay for the loss of the ship; for the equity admittedly applies
only if things are thrown overboard in the interests of the others facing a
common danger and the ship is saved.].43 9
Kent next points out that there is nothing in the above quoted part of
the Lex Rhodia de Jactu as set forth in the Digest that "Countenances the
idea of average, when the ship is lost. . .,440 Despite the above point:

the authority of some respectable Dutch civilians is in favor of
contribution, not only if the vessel be voluntarily run ashore and
injured, but if she be totally lost; and this contrariety of opinion
cannot but excite some doubt and embarrassment, in searching for the
true rule on this occasion. Voet, in his commentaries on the Roman
text (Com. Ad. Pond. Lib. 44 tit. 2.s.5), speaks of the rule of
contribution as applying to this very case of a ship run ashore,4 4after
1
consultation, for the preservation of the cargo, and the ship lost.
Kent next moves on to Bynkershock's arguments, and explains that
Bynkershock's statements leave one to infer that in Bynkershock's
opinion, the cargo owners should contribute after consultation when a
ship is run ashore with the intention of preserving the cargo, even when
the ship is then lost. 44 2 Bynkershock further "cites and condemns a
decision of the maritime judges of Amsterdam, in which they say there is
to be no contribution, unless the ship so voluntarily run ashore, be
saved.' ' 443 Kent believes that this opinion of the Dutch Judges at
Amsterdam actually derives from their true and accurate construction of
the Rhodian law regarding jettison.44
Kent further points out that in his opinion, Bynkershock "does not
clearly distinguish between the case of a ship that is voluntarily run

438. Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 14 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
439. Id. (emphasis added). Translation from 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 421 (Alan
Watson trans., 1985). The translation used herein is perhaps the most recent one
available. It should be pointed out, however, that the exact translation of the Lex Rhodia
and of the Digest sections commenting on it has long been a matter of contention.
440. Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 14 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
441. Id. at 14-15.
442. Id. at 15. The original form of citation to Bynkershock's work was "Quaest. Jur.
Priv. Lib. 4. c. 24. De Jactu."
443. Id.
444. Id.
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ashore and saved, and one that is run ashore and lost. ' 445 He also states
that Bynkershock and Voet both point to the ordinance of Philip II and
apparently believed that that ordinance applied the rule of contribution to
the case of a ship stranded and lost. 446 Kent reviewed the ordinance as
printed in Magens 447 but could not
read anything in that ordinance in
448
support of Bynkershock's position.
Kent next refers to the Prussian ordinance of Konigsberg, Germany

445.
446.
447.

Id.
Id.

See NICOLAS MAGEN, AN ESSAY ON INSURANCES, EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF INSURANCE, PRACTICED BY THE DIFFERENT COMMERCIAL STATES OF

EUROPE (London 1755); NICOLAS MAGEN, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE FOREIGN
ORDINANCES OF INSURANCE, AND FORMS OF POLICIES, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH; WITH
REMARKS (London 1755). These had first been published in Hamburg, Germany, in
1753. "Its Chief value lies in the collection of Foreign ordinances upon Insurance, but, in
this respect, it is less complete than Baldasseroni's Trattato del l'Assecurazione."
MARVIN, supra note 55, at 492-93. The 1755 edition of Magens provides a copious
extract and translation from the "Ordinance of King Philip the Second, in the Year 1563,
at Antwerp, Concerning Navigation." The pertinent parts are as follows:
Of Shipwrecks, Jettisons, and Averages.
[No. 23]. IV. When any Ship is in Distress, and the Master judges it necessary
for the Preservation of Life, Ship, and Cargo, to throw some of the Goods
overboard, to run the Ship on Shore, or to cut away the Mast, Cable, or any
Thing else, he shall not be at Liberty to do it, without communicating the same
first, and consulting about it with the Merchant or his Agent, if such is on
board: And in case the said merchant or Agent does not approve thereof, the
Master may neverthless do it by the Advice of the major Part of his Ship's
Company, who must declare upon Oath when they come to Shore, at the Desire
of the Merchant, that it was absolutely necessary, and was done by their
Advice, after the Merchant refused to Consent. But if the Merchant or his
Agent is not on board the Ship, as aforesaid, then the Master shall not do any of
the abovementioned Acts, without the Consent of the Majority of his said
Ship's Company.
[No. 25] VI. And in order to ascertain the Damage which shall have happened
by Reason or in Consequence of the abovementioned Jettisons, stranding, or
cutting away, for the effectual Preservation of Life, Ship, and Cargo, all the
Goods whether lost or saved, shall be valued all together, according to the
prices at the market where the goods saved shall be disposed of, for money, or
money's worth (first deducting from thence the freight and other charges) and
then adding thereunto the true value of the ship, or the whole freight agreed for
by the master, at the option and choice of the Merchant: All which being added
together, every one shall from the whole sum be rated in Proportion to the
Goods which he has lost, or were saved: Which estimation and calculation of
such averages shall be made by Master of Ships and Merchants experienced
therein, and that are impartial.
NICOLAS MAGEN, BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE FOREIGN ORDINANCES OF INSURANCE,
AND FORMS OF POLICIES, TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH; WITH REMARKS 14-17 (London

1755).
448.

Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 15 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
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and describes it as the only ordinance that lays down a rule of
contribution in a deliberate case of stranding where the ship is not
ultimately saved.449 It is expressed in unmistakable terms:
if the Master, for saving the cargo, and preventing greater damage,
shall, after the usual consultation, designedly run the ship ashore, and
thereby the cargo is saved, but the ship utterly lost and beaten to
pieces, the average contribution45shall
remain good, and the goods
0
thus saved contribute to the ship.
Kent next dismisses these various opinions, despite the weight they
would generally be accorded, because he was "persuaded that they [had]
arisen from a misapplication of principle, for the general doctrine and
language of the marine law [was] undoubtedly otherwise, and the
evidence of this [appeared]
in the most authoritative treatises [available]
' 45 1
upon the subject.

Kent asserts that such authoritative treatises on maritime law:
either expressly assert, or evidently imply, that if the ship be stranded
and lost, (no matter by what means), it is not a case of general
average, and that such average applies only to the partial damages
which the rescued ship sustains by an act done for the common
safety.452
To justify his assertion, Kent cited the following authorities: Cleirac sur
Jugemens d'Oleron,4 53 Le Guidon,45 4 ord. De la Marine, Valin, Huber's
449.

Id. at 15.

450.

2 MAGENS ON INSURANCE 200 (1755).

451.
452.
453.

Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 15 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
Id.

CLEIRAC, ETIENNE, US ET COUTUMES DE LA MER, CONTENANT LES JUGEMENS
D'OLERON, ORDONNANCES DE WISBUY DE LA HANSE-TEUTONIQUE, ET AUTRES PIECES 42

(Bourdeaux, 1647, 1661, and Rouen, 1671). Cleirac's collection of these famous
maritime laws was translated into English as A General Treatise of the Dominion of the
Sea, and the complete body of the Sea Laws (London: 1709). Additionally, an English
translation of these laws with annotations can be found in I RICHARD PETERS,
ADMIRALTY DECISIONS (Phila., 1807).
454. Le Guidon De La Mer was published by Cleirac in Us et Coutumes de la Mer,
and by Pardessus in his collection de Lois Maritimes. James Allen Park, in his System of
the Law of Marine Insurances, Preface to the original ed. of 1787, at lxxx-lxxxi, in
speaking of the various French codes and ordonnances says:
But of all the sources, from which modem French legislators could derive the
most essential information, the famous treatise called Le Guidon was the chief.
This tract was republished by Cleirac,who pays a due compliment to its merits,
in his work upon the usages and customs of the Sea: and although in its style
and manner it certainly savors of the rust of antiquity, yet it contains the true
principles of naval jurisprudence. If the style be antiquated, and the text be
corrupted in some places, yet the treatise is still valuable by the wisdom which
shines through the whole, and the number of decisions which it contains.
PARK, supra note 121, at lxxx-lxxxi.
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Proelec. Ad Pand.,45 5 Emerigon, Roccus's De Navibus et Naulo, 45 6 and
The earliest work extant on insurance, is the celebrated French treatise entitled
Le Guidon. It was digested and prepared some centuries ago, by a person
whose name is unknown, for the use of the merchants of Rouen. It was
published by Cleirac in [1647], in his collection entitled, Les Us et Coutumes
de la Mer; but it was a production of a much earlier date, and it contains
decisive evidence, that the law of insurance had become, in the sixteenth
century, a regular science. Emerigon viewed it as containing the true principles
of nautical jurisprudence, and was valuable for its wisdom, and for the great
number of principles and decisions which it contained; and when Cleirac gave
to the world his revised and corrected edition of the Le Guidon, he regretted
that he was not able to rescue from oblivion the name of an author, who had
conferred signal honour on his country, by the merit and solidity of his
production, though it wanted the taste and elegance of later ages.
3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290 (N.Y. 1828). This work by
Cleirac went through many editions between 1647 and 1788 and also formed parts of the
immense compilation of law used to frame and draw the French Ordonnance of 1681.
JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 245 (Boston 1835).
455. Ulricus Huber (1636-1694), occasionally referred to as "Huberus," was a Dutch
jurist of considerable note. He began his career as a professor of History and Oratory,
later becoming a professor of law in the University of Franeker and a Judge in Friesland.
The work cited by Kent is Praelectionumjuris civilis tomi tres secundum Institutiones et
Digesta Justiniani, first published in 1687. This work was considered one of the
"Institutiones" or elementary instructional text books of Roman law.
456. Francesco Rocco, also known as "Roccus" was an eminent jurist and judge at
Naples. He published two major tracts: De Navibus et Naulo and De Assecurationibus.
Despite being modestly termed "Notabilia," his works were universally regarded as being
of great authority. His works, consisting of the two aforementioned titles and
approximately 200 selected legal questions and discursive answers, were collected and
published in two large folio volumes in Naples in 1655. Westerween provided a learned
Dutch edition of part of Roccus's works by selecting his treatises and his answers to
questions on maritime law. This edition was published in Amsterdam in 1708 under the
title De Navibus et Naulo. Item de Assecurationibus notabilia Accedunt ejusdem selecta
Responsa. This latter work, though well-known, was often very scarce. J. R. Ingersoll
translated it with the addition of learned notes and published it in Philadelphia in 1809
under the name of A Manual of Maritime Law. Translatedfrom the Latin of Roccus with
Notes by J.R. Ingersoll. The translation was executed with "great judgment and
accuracy" as to "well supply the place of the original." Roccus was of more practical use
to English lawyers than almost any other maritime work, with the possible exception of
Cleirac. In the preparation of his work, Roccus freely used the works of his predecessors
and contemporaries, and the best known are: Juan de Hevia Bolanos; Santema: and
Straccha.
Bolanos was a Spanish writer of great note and merit and the author of an
"excellent institute of the law of Spain, entitled Curia Philippica;the last part of which
treats of commercial and maritime law, and has been the foundation of many subsequent
works upon that subject. Roccus has borrowed heavily from it. This work is remarkable
for its clearness, brevity and precision, and lays down very sound and correct principles
on the subject of maritime and commercial jurisprudence." This book was completed in
Peru in 1615 and went through a number of editions. It was considered a book of "great
authority" in the Spanish colonies and in the city of New Orleans and Territory of
Louisiana.
Benvenuto Straccha (1509-1578) was an Italian Humanist who specialized in
commercial law. He was one of the first jurists to treat commercial law in a practical
fashion and to see it as distinct from the general civil law. His exposition of the
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ordinances of Rotterdam and Copenhagen. Kent opines that one "cannot
have recourse to better sources for the principles of the marine law on the
subject of contribution.' ' 7 He then states flatly that so "far as the
English writers have alluded to this question, they have adopted the same
ideas. ,4 58
Kent continues on:
Nothing can be more clear and explicit than the language of
Emerigon; the damages (he observes) resulting from the stranding of
the ship, if the stranding be done voluntarily, for the common safety,
are general average, provided always, that the ship be again set
afloat; for59if the strandingbe followed by shipwreck, then it is save
4
who can.

Kent next applauds the soundness of the principles and authorities
upon which Emerigon was relying and proceeds to provide a summary:
These authorities are founded on sound principles, for the loss of the
ship, in these cases, is more imputable to casualty than design. When
a ship is voluntarily run ashore, it does not, of course, follow, that she
is to be lost. The intention is not to destroy the ship but to place her
in less peril, and if she afterwards goes to pieces, or is otherwise lost,
it is not to be attributed exclusively to the act of the master, but to the
direct, and more immediate operation of other causes. In most cases,
he has no expectation, and certainly no intention, of destroying the
commercial law was presented on a systematic basis. Of his several works, the most
relevant for our current purposes is De Assecurationibus,which examines the form of a
policy of insurance issued in Ancona in 1567. In this work, Straccha examines the policy
line by line and provides a commentary. Valin held Straccha in high esteem.
Peter Santerna, a Portuguese writer, authored a treatise on insurance under the
title of Tractatus de assecurationibus& Sponsionibus Mercatorum. This work abounds
with references throughout to the civil law and the early civilians.
The treatises of Santema and Straccha, among others, were contained in De Mercatura,
Decisiones & Tractatus varii & de rebus ad earn pertinentibus, "a large and valuable
collection of treatises and dissertations, by various authors of different nations, on
subjects of maritime and commercial law."
As to Roccus in particular and some occasional references to Bolanos, Santema,
and Straccha, see J. MARKE, A CATALOGUE OF THE LAW COLLECTION AT NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY WITH SELECTED ANNOTATIONS 267, 269 (1953); MARVIN, supra note 55, at
616; JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 245 (Boston 1835); 3 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290-91 (New York 1828). Straccha is separately
addressed in DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1193-94 (1980). Du
Ponceau's A Treatise on War provides a number of items of valuable information as to:
"Juan de Hevia Bolanos," at pages xxiii-xxiv; "De Mercatura," at page xxviii; "Roccus,"
at pages xxviii-xxix; "Santema," at page xxix; and "Straccha" at page xxix. See Du
PONCEAU, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR (Phila., Farrand & Nicholas 1810).

quoted
457.
458.
459

materials are from the entries in Du Ponceau's translation.
Bradhurst v. Columbian Ins. Co., 9 Johns. 9, 16 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1812).
Id.
Id-

All
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vessel. He does an act hazardous to the vessel and cargo, in order to
escape from a more pressing danger, as a storm, or the pursuit of an
enemy, or pirate. The stranding may be an act done for the common
safety, but this cannot be said to be the case of the subsequent
shipwreck or capture. Indeed, the very act of running a ship ashore is
desperate, and places the cargo in extreme jeopardy; and if it happens
that the ship be lost, and the cargo saved, it is saved tanquam ex
incendio [just as if out of a fire], according to the allusion in the
Rhodian law. In such a case, it is emphatically said to be "save who
can"; and to burden the rescued cargo with contribution for the ship,
would seem to be oppressive, and is clearly not within the policy and
equity of the rule. The courts are, accordingly, of opinion, that there
and that the plaintiffs are entitled to
is no contribution in this 4 case,
60
recover as for a total loss.
Several other prominent judges, however, declined to follow Kent's
opinion. As will be seen below, these judges were not only prominent,
but also well-versed in maritime law and its foreign sources, and
possessed keen analytical minds.
E. Bushrod Washington and the PennsylvaniansAddress the Loss of a
Stranded Ship and GeneralAverage
Within two years after Kent's decision in Bradhurst,a similar case
arose in the federal circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania.
Bushrod Washington,46 1 Circuit Justice, writing for himself and Richard
Peters, 462 District Judge, provided an in-depth and logical analysis in
460. Id.
461.

Bushrod Washington (June 5, 1762-Nov. 26, 1829) was the nephew of George

Washington. He was a graduate of William and Mary College and apparently attended
the law lectures of George Wythe, Thomas Jefferson's mentor, while there in 1780.
While at William and Mary, Washington developed a close friendship with John
Marshall, later to become the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Washington soon afterwards began the study of law under James Wilson, the well-known
Federalist attorney of Philadelphia. Wilson was the choice of Bushrod's uncle George
Washington, despite the steep price involved. His uncle George decided to pay Wilson's
relatively huge fee as he wanted the best mentor available for his favorite nephew. The
expensive mentoring paid dividends as is readily observable by a perusal of a few of
Bushrod's opinions. Upon Wilson's death in 1798, Washington was appointed to the
United States Supreme Court to replace him. He was assigned for circuit court purposes
to the federal courts in Philadelphia where he developed a great reputation for scholarly
and well-written opinions. See 10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 508 (1958); 22
AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY

756 (1999).

462. Richard Peters (June 22, 1744-Aug. 22, 1828) was the son of an English lawyer
who came to Pennsylvania sometime prior to 1739. Richard became a good Latin and
Greek scholar and became fluent in both French and German. He graduated from the
College of Philadelphia (now University of Pennsylvania) in 1761. He was admitted to
the bar in 1763 and soon developed a successful practice. He ran the War Office for
George Washington during the Revolution. After the war he was elected to legislative
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Caze v. Reilly.463
Caze was a replevin case to recover part of the goods saved from a
shipwreck.4 64 The legal representation was at a high level. Both sides
cited Emerigon and argued the relevance and meaning of his Treatise
vigorously.4 65 After considering their detailed and luminous arguments,
Washington went through a careful and in-depth analysis of the French
sources of maritime insurance law, including Valin, Pothier, and
Emerigon.466 Washington's selection and use of the relevant parts from
Emerigon's Treatise should be carefully contrasted to that of Kent.
Du Ponceau, inter alia, argued that the Rhodian Sea Laws, upon
which all else was allegedly based, had been spuriously translated and
repeated and that there was only one true translation. Washington, like
office for several terms. On April 11, 1792, he was commissioned Judge of the United
States for the District of Pennsylvania. He held this office for the remainder of his life.
The Pennsylvania District Court was then a very active one, especially with regard to
commercial and maritime law. Justice Story, in writing to Richard Peters, Jr., on his
father's death, by letter of August 30, 1828, remarked that his father had attained "a high
and brilliant fame, founded in solid learning, and strengthened by wisdom and integrity."
Story continued, "I have learned much in his school, and owe him many thanks for his
rich contributions to the maritime jurisprudence of our country." See 7 DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 509 (1958); HENRY SIMPSON, THE LIVES OF EMINENT
PHILADELPHIANS, Now DECEASED. COLLECTED FROM ORIGINAL AND AUTHENTIC SOURCES

777 (Phila., 1859); MARVIN, supra note 55, at 564. The quoted material from Justice
Story's letter appears in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 540-41 (William W. Story
ed. Boston, Little & Brown 1851). Of course, this Richard Peters should not be confused
with his son, Richard Peters, Jr. (Aug. 4, 1779-May 2, 1848), who succeeded Henry
Wheaton as the reporter for the United States Supreme Court and who published a
number of other works.
463. 3 Washington C.C. 298, 5 F.Cas. 332, Cas. No. 2, 538 (C.C.D. Pa., 1814). It is
most likely that manuscript copies of Washington's decision in this case were circulating
as available within certain circles. It is most likely that manuscript copies of
Washington's decision in this case were circulating as available within certain circles. It
appears that the first formal publication of this decision was with the Pennsylvania case
Gray v. Waln, 2 Serg. & R. 229 n.237 (Pa. 1816). Volume three of Washington's
Reporter was not published until 1827. The case appears therein at pages 298-312. The
reference to Bradhurst is made therein at page 309. There are a total of five volumes of
Washington Reports, four under his name and one under the name of Richard Peters, Jr.
Despite the difference in names they should be considered one set. See REPORTS OF
CASES DETERMINED FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT FROM 1803 TO 1827 (Philadelphia: Philip H. Nickling, 1826-1829); RICHARD
PETERS, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, CONTAINING CASES DETERMINED IN THE
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY, FROM THE YEARS 1803 TO 1818; AND THE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE YEARS 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818, at v (Philadelphia, William Fry,

1819). A second edition of Washington's Reports was published in 1852-1853. There
was little difference between the editions, however, except their appearance. See also
MARVIN, supra note 55, at 564-65, 720; C. SOULE, THE LAWYER'S REFERENCE MANUAL
OF LAW BOOKS AND CITATIONS 7 n.6, 7, 10 (Boston, Soule & Bugbee, 1883).
464. Caze, 5 F.Cas. at 332.
465. Id. at 333.
466. Id. at 335.
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Kent, began his analysis with the Rhodian Sea Law as the starting
point.4 67 He, however, saw its interpretation as dependent on a principle
to be derived from the examples given.468 To arrive at the principle to be
applied, he relied on reason and logic, with the result that it was only
equitable that if one made a sacrifice for the common safety, he should
be recompensed for it. 469 This principle should be applied to the ship as
any case
well as to the cargo, for once a general principle is established,
it. 470
that can be brought within it should be controlled by
Washington next examined the various authorities, including most
of those cited and discussed by Kent. 47' After strongly disagreeing with,
among others, the decision of the Dutch judges, which Kent had found to
be an appropriate and true interpretation of the law, Washington
proceeded to make a polite reference to Kent and his capabilities:
We approach, with infinitely more respect, the case decided in the
supreme court of New York, cited from 9 Johns. 9. It is that case
alone, which has produced any hesitation in our mind. The great law
learning of that court, is respected by none more highly than
ourselves; and we should upon all occasions see the propriety of
examining very thoroughly, any opinion which we might form,
differing from a decision of that court, before we should feel
ourselves safe in entertaining or expressing it. This we have
faithfully done in the present instance; and we can only add the
us to a
course of reasoning which our mind has suggested,
472 forcing
leads.
it
where
follow
must
we
conclusion,
different
Justice Washington next began an analysis of a number of the
foreign jurists relied on by Du Ponceau in argument and Kent in
When he addresses Emerigon, Washington views
Bradhurst.473
Emerigon's position differently than did Kent, and proceeds thus:
Emerigon (Ins. 408, 614, 616) is the only writer upon the subject of
average, who intimates an opinion, that in the case of a voluntary
stranding, followed by the total loss of the vessel, there shall be no
contribution. "If' says he, "the stranding was done voluntarily for
the common safety, it would be general average, provided always that
the ship be again set afloat; for, if the stranding be followed by
shipwreck, then it is, save who can." There is no writer upon
maritime law, whose opinions are more to be respected in general,
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id. at 333.
Caze, 5. F. Cas. at 333.
Id. at 333-34.
Id.
Id. at 335-37.
Id. at 336.

473.

Id. at 333, 335-57.
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than those of Emerigon. But, after all, it is only an opinion in this
case, in support of which he quotes no law, ordinance, or decision,
and does not even condescend to assign a single reason.
Immediately after the opinion just cited, he refers to what he
afterwards says, in respect to a jettison which does not save the ship;
as if he intended to illustrate, by this latter case, the opinion he had
given in the case of a voluntary stranding and loss of the ship. Now,
it is most obvious, that no two cases can be more unlike in principle.
In the one, an ineffectual sacrifice of goods is made to save the ship.
And in the other, an effectual sacrifice of the ship is made to save the
cargo. In the former, the property demanding contribution, has no
merit, and is therefore entitled to no compensation. In the latter, the
converse holds good throughout. Nevertheless, we should be greatly
embarrassed by this naked opinion of Emerigon, if it stood
uncontradicted by other writers, equally respectable. The opinions of
those jurists, we shall now proceed to state .... 474
Washington then reviews a number of other continental writers who
oppose Emerigon on the subject, including Voet and Bynkershoeck:
To these authorities, I add, with great confidence, the opinion of
[Joseph Story], a distinguished judge of the Supreme Court of the
United States, intimated in one of his notes upon Abbott, a work in
itself of great merit, and which is rendered still more valuable by the
475
labours of the learned editor.

474. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
475. Id. at 337. The references, of course, are to Charles Abbott's work which was
annotated by Justice Joseph Story, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT
SHIPS AND SEAMEN INFOUR PARTS. (Joseph Story ed., 1810) (1802).
Charles Abbott (Oct. 7, 1762-Nov. 14, 1832), perhaps better known as Lord
Tenterden, was the son of a Canterbury barber who, without patronage, rose to high
judicial office and legal eminence. In 1818 he became the Chief Justice of the King's
Bench. As a lawyer, he enjoyed a thriving commercial practice. He published his book
on the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen in 1802. It was the first English
treatise devoted exclusively to the law of shipping. The book quickly became a legal
classic. It was frequently cited in the courts of England and America. The American
editions of Justice Story of 1810 (used here by Bushrod Washington) and the later edition
of 1829 were considered the most valuable during the time here in question. Story's
references to American cases were considered helpful and his explanatory notes and
comments were especially valued in England as well as in America. See BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW

2-3 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984);

MARVIN,

supra note

55, at 47; see also Story's Edition ofAbbott Shipping, THE AM. JURIST & L. MAG. (Jan. &
April 1829); CHARLES ABBOT, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT
SHIPPING AND SEAMEN

(4th ed., John Henry Abbott ed., 1829). As to the value of Story's

notes to English lawyers and jurists, see the letter of Charles B. Vaughan, representative
of the Court of St. James at Washington to Joseph Story, dated June 22, 1824, printed in
LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY

570-71 (William W. Story ed., Boston, Little &

Brown 1851). More particularly, the precise edition to which Justice Washington refers
is CHARLES ABBOTT, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND
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SEAMEN: IN FOUR PARTS... THE SECOND AMERICAN, FROM THE THIRD LONDON EDITION,
WITH ANNOTATIONS BY JOSEPH STORY (Newburyport, Edward Little & Co. 1810). The

Third Part, Chapter VIII, is entitled "of General or Gross Average." It begins at page
325.
Abbott explains that the principle of general contribution is derived from the
ancient laws of Rhodes, by way of adoption into the Digest of Justinian. He then
provides various quotations from and commentaries on the Rhodian law. At pages 33435, in section 7, Abbott addresses the various rules associated with voluntary damages
done to ships in efforts to save the ship and/or cargo from impending perils and how such
are typically "sustained by a general contribution." Because these editions are difficult to
obtain and to give the interested student a fair chance at a meaningful analysis, the
pertinent part of section 7 is herein provided:
7. If sails are blown away, or masts or cables broken by the violence of the
wind, the owner alone must bear the loss. The broken tools of an artificer bring
no charge upon his employer. And this rule has been held to apply to the case
of a mainmast broken in a heavy gale, by carrying an unusual press of sail in
order to escape from an enemy, to whom a ship had struck. But if the master,
compelled by necessity, cut his cable from the anchor, in order to use it as a
howser, or if he cut away and abandon his masts, sails, or cables, to lighten and
preserve the ship, their value must be made good by contribution.
In like manner the damage voluntarily done to a ship by cutting its deck or
sides in order to facilitate a necessary jettison, or by running it on a rock,
shallow, or strand, to avoid the danger of a storm, or of an enemy, and the
expense of recovering the ship from this latter situation; and also the pilotage,
port duties, and other charges incurred by taking a ship into a port to avoid an
impending peril, and the expense of extraordinary assistance to preserve and
secure a ship from the violence of a storm at its entrance into the port of
destination are to be sustained by a general contribution.
Id. It is at this point that Story provides in note 1 the following annotation:
(1) In case a ship be voluntarily stranded to save the cargo, the loss of the ship
becomes a general average. But where the ship is involuntarily wrecked and
part of the cargo saved and part lost, no general average is due. Emerigon
(tom. 1.p. 612) states this rule, 'the owner of the ship wrecked, and the owners
of the merchandise lost in the shipwreck, have no right to contribution from
those who have the good fortune to save their effects; because the loss that the
one and the other has sustained, has not procured the common safety. The rule
of the civil law is the same. Amissae navis damnum, collationis consortio non
sarcitur per eos, qui merces suas naufragio libera-verunt; nam hujus aequitatem
tunc admitti placuit, cum jactus remedio, ceteris in communi periculo, salvi
navi, consultum est. Lib. 5. ff de leg. Rhod. It is as in the case of a fire; he
who saves his own saves for himself alone. Cum depressa navis, aut dejecta
esset, quod quisque ex ea secum servasset, sibi servare respondit, tanquam ex
incendio. Lib 5 ff. Cod. So Cleirac, p. 51, n. 4. "after shipwreck there is no
contribution to be made between the merchandizes recovered and fished up,
and those lost; but save who can. So Casarege's disc. 121 note 17. Kuricke.
780. 788. Lubeck. cap. 3. n. 1. See also Weskett, 132. Section 4. 255. Section
4. and 2 Brown's Civ. and Adm. Law 199. 200."
The key word in Washington's reference thereto is no doubt "intimated."
Webster defined it and its cognates as follows: "INTIMATE, v.t.... To hint,
to suggest obscurely, indirectly or not very plainly; to give slight notice of. He
intimated his intention of resigning his office. 'Tis heaven itself that points out
an hereafter, and intimates eternity to man. Addison."'
Id.
"INTIMATED, p.p. Hinted, slightly mentioned or signified." 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN
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Washington then goes on to point out that the ordinance of Koenigsberg
is also opposed to Emerigon's position, and then proceeds to render an
opinion in disagreement with that of Kent.476
Two years later, in a case before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Kent's opinion in Bradhurst is again reviewed with the same result. The
justices involved in the case were William Tilghman 47 7 and Jasper
Yeates.47 8 The case in which they both opposed Kent's conclusion was
Gray v. Wain, which reprinted Washington's opinion in Caze v. Reilly.479
Gray involved an assumpsit action to recover the defendant's proportion
of a general average arising from the voluntary stranding and subsequent
loss of a vessel. 480 The case was argued elaborately by Chauncey,
Rawle, and Horace Binney.
The arguments advanced by all three counsels are detailed,
eloquent, and strong. Chauncey argues that the real issue is whether a
clear general principle, based on equity and justice, should prevail. 481 He
also outlines the various authorities in favor of a contribution in general
average for a stranded but lost ship.482
Rawle meets these arguments with a detailed and elaborate
argument from principle in which he contends that the Lex Rhodia is
clearly a mere statute and not a part of the common law or the law of
nations.483 Therefore, as a mere statute, the decisions based on it are
mere commentaries and glosses on a statute and cannot extend it beyond

(N.Y., S. Converse 1828). The
strength and clarity of the intimation based upon Story's note above is left to the opinion
of the reader. The "intimation" will soon become a "declaration" as will be discussed
further.
476. Caze, 5. F. Cas. at 333.
477. William Tilghman (Aug. 12, 1756-Apr. 29, 1827) graduated from what is now
the University of Pennsylvania. From 1772 to 1776, he read law under Benjamin Chew,
an eminent attorney in Philadelphia. In 1806 he was appointed Chief Justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court where he served with great distinction. "His chief
contribution as a jurist was the incorporation of the principles of scientific equity with the
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

law of Pennsylvania." See 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN

BIOGRAPHY

545-46 (1958).

478. Jasper Yeates (Apr. 17, 1745-Mar. 14, 1817) was a descendant of John Yeates, a
Philadelphia merchant heavily engaged in foreign trade. Yeates attended the College of
Philadelphia, graduating with a B.A. Degree in 1761. He then took up the study of law
under Edward Shippen, a pre-eminent member of the Philadelphia bar and later
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice. Yeates was admitted to the bar in 1765 and soon
established a successful practice. He was appointed an associate justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1791 and held that position until his death. See 10
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 606 (1958).
479. The report of Gray v. Wain, 2 Serg. & R. publishes the report of Caze v. Reilly in
a lengthy footnote. See Gray v. Wal, 2 Serg. & R. 229, 237 (Pa. 1816).
480. Id. at 230-33.
481. Id. at 233.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 244.
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its limited direct statement. 84 Rawle next fashions arguments based
upon the liabilities of common carriers,4 85 and then goes through all the
various authorities used by Kent in Bradhurst, plus several additional
ones. 486 As did Kent, Rawle pointedly refers to Emerigon's strong
statement,487 and begins the concluding portion of his argument by
referring to Kent's opinion:
In New York, this question has been put to rest by the case of
Bradhurst v. Columbia Insurance Company, 9 Johns. 9, where

KENT, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, reviews the whole
law of marine contribution, both upon principle and upon authority,
and substantially declares, that to make the cargo saved come into
general average, to repair the loss of a ship voluntarily stranded is not
Rhodes, and is
within the language or the equity of the law of 488
contrary to the general doctrines of the maritime law.
Rawle next proceeds to mount an attack on the opinions of Voet and
Story as expressed in their commentaries on the Digest and annotations
on Abbott's work on shipping, respectively. 489 Rawle contends that their
authorities do not support their opinions, 490 and then proceeds to dissect
the opinion of Bushrod Washington in Caze.49 1
Binney makes an elaborate final reply to Rawle, concentrating
primarily on general and broad principles and on considerations of
justice and equity. 492
Rawle's elaborate argument went for naught. Justice Tilghman
began his analysis by stating the principle of a general average to be:
"what is given for the benefit of all, shall be made good by the
contribution of all. 493 He then reviewed the Rhodian law of jettison and
494
the reasons for it, which were based on certain legal principles.
Tilghman next considered the issue on authority and pointed out that
certainty in the law was so important that he would not think of setting
up his own opinion against a series of nonconflicting decisions.495
484. Id.
485. Id. at 245.
486. Id. at 246-49.
487. Id. at 247.
488. Id. at 248.
489. Id. at 248-49.
490. Id. at 248.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 249-52. The three arguments by Chauncey, Rawle, and Binney are great
specimens of their types and are repeated in extenso in the original report of Gray by
Sergeant and Rawle. See id. at 233-54. These arguments merit a most attentive and
detailed comparison and study by interested students.
493. Id. at 255.
494. Id. at 255-56.
495. Id. at 256.
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Tilghman then set out the foreign jurists in favor of a general average, as
opposed to Emerigon.496 Only Huberus (Ulricus Huber), a famous Dutch
jurist and professor of law, agreed in any way with Emerigon. 4 7
However, even his agreement was limited.
Tilghman next reviewed the positions of American jurists. Bushrod
Washington, in Caze v. Reilly, and Joseph Story, in his edition of Abbot,
Merchant Ships and Seamen, agreed that the answer to the question was
in favor of a contribution to the general average.49 8 Only Kent was
opposed to this. Tilghman again referred to Emerigon, 499 and then
decided in favor of general average despite what Emerigon had said.50 0
Tilghman avoided any minute or detailed comparison of the various
American decisions and their authors. He wrote:
Between the respectable judges of our own country, I make no
comparison; suffice it to say, that the weight does not incline so
decisively on either side, as to prevent this court from following its
own opinion. I feel myself free, therefore, to say that I agree with my
brother YEATES,
who directed the jury to consider this as a case of
5 1
general average.

0

Yeates, in a separate opinion, then stated that Washington's opinion
in Caze had fully satisfied his mind on the entire question:
I will not enter into a detail of the arguments he has made use of, or
the authorities he has cited and answered, in support of his legal
conclusion, but shall content myself with observing, that his masterly
system of reasoning contains the most just and correct inferences
from the true principles of the Rhodian law, according to my
apprehension, and conveys to my mind full conviction upon the
subject in question. I have no hesitation, therefore, in declaring, that
the ship Apollo, under the events which have occurred, should be
contributed for as general average.502
The last of the celebrated judges to refuse to follow Kent's
reasoning and his decision was Justice Joseph Story in Columbian
Insurance Co. v. Ashby. 50 3 In that case, a ship was voluntarily stranded
by its master with an intent to preserve the vessel, crew, and cargo. The
decision to run the ship aground was undertaken by the master without

496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.

Id.
Id.
Id.
1 Emerigon, supra note 1, at 651.
Gray, 2 Serg. & R. at 259.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
13 Pet. 331,337-43, 38 U.S. 331, 10 L. Ed. 186 (1839).
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consultation with the ship's officers. °4 The ship was subsequently lost,
and Ashby, the owner of the vessel, sued the owners of the preserved
cargo and their underwriters for contribution to a general average.50 5 The
United States Circuit Court for the County of Alexandria, in the District
of Columbia, found in favor of the plaintiff ship owner. 50 6 The defendant
underwriters then appealed. 0 7
At trial, the plaintiffs argument was largely an updated version of
that used by Chauncey and Binney in Caze. Plaintiffs aimed the
strongest thrust of their several attacks against Kent and Emerigon's
interpretation of the law of jettison and their applications of those
interpretations to voluntary strandings:
The law of Rhodes, "De Jactu" established the principle of average,
in cases of jettison of part of the cargo for the safety of all. The
provision is express in respect to jettison, but no other case is named.
The expression of one case will not, however, exclude others from
coming within its reason. The case put in the Rhodian law is by way
of example or illustration, and not as implying that average is
exclusively confined to cases of jettison. To show this clearly, we
need only resort to the authority of Emerigon and his followers. With
a solitary and almost ludicrous exception they admit that if a ship be
voluntarily stranded, when in peril at sea, when chased by an enemy
or by pirates, for the common safety, and be subsequently gotten off
and proceed on her voyage, then, that the cost of repairs shall afford a
claim to the ship owners for a general average. If the ship be
partially destroyed there shall be an average; if the loss be total, there
shall be none. Such is the doctrine of Emerigon and of the Supreme
Court of New York. 50 8

504.

Columbian Insur. Co., 35

U.S. at 332.

505. Id. at 331-332.
506. Id. at 332.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 335. It should be noted, that since Caze was decided in 1814, additional
editions of Story's annotations to Abbott were published. See CHARLES ABBOTT, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN:

IN FOUR PARTS

(Exeter, G. Lamson, 1822). There is no change to the content of note I from the edition
of 1810, nor are there any American cases cited to in the digest of subsequent decisions.
However, by the 1829 edition there are significant changes. CHARLES ABBOTT, A
TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN:

IN FOUR PARTS

(Boston, Hilliard, Ray, Little, & Wilkins 1829).
Chapter Eight, "of General or Gross Average" begins at page 342. Note 1
appears at page 349 and is inserted a paragraph sooner than it had been in the previous
American editions. It has also been radically changed from that of the 1810 edition. The
"intimation" is now a "declaration," albeit with some polite deferential reservations in
favor of Kent and some enhancements. Because this particular edition is very difficult to
obtain it is reprinted here for the convenience of students wishing to make a fair analysis
and comparison as follows:
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(1) The case of a voluntary stranding has been much discussed in our
courts. The correct distinction seems to be, that if the stranding of the ship be
voluntary to save the cargo, the loss of the ship becomes a general average.
But if it be involuntary, and the cargo be saved in whole or in part, no general
average is due. Emerigon (tom. l, p. 612) states the rule thus: - "The owner of
the ship wrecked, and the owner of the merchandize lost in the shipwreck, have
no right of contribution from those, who have the good fortune to save their
effects; because the loss, that the one or the other has sustained, has not
procured the common safety. The rule of the civil law is the same. Amissa
navis damnum, collationis consortio non sortitur per eos qui merces suas
naufragio liberaverunt; nam hujus equitatem tunc admitti placuit, cum jactus
remedio, coeteris in communi periculo, salva navi, consultum est. (Lib. 5, de
Leg. Rhod.) It is the same as the case of fire. He, who saves his own, saves for
himself alone. Cum depressa navis aut dejecta est, quod quisque ex ea suum
servasset, sibi servare respondit, tanquam ex incendio. (L.7.ff.eod.) So Cleirac
(p. 51, note 9) says, after shipwreck there is no contribution between the
merchandizes recovered and fished up, and those lost; but, save who can. So
Casaregis says, (Disc. 121, note 17) he who saves, saves; he who loses, loses.
See also, Kuricke, p. 780. 788. Lubeck, ch. 3, note 1."
This language applies to the case of an involuntary stranding. For the
general, if not universal, foreign law seems to be, that a voluntary stranding to
save the ship and cargo entitles to general average. Jacobsen's SEA LAWS,
(Frick's Translation) p. 348. Bynkers. Ques. Priv. Juris. sec. 4. ch. 24, p. 424.)
Voet. B. 14, tit. 2, s. 5. Indeed, no doubt seems to be entertained, that if the
ship, after such voluntary stranding, is got off and performs her voyage, that the
damage is a general average. The point of difficulty has been, whether, if she is
totally lost by such voluntary stranding, and the cargo is saved thereby, any
contribution is due.
The subject is examined with great learning and ability by Mr. Justice
Washington, in the opinion delivered in Caze v. Reilly, (3 Wash. Cir. R. 298)
where the principal authorities, foreign and domestic, are collected; and the
conclusion of the Court was, that contribution was due, although the ship was
totally lost. This conclusion is however at variance with that entertained by the
Court in Bradhurstv. Columbian Insurance Company. (9 John. R. 9) where the
general doctrines of the maritime law on this subject are examined by Chief
Justice Kent in his usual comprehensive and exact manner. Upon such a
question, where such highly gifted minds have differed, it is not too much to
say, that there must be some room for doubt.
The same question came more recently before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, in the case of Gray v. Wain, (2 Serg. & Rawle, 229) and after a
very full discussion the court adhered to the doctrine of Mr. Justice
Washington. See also, Weskett. p. 132, s. 4; p. 255, s. 4. 2 Brown Civ. &
Adm. 199, 200; Code de Commerce, art. 425; Sims v. Gurney, (4 Binn. R. 513.)
Where a ship is accidentally stranded, and by labour and expenses is set afloat
again, and completes her voyage, the whole expenses constitute a general
average. Bedford CommercialInsurance Company. v. Parker,(2 Pick. R. 1.)
But contribution, as a general average, is due only where there has been a
voluntary sacrifice of something for the goods of the whole. In case of a
shipwreck, if goods are saved, no such contribution is due, as has been already
stated, unless there be a voluntary sacrifice for this purpose. On the other hand,
if a ship strikes the ground, and is abandoned by the crew, who take to the boat
and carry with them some of the cargo of the ship, and afterwards some of the
property on board of the boat is thrown overboard in order to preserve the lives
of the crew, and the residue arrives safe to the shore, and the ship afterwards
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drifts to the shore with the rest of her cargo on board, and is saved; it seems that
in such a case no contribution is due for the goods thrown overboard, either
from the cargo saved in the ship, or from that saved in the boats. The reason in
respect to the former is, that the goods were not taken out of the ship for the
purpose of preserving the rest of the cargo; and in respect to the latter, the
reason, which has been assigned, is, that the goods in the boat and the jettison
from it were thus exposed together in consequence of a previous peril, and for
the purpose of saving what could be saved, without any mutual concert or
design of the parties interested. There was no common engagement or
common benefit intended. The crew lightened the boat, as they were justified
in doing, to save their lives. The goods thrown out for the purpose of
contribution were in no other situation than that of goods left on the ship. If the
ship had perished, the event would have been precisely the same. If the goods
lost in the jettison had been left in the ship, the danger from overloading the
boat would not have been incurred. The eventual safety of the ship and loss of
property thrown overboard without any regard to the safety of the ship, or of
the other effects taken into the boat, afforded no case of contribution or
average. Whittridge v. Norris, (6 Mass. R. 125.)
The only point worthy of further consideration in this case, is, whether the
jettison could be considered as done exclusively for the preservation of the
lives of the crew, and not of that object, and the preservation also of the
remaining property in the boat. That, however, seems to revolve itself rather
into a question of fact, than of law. The jettison was doubtless to preserve the
lives of the crew; and so in all cases it is, where the ship is in danger of
foundering. But if it does also necessarily conduce to the preservation of the
cargo, does this not furnish a case for contribution, although that was not the
primary object of the parties? The reader will consider this as a mere
suggestion for farther inquiry.
If the masts, rigging and sails of a ship are carried overboard in a storm, and
they remain by the side of the hull by means of the rigging, and they are then
cut away for the preservation of the ship and cargo, this is not a case of general
average, at least not beyond the extent of the value of the articles lost, while
lying by the side of the ship. Nickerson v. Tyson, (8 Mass. R. 467.)
Id. Abbott remained a valuable practical treatise well into the nineteenth century. The
best and most comprehensive edition is CHARLES ABBOTt, LORD TENTERDEN, A TREATISE
OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND SEAMEN. IN FIVE PARTS (8th ed., Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1854). In a reworked format, the chapter on "General or Gross
Averages" appears as chapter X of a new Part IV, beginning at page 473. Section 4,
beginning at page 490 addresses "Ships stranded and lost." Story's 1829 note is much
enhanced as is the body of the text itself. See id.
Sir William Shee (1804-1868) was a well-known barrister who served as counsel
in most of the famous trials of his day. He went on to become a Justice of the Queen's
Bench and to attain knighthood. He edited several editions of Lord Tenterden's Treatise
as well as Samuel Marshall's Treatise on the Law of Insurance and a number of other
works. 18 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 5-7 (Repr. 1921-1922).
Jonathan Cogswell Perkins (1809-1877) studied law under the noted attorney
Rufus Choate at Salem and at Harvard Law School. He had a successful practice and
eventually became a noted Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Massachusetts and for
a time served as a State Senator. He "was an able and voluminous commentator and
writer on law subjects" with a large number of annotated editions to his credit.
APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (John Grant Wilson & John Fiske
eds., New York, 1888).
The reference in Story's note to Jacobsen is to Frederick J. Jacobson's The Laws
of the Seas. See FREDERICK J. JACOBSON, THE LAWS OF THE SEA, WITH REFERENCE TO
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The defendants argued, in turn, that the master's failure to consult with
the ship's officers disqualified the stranding from consideration as a
voluntary sacrifice. 50 9 They also made the by now familiar arguments
that a total loss of the stranded vessel eliminated any obligation of the
cargo owner to make a contribution to the general average.5 1 ° They
added several citations to newer treatises but relied primarily on Kent's
decision and the authorities and principles he cited.511
Justice Story, after considering the various arguments, began his
analysis thus: "The main question in this case is, whether the voluntary
stranding of a ship in a case of eminent peril, for the preservation of the
crew, the ship, and cargo, followed by a total loss of the ship, constitutes
a general average, for which the property saved is bound to
contribution. 12
Story pointed out that the maritime jurists of Continental Europe
were not in entire agreement on the point and that American courts had
given conflicting opinions as well. Story regarded it to be the court's
duty to examine and weigh the opposing opinions and to ascertain the
true governing principles.5 13 Story continued:
It is admitted on all sides that the rule as to general average is derived
to us from the Rhodian law, as promulgated and adopted in the
Roman jurisprudence. The Digest states it thus: If goods are thrown
overboard in order to lighten a ship, the loss incurred for the sake of
all shall be made good by the contribution of all. ...That the case of

Jettison was here understood to be put as a mere illustration of a more
general principle, is abundantly clear from the context of the Roman
law, where a ransom paid to pirates to redeem the ship is declared to
be governed by the same rule....

The same rule was applied to the

case of cutting away or throwing overboard of the masts or other
MARITIME COMMERCE, DURING PEACE AND WAR

(William Frick trans., Baltimore 1818).

For details and a review, see MARVIN, supra note 55, 418-19. The reference to Brown is
to Arthur Browne. See ARTHUR BROWNE, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW, AND
OF THE LAW OF THE ADMIRALTY; BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF A COURSE OF LECTURES READ IN

THE UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN (Dublin 1797-98). A second edition was published in 1802,
which was republished in New York in 1840, again in two volumes. He also authored a
treatise on ecclesiastical law as well as a number of essays. 1 S.AUSTIN ALLIBONE, A
CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE AND BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS

261(Phila., 1859).
The force and thrust of Story's 1829 note may go far in explaining the boldness
of counsel's assertions against Emerigon and his position as to stranding and general
average. The author leaves it to the reader's speculation as to whether Washington
discussed this issue with Story before Washington's death in November of 1829.
509. ColumbianInsur. Co., 35 U.S. at 333.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 333-34.
512. Id. at 337.
513. Id.
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tackle of the ship to avert the impending calamity; (Dig., lib. 14, tit.
2, ch. 3, ch. 5, sec. 2) and the incidental damage occasioned thereby
to other things. Without citing the various passages from the Digest
which authorize this statement, it may be remarked that the Roman
law fully recognized and enforced the leading limitations and
conditions to justify a general contribution, which have been ever
since steadily adhered to by all maritime nations. First, that the ship
and cargo should be placed in a common imminent peril: secondly,
that there should be a voluntary sacrifice of property to avert that
peril: and, thirdly, that by that sacrifice the safety of the other
property should be presently and successfully attained. Hence, if
there was no imminent danger or necessity for the sacrifice, as if the
jettison was merely to lighten a ship too heavily laden by the fault of
the master in a tranquil sea, no contribution was due.... So if the
ship was injured or disabled in a storm, without any voluntary
sacrifice; or if she foundered or was shipwrecked without design, the
goods saved were not bound to contribution. (Dig. Lib. 14, tit. 2, ch.
2, sec. 1; lb., ch. 7. 1 Emerig. On Assur., ch. 12, sec. 39, p. 601-603).
On the other hand, if the object of the sacrifice was not attained; as if
there was a jettison to prevent shipwreck, or to get the ship off the
strand, and in either case it was not attained, as there was no
deliverance from the common peril, no contribution was due. (Dig.,
lib. 14, tit. 2, ch. 5, ch. 7; 1 Emerig. On Assur. Ch 12, sec. 41, p. 612,
p. 616). The language of the Digest upon this last point is very
expressive:
"Amissae navis damnum collationis consortio non
sarcitur perieos, qui merces suas naufragio liberarunt-nam hujus
aequitatem tunc admitti placuit, cum jactus remedio caeteris in
communi periculo, salva, nave, consultum est." [Those who save
their goods in a shipwwreck need not club together to pay for the loss
of the ship; for the equity admittedly applies only if things are thrown
overboard in the interests of the others facing a common danger and
the ship is saved.] 514 It is this language which seems in a great
measure to have created the only doubt among the commentators as
to the extent and operation of the rule; some of them having supposed
that the safety of the ship (salva nave) for the voyage, was in all cases
indispensable to found a claim to contribution; whereas others, with
far more accuracy and Justness of interpretation, have held it to apply
as a mere illustration of the general doctrine, to a jettison, made in the
particular case, for the very purpose of saving the ship and the
residue of the cargo. In truth, the Roman law does not proceed upon
any distinction as to the property sacrificed, whether it be ship or
cargo, a part or the whole; but solely upon the ground that the
sacrifice is voluntary, to avert an imminent peril, and that it is in the

514.

1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 421 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan

Watson trans., 1985).
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event successful by accomplishing that purpose. And, therefore,
Bynkershoek has not hesitated to declare the general principle to be,
that whatever damage is done for the common benefit of all is to be
contributed for by all; and that as this obtains in a variety of cases, so
especially by the Rhodian law it obtains in cases of jettison....
These remarks seem proper to be made in order to meet the
suggestions thrown out at the argument with reference to the actual
bearings of the Roman law on the question before the Court; and they
may also serve in some measure to explain
the true principles by
5
which the question ought to be decided.
Story next went into his own analysis as to just what the foreign jurists
actually had to say on the issue:
In examining the foreign jurists, it will be found that there is far less
disagreement among them than has been generally supposed. All of
them that have come within our own researches, or those of counsel,
admit that a voluntary stranding of the ship constitutes a case of
general average, if there is not a total loss of the ship. Emerigon in
one passage lays down the doctrine in the following broad language:
"It sometimes happens that, to escape from an enemy or to avoid an
absolute shipwreck, the ship is run on shore in a place which appears
the least dangerous. The damage suffered on this account is a general
average because it has been done for the common safety."... It is
true that in another place he says, "The damages which happen by
stranding are a simple average for the account of the proprietors;"
citing the French ordinance: and then adds, "But it will be a general
average if the stranding has been voluntarily made for the common
safety, provided always that the ship be again set afloat; for if the
stranding be followed by shipwreck, then it is, save who can." (1
Emerigon Assur., ch. 12, sec. 13, p. 614). And he then refers to the
case of jettison, where the ship is not saved thereby, in which case
there is no contribution. (Emerigon Assur. Ch. 12, sec. 13, p. 616).
Now, the analogy between the two cases is far from being so clear or
so close as Emerigon has supposed. In the case of the jettison to
avoid foundering or shipwreck, if the calamity occurs, the object is
not attained. But in the case of the stranding, whatever is saved, is
saved by the common sacrifice of the ship; although the damage to
her may have been greater than was expected. Surely the question of
contribution cannot depend upon the amount of the damage sustained
by the sacrifice; for that would be to say that if a man lost all his
property for the common benefit, he should receive nothing; but if he
lost a part only he should receive full compensation. No such
principle is applied to the total loss of goods sacrificed for the
common safety: why, then, should it be applied to the total loss of
515.

ColumbianInsur. Co., 38 U.S. at 337-39.
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the ship for the like purpose? It may be said that unless the ship is
got off the voyage cannot be performed for the cargo; and the safety
and prosecution of the voyage are essential to entitle the owner to a
contribution. But this principle is nowhere laid down in the foreign
authorities; and certainly it has no foundation in the Roman law. It is
the deliverance from an immediate impending peril, by a common
sacrifice, which constitutes the essence of the claim. The Roman law
clearly shows this; for by that law it was expressly declared that if by
a jettison in a tempest, the ship was saved from an impending peril,
and afterwards was submerged in another place, still contribution was
the property which might be fished up, and saved from
due from all 516
the calamity.
After several other citations and quotations, Story continued on:
And, besides, in a case like that now before us, the cargo might be
transhipped in another vessel, and the voyage be successfully
performed. But, in truth, it is the safety of the property and not of the
voyage, which constitutes the true foundation of general average. If
the whole cargo were thrown overboard to insure the Safety of the
ship, the voyage might be lost; but, nevertheless, the ship must
contribute to the jettison. Why, then, if the ship is totally51sacrificed
7
for the safety of the cargo, should not the same rule apply?
Story continued to confront Emerigon and his statements: "As far as we
know, Emerigon stands alone among the foreign jurists, in maintaining
the qualification that it is necessary to a general average that the ship
should be got afloat again after a voluntary stranding. '51 8
Story next went into an analysis of the opinion of each of the
leading jurists on the question. 519 He then pointed out that the weight of
authority is decidedly in favor of the claim for a general average, 520 and
proceeded with an analysis of the various opinions held by American
Courts:
In Bradhurst v. The Columbian Insurance Company, (9 Johns Rep.,
9), the Supreme Court of New York held that where a ship is
voluntarily run ashore for the common good, and she is afterwards
recovered, and performs the voyage, the damages resulting from this
sacrifice are to be borne as a general average. But that where the ship
is totally lost, it is not a general average. The ground of this opinion,
as pronounced by Mr. Chief Justice Kent, seems mainly to have been
that this was the just exposition of the Rhodian and Roman law, and
516. Id. at 339-40.
517. Id. at 340.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at 340-341 (translation supplied by the author, emphasis added).
Id. at 341-342.
Id. at 342.

1210

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:4

that the weight of authority among foreign jurists clearly supported it.
With great respect for the learned court, we have felt ourselves
compelled to come to an opposite conclusion as to the true
interpretation of the Roman text, and of the continental jurists. We
agree with the learned court that when a ship is voluntarily run
ashore, it does not, of course, follow that she is to be lost.... But,
then, the act is done for the common safety; and if the salvation of the
cargo is accomplished thereby, it is difficult to perceive why, because
from inevitable calamity the damage has exceeded the intention or
expectation of the parties, the whole sacrifice should be borne by the
ship owner, when it has thereby accomplished the safety of the
cargo.... Upon principle, therefore, we cannot say that we are
satisfied that the doctrine of the Supreme Court of New York can be
maintained; for the general principle certainly is, that whatever is
sacrificed voluntarily for the common good, is to be recompensed
by
521
the common contribution of the property benefitted thereby.
Story then addressed the other decisions in the federal and Pennsylvania
courts:
But the same question has come before other American Courts, and
has there, with the full authority of the New York decision before
them, received a directly opposite adjudication. Our late brother, Mr.
Justice Washington, than whom few judges had a clearer judgment or
more patient spirit of inquiry, had the very point before him in Caze
v. Reilly (3 Wash. C. C. Rep., 298); and after the fullest argument and
most extensive research into foreign jurisprudence, he pronounced an
opinion that there was no difference between the case of a partial and
that of a total loss of the ship, by a voluntary stranding and that both
constituted equally a case of general average.... We have examined
the reasonings in these opinions, and are bound to say that it has our
unqualified assent; and we follow without hesitation the doctrine, as
well founded in authority and supported by principle, that a voluntary
stranding of the ship, followed by a total loss of the ship, but with a
saving of the cargo, constitute, when designed for the common
522
safety, a clear case of general average.
Story dismissed the objection that the master had undertaken the
stranding without consultation with the ship's officers, as imminent
perils leave no time for timidity, 523 and the very issue had already been
524
decided in the Pennsylvania Case of Sims v. Gurney.
525
In 1845, in Mutual Safety Insurance Co. v. Cargo of the George,
521.
522.
523.

Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 344.

524.
525.

Sims v. Gurney, 4 Binn. 513 (Pa. 1812).
Mut. Safety Ins. Co. v. Cargo of the George, 17 F. Cas. 1082, 1084
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a voluntarily stranded ship was lost in an effort to save its cargo.
was argued that because the United States District Court was based in
New York, it had to follow Kent's decision in Bradhurst as controlling
law. This the court refused to do. 527 However, with Story's decision for
the United States Supreme Court, the issue of whether a voluntary
stranding followed by a loss of the ship qualified for general average was
resolved.

F.

Kent's References to GeneralAverage and Voluntary Standing in
His Commentaries

In Kent's first edition of his Commentaries of 1828, prepared years
after the decisions in Bradhurst, Caze, and Gray, he addresses the
question of general average. He addresses the issue of voluntary
stranding:
If the ship be voluntarily stranded, to escape danger from tempest, or
the chase of an enemy, the damages resulting from that act are to be
borne as general average, if the ship be afterwards recovered and
perform her voyage. But if the ship be wholly lost or destroyed, by
the act of running her ashore, it has been a question much discussed,
and different opinions entertained, whether the cargo saved was
bound to contribute to bear the loss of the ship.
In Bradhurstv. The Columbia Insurance Company (9 Johns. Rep. 9),

the ship, in a case of extremity, was voluntarily run ashore and lost,
but the cargo was saved; and it was held, that no contribution was to
be levied on the cargo for the loss of the ship. The marine
ordinances, and writers on maritime law were consulted, and the
conclusion drawn from them was, that the cargo never contributed for
the ship, if she was lost by means of the act of running her ashore.
But in two subsequent cases, where the ship was lost under like
circumstances, it was decided, on a like review of the European law,
that the loss was to be repaired by a general average (Caze v.
Richards, in the Circuit Court of the United States for Pennsylvania,
in 2 Serg. & Rawle (Pa.). 237. Gray v. Wain, ibid. 229). The
authorities so
question, therefore, in which the foreign and domestic
528
materially vary, remains yet to be definitely settled.
Kent would live to prepare another five editions of his Commentaries,
although the last edition was published posthumously. 529 These editions,
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1845).
526. Id.
527. Id. at 1087.
528.
529.

3 KENT,supra note 1, at 191.
Kent prepared a second edition in August of 1832 (New York: 0. Halsted,
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including his sixth and last personally prepared edition, contained no
alterations to the above-quoted text. The sixth did, however, contain
several additions to existing footnotes and a new footnote that had been
added at the end of the quoted material. 3 °
Kent, in an apparent effort to bolster and justify his own
interpretations and holding in Bradhurst, added two cases to his note
giving the citation thereto:
Eppes v. Tucker 531 and Scudder v.
53
2
Bradford.
Eppes, although decided as early as 1790, was not
circulated as part of a published report until 1833.
In Eppes, the defendant, the owner of a schooner, in an effort to
escape British cruisers and to preserve the cargo, ran the ship aground.533
With the help of the local patriots, the British were fought off and the
1832); a third in April of 1836 (New York: Printed for the author, E.B. Clayton, James
Van Norden, Printers, 1836); a fourth in 1840 (New York: Printed for the author, E.B.
Clayton, Printer, 1840); a fifth in 1844 (New York: Printed for the author, and sold by the
principal law booksellers throughout the United States, 1844); and the sixth in the last
year of his life, 1847. The sixth was published in 1848 (New York: Published by
William Kent, and sold by the principal booksellers throughout the United States, 1848).
In each succeeding edition, considerable additions were made to the original text and in
some instances changes were made as well. A complete listing of all the various lifetime
and posthumous editions of the Commentaries, the translations, and other works by Kent
can be found in the National Union Catalog of pre-1956 Imprints. It is unfortunate that
no central collection has been made of all the various editions and works by Kent and his
later editors such as has been done for Sir William Blackstone. See CATHERINE SPICER
ELLEN, THE WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COLLECTION IN THE YALE LAW LIBRARY: A
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CATALOGUE (1938). Such a centralized and comprehensive collection

would be a great boon for students. However, a nearly complete collection of Kent's
various works can be assembled via various microfilm reels and microfiches available
from Primary Source Microfilm, Research Publications, The Gale Group, 12 Lunar
Drive, Woodbridge, Connecticut 06525-2398, as part of its Eighteenth Century (Law)
and Nineteenth Century Legal Treatises collections. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND
BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW 152 (1921); JOHN A. DUER, A DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE,
CHARACTER AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF JAMES KENT 74-76 (New York, D. Appleton 1848);

John Langbein, ChancellorKent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
547, 565 (1993); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES vii-viii (12th ed., Boston, Little Brown &

Co. 1874) (Preface by Oliver Wendell Holmes); HORTON, supra note 141, at 314, 325;
WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, L.L.D. 200-01 (Boston, Little

Brown & Co. 1898).
530. Kent worked diligently to update the footnotes accompanying his text regarding
the issues addressed in Bradhurst. He began the star-paging system with his second
edition and with each succeeding edition added to his accompanying footnotes as new
case reports and updated editions of the cited treatises were published. The text and
footnotes of the sixth edition were left unaltered but were supplemented in the eleventh
edition by George F. Comstock (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1867) and the twelfth
edition by Oliver Wendell Holmes (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1873). The quoted
material taken from the original edition can be found in the star-paged editions, including
the sixth, at page *239.
531. Eppes v. Tucker, 8 Va. (4 Call) 346 (1790).
532. Scudder v. Bradford, 31 Mass (14 Pick.) 13 (1833).
533. Eppes, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 347.
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cargo saved. 34 The schooner, however, was lost and the defendant
owner of it sought contribution to a general average from the cargo
owner. 535 It was there argued by the plaintiff cargo owner that the
Rhodian laws of jettison and the Laws of Oleron 536 had been adopted as
statutes by the Act of the Virginia Assembly establishing the Virginia
Court of Admiralty. 537 The plaintiffs primary argument was based on
the idea that only jettison-as stated in the Rhodian law brought down to
the present day by the Roman Digest-and not the stranding of a
destroyed vessel, should be subject to general average.53 8 This was
supposed to be the only way to interpret "the statute., 539 The source of
text and comment for the Rhodian law and the Digest was apparently
translation of Jean Domat's work, The Civil Law in Its Natural
Strahan's
540
Order.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 348.
536. The Laws, or sometimes referred to as the Rules, of Oleron, are perhaps the most
important and influential of the medieval sea codes. They are also considered to be of
central importance to the development of maritime law, having furnished the basis of a
number of other European codes of similar nature. For the most part, they appear to be a
collection of judgments believed to have been rendered by the maritime Judges of
Oleron, an island off the west coast of France. It is generally accepted that the Rules
state the common maritime law of the Atlantic Coast, generally corresponding to the
Consolato del Mare of the Mediterranean. It has often been claimed that the compilation
was made about 1150 for Eleanor of Aquitaine, who became successively the Queen to
France's Louis VII and England's Henry II. The Rules were said to have been carried
into England by Richard the Lion-hearted. Edward III declared it to be the law of
England by which the Admiralty was to settle relevant disputes within its jurisdiction. It
is still occasionally cited by English Courts. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 903. There
are a number of translations of the Rules of Oleron. See, for example, 1 PETERS, supra
note 453, at iii. This translation was printed from the "Sea Laws" and was carefully
compared to the copy published in French by Cleirac in Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer.
Wherever variances occurred they were pointed out and the French text given as well.
There is also a translation with annotations in The Black Book of the Admiralty. See I
THE BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY 89 (Sir Travers Twiss ed., 1985). The Introduction to
this volume of the Black Book contains a number of helpful analyses and comments as to
the history and contents of the Rules. See id.
537. Eppes, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 349-50.
538. Id. at 349.
539. Id.
540. JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER: TOGETHER WITH THE
PUBLICK LAW (2nd ed., London, D. Midwinter 1737). There were a large number of
French editions of Domat's various works. Strahan's translation was first published in
1722. A later edition, based primarily on Strahan's work, was submitted to the world, by
Luther S. Cushing, in 2 volumes (Boston, Little and Brown 1850). A collected Set of
Domat's works were edited by N. E. Carre and entitled Oeuvres de J. Domat (9 vols.,
Paris: 1821-1825).
Domat, in volume I, part I, Book II, Title IX, at page 329, addresses
"Engagements which are formed By Accidents." In Section 1, "In what manner are
formed The Engagements which Arise From Accidents," Art. Il1. addresses "of that
which is thrown into the Sea in a Danger of Shipwreck." In Section II "of The
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At the hearing and first determination of this case, Chancellor
Wythe, 54 1 Thomas Jefferson's mentor, in anticipation of Justices
Washington, Tilghman, Yeates, and Story, took the position that the case
at hand was clearly within the rule of contribution despite the argument
fashioned from Domat's comments on the Lex Rhodia, the Digest, and
the Rules of Oleron.542 Wythe reasoned that this was a case of a general
principle clearly encompassing a particular set of facts and
circumstances. 543 Because the vessel was destroyed in an act of sacrifice
aimed at saving the crew and cargo, the vessel was to stand upon the
Consequences of The Engagements which Are Formed By Accidents," Art. VI. addresses
"Contribution for the Loss of what is thrown into the Sea in a Danger of Shipwreck."
This includes an extensive annotation which addresses the contribution to be made by the
preserved cargo afterjettison. The explanation adds that the contribution ought not to be
made until the ship has gotten into port safely and then explains the modes of selling and
valuation of the preserved cargo. Articles VII through XVIII contain additional details
on Contribution. All of the annotations and the text of Domat are based on the Lex
Rhodia and the excerpts therefrom and comments thereon in the Digest which by now
should be familiar to the reader. The text and comments, however, do not directly
address the circumstance of a voluntarily sacrificed stranded ship, which is lost in the
effort to preserve the crew and cargo.
541. George Wythe (1726-June 8, 1806) was a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, a statesman, professor of law, and Chancellor of Virginia. He was
descended from a distinguished English family on his father's side and on his mother's
side was descended from George Keith, the noted scholar and divine. He learned the
fundamentals of both Latin and Greek from his mother at a young age. After a brief
attendance at the College of William and Mary, he took up the study of law under
Stephen Dewey in Prince George County. Upon admission to the bar at age twenty, he
became associated in practice with John Lewis, a prominent lawyer in Spotsylvania
County. Wythe held a number of legal and political offices. By diligent study of the law,
the classics, and the liberal sciences, he gained admission to the bar of the general court
in Williamsburg. During the Revolution he was a distinguished patriot and helped design
the seal of Virginia with its motto of warning to tyrants: "Sic Semper Tyrannis." With
Jefferson, to whom he was virtually a surrogate father, and Edmund Pendleton, he took
on the task of revising Virginia's laws. In 1778 he became one of the three judges of the
new Virginia high court of Chancery. On December 4, 1779 the "Professorship of Law
and Police" was established at the College of William and Mary. Wythe occupied this
first chair of law at any American College. His lectures largely followed Blackstone and
included a careful comparison between those of England and Virginia. "Wythe literally
charted the way in American jurisprudence." In 1788 the Virginia judicial system was
reorganized and Wythe became the sole chancellor. He held that position until 1801
when three chancery districts were created. "Scrupulously impartial, erudite and logical
in his opinions, Wythe was compared by classically minded Virginians to Aristides the
Just .... He viewed the lawyer as an instrumentality of justice. His mind was
methodical.... But it penetrated deeply. Possessed of broad education and culture, he
was probably the foremost classical scholar in Virginia, and was widely read in Roman
and English law." It is assumed that Wythe was poisoned with arsenic by a grandnephew in an effort to accelerate the receipt of his inheritance. Wythe lingered long

enough to revoke his will and disinherit the culprit.
BIOGRAPHY 92-94 (1999); 10 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
542.
543.

Eppes, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 351-52.

Id.

See 24

AMERICAN NATIONAL

BIOGRAPHY

586-89 (1958).
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same principle as would cargo jettisoned for the same purpose.544
Chancellor Blair, however, was of the opinion that the ship had
really been run on shore to benefit the owner of the ship and not to
benefit the owner of the cargo. 545 Blair was further of the opinion that
the stranding of the ship had taken away the cargo's chance to make a
full escape from the pursuing British and hence should not be within the
rule of equity and justice generally associated with a contribution to
general average.5 46
The case, which likely began prior to 1778, was held over several
terms and was eventually decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals. 547 It
was then held that the cargo preserved should be exempt from a
contribution in general average for the destroyed ship.148 However, the
grounds for this decision are not reported.
In Scudder,549 the other case newly cited by Kent, the master of a
vessel that had been caught in a storm and was dragging its anchors
toward the shore cut away the ship's masts in an effort to stop the
vessel's drifting. 550 This action stopped the drifting for approximately
one hour, after which the vessel resumed drifting and was wrecked.55 '
Although Caze and Bradhurst were cited in the arguments, the
552
opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court cited neither of them.
Based upon the fact that the peril faced was a continuous one, which had
not been avoided by the voluntary destruction of the masts, it was held
that although part of the cargo had been retrieved from the wreck, it was
a situation of save who can.553 Therefore, no contribution in general
average was required.5 54
At the end of the above quoted excerpt from his Commentaries,
after saying that the questions surrounding the loss of ships from
voluntary strandings remained to be settled, Kent added the following
note of concession:
It remains to be settled in the English law. Abbott on Shipping, 5th
Am. Ed. Boston, pp. 590. 591. But this question was finally settled
in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the
Columbian Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 13 Peters U.S. 331. The court reviewed
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id. at 352-53.
Id.
Scudder v. Bradford, 31 Mass (14 Pick.) 13 (1833).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
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the principal authorities, foreign and domestic, and decided, that in a
case of voluntary stranding of the ship for the common safety, and to
save the crew and cargo from impending peril, followed by a total
loss of the ship, but with a saving of the cargo, a clear case of general
average existed, in which the insurers of the cargo were held liable to
contribute upon that principle to the loss of the ship and freight. See
the cases collected and condensed
in Abbott on Shipping, 5th Am.ed.
555
Boston, 1846, 490, 491, note.
George F. Comstock, in his editor's notes to the eleventh edition of the
Commentaries, asserts: "The rule is now settled in the English courts, in
accordance with the decision in 13 Peters U.S. 331, supra. The shipper
who pays the whole amount of salvage, has a lien on the goods for the
amount of the contributions, so as to give him an insurable interest
therein..., 5 5 6 Here the matter has remained. Couch on Insurance reads
in pertinent part:
Voluntary stranding occurs where a ship is run aground either to
preserve her from a worse fate or for some fraudulent purpose.
Where voluntary stranding is required and designed for the common
safety of the associated interests, the resultant damage to the ship is a
general average loss. Such is the case where the ship is lost but the
cargo is thereby saved, as well as where the ship557is refloated and
performs her voyage, albeit in a damaged condition.
X.

Conclusion

To conclude, Emerigon was a dedicated student of the law in
general, and of maritime insurance in particular. His treatises were of
immense value in France and Continental Europe, as was quickly
realized and appreciated in England and America. Of all the then current
foreign legal publications, Emerigon's were perhaps the most revered by,
and the most useful to, American lawyers in commercial cities. His
various works were often quoted in English and American Admiralty
Courts, and in fact frequently served as the basis, or one of the bases, of
the decisions therein rendered.
Kent was likewise a dedicated student of the law and undertook a
systematic study of the law of maritime insurance. Kent, however, was
far from the only American lawyer or jurist making good use of
Emerigon. The erudite and ambitious lawyers of Philadelphia and New
555. This concessionary note is labeled note (d), star-page *239 in the last edition
edited by Kent and in later editions by other editors.
556. 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES *239 n.1 (11th ed., Geo. F. Comstock ed.,

Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1867).
557.

15 COUCH ON INSURANCE 221:16 (3d ed. 2002) (citations omitted).
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York were making good and frequent use of Emerigon in their arguments
before 1804, the year Kent undertook to outline and abridge Emerigon's
Treatise on Maritime Insurance. More importantly, it is clear that the
other Justices of the New York Supreme Court were using Emerigon
before 1804. It is apparent that these Justices were quite capable of
understanding the French language and carefully analyzing Emerigon's
statements and propositions.
Before 1804, Morgan Lewis and
Brockholst Livingston, the two leading Republicans on the Court, despite
Kent's assertions to the contrary, were not awed by the use of
Emerigon's Treatise. Rather, on several occasions they steadfastly
refused to bow to it. Instead, they based their decisions on established
common law principles.
In view of the facts, it is most probable that Kent did not begin
abridging Emerigon with the intention of dominating his brothers on the
bench. It is more likely that he began the abridgment to keep up with the
rest of the bench and bar in an effort at simple self-preservation-not
domination. It was at least three years later, in or after 1807, that
Livingston and the more erudite members of the bench had either retired
or lost any inclination to bother to translate or use Emerigon. Only then
did Kent have any opportunity to use Emerigon to dominate the other
justices. From 1807 to 1814, Kent did have opportunities to use
Emerigon to dominate his brethren and it appears that in at least some of
the cases his claims to have done so are likely accurate. The wand of
Emerigon and the French law indeed gained potency.
Kent, as Chancellor from 1814 to 1823, seldom cited Emerigon.
But Kent did use Emerigon very extensively in his Commentaries, even
providing a reverent and laudatory eulogy for the Frenchman. An
analysis of Bradhurst, by contrasting it to Caze and those cases
subsequent to it, provides an interesting study of the use of Emerigon to
help develop an important point of law. Among other things, a careful
analysis shows that neither Kent nor Emerigon were infallible. More
importantly, it shows that Kent was not as careful and methodical when
using Emerigon as he could have been. When other learned members of
the bar and bench-with both the time and inclination to translate and
study Emerigon as well as the other continental jurists used by Kentdid so, they came to an opposite and clearly sustainable conclusion.
Kent's Emerigon-based position on a voluntarily stranded ship and a
contribution by a saved cargo to a general average has now been
repeatedly held to have been faulty.
The earliest exceptions taken by the bench and bar to Kent's usage
and interpretation of Emerigon were couched in polite and almost
reverent terms. Nevertheless, it was clear that he had been less than
wholly careful in his reading and interpretation of Emerigon. The great
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Kent had been found out. 558

558. It is interesting to note that Alan Watson, certainly one of the world's foremost
authorities on law and religion, legal history, comparative law, and Roman law believes
that Kent more often than not used foreign authorities as mere window dressing to
support his actual usage of and reliance on the English common law. Watson further
points out that Kent's reading of foreign authorities was on many occasions careless and
even faulty as was the accuracy of his citations of foreign authorities. Alan Watson's
broad based and more general article is entitled "Chancellor Kent's Use of Foreign Law."
See THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 1820-1920, at
45 (Matthias Reiman ed., 1993). For an interesting article on Kent's own views on the
English common law and his use of it in decision making, see David W. Raack, To
Preserve the Best Fruits: The Legal Thought of ChancellorJames Kent, 33 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 320 (1989).

Appendix: James Kent's Notes on
Emerigon
The notes below are typed from the original handwritten materials
of James Kent, which are in the possession of Charles Shields. All
emphases are in the original handwritten manuscript in the form of
underlining. All materials included in "( )" are in the original. All
materials included in "{ }" are later additions or insertions made by
Kent. All materials included in "[ ]" are comments or questions
supplied by Charles Shields.
[face page] (James Kent)
Notes taken from Emerigon on Insurance-In August, Sept. &
October 1804[obv. of face page]
Pothier's Treatise on Insurance is short, & excellent as a clear,
lucid, elementary digest, but it is not to be compared to Emerigon. The
latter has all the general principles of the first with infinitely more
learning to support them, with numerous distinctions & lesser matter not
touched by Pothier, & with a great variety of reported cases.
[*1] Preface.
The preface of Emerigon appears to be the groundwork of that of
Marshall. He gives a short account of all of the maritime treatises prior
to the Ordinance of Lewis 14th-He speaks with a filial fondness of the
Laws of Marseilles. The Consulat de la Mer originated in Spain & is a
venerable Code of the maritime law of Nations. The Guidon de la Mer
contained in the Compilation to Cleirac is an extensive and masterly
treatise, but the Ordinance of 1681 is a profound Digest of all these
ancient laws-In vol. 2. pa. 3-6-He speaks most highly of his two
predecessors Valin & Pothier.
[*2] Vol. 1.
Ch. 1. General observations
page 4-) There are two kinds of assurance. The one properly so
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called whose object is the risk of things, the other is a wager. The last is
prohibited in France, because it tempts to Fraud. Risque is therefore of
the Essence of the contract which requires that one party should take the
peril of the Effects of another upon the Sea. There must be an active or
presumed isLque at the time of the contract.
Sect. 2. pa. 8- As soon as the Policy is signed the assured cannot
effect a double assurance by other persons. He only can insure the
solvency of the first assurers. So on the other hand, the assurer may
cause the same vessel to be re-assured [*3] for his Indemnity. See pa.
247.
Emerigon here gives a learned dissertation on the Roman law
relative to nude pacts & concludes that policy is not a nude pact. It has a
lawful cause & a determined object. The risque is the lawful condition
of the contract.
If the risque real or supposed fails the contract fails for want of
matter. Sect. 3 pa. 13- The contract is conditional & fails if the voyage
be broken up before the risque commences, even tho it arise from the act
of the insured.
It is binding if the Peril happens by force majeure.
This contract demands much of prudence. It is necessary to make
an analysis of Hazards [*4] & to possess the science of the calculation of
probabilities.
Sect. 4 pa. 14.) The insurance is a contract of indemnity, & cannot
become a means of gain to the insured. This would be against the nature
of the contract. Consequently, profits, freight, salaries, not yet acquired
or in esse are not insurable. The object is to insure against real, intrinsic
loss, & therefore the subject insured must not be overvalued. Page 262.
Sect. 5. pa. 18. 19.- The policy of insurance is a contract of strict
rght, where the intent is clear & it is a contract of good faith, & the
insured is bound to disclose all the facts material for the insurer to know.
The insurer is generally passive & acts upon facts disclosed to him & is
often the victim of his good faith. -See also Vol. 2. 130 [*5] If the
Insured does not disclose all the material facts, tho the failure happen
thro inadvertence, the contract is void.
Sect. 6. pa. 21 - The policy of Insurance is a contract founded on &
governed by the law of nations, for the law merchant is the universal law
of nations, & is to be expounded by having recourse to the usages of
other nations. So has been the maxim from the time of the Rhodian law
to this day.
The policy however is liable to the positive & arbitrary Regulation
of every state in which it is made. Sect. 7. pa. 23 - Altho double
assurances are not permitted, yet there may be a plurality of policies, if
united they do not exceed the value of the subject insured.
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[*6] Ch. 2. Of the Form of the Contract.
Emerigon gives the different Forms of the Policy as they prevail in
different countries & they substantially agree.
-Sect. 4. pa.41 - He condemns the pract of only dating the
subscription once-at the time of the first signature & so bringing all the
subsequent subscriptions back to that date; a practice exposing to Fraud
& imposition & which he well exposes.
pa. 43 - If the first insurer add some restrictive clause to his
subscription, all the subsequent insurers are presumed to sign under the
same modification.
pa. 44. Every insurer makes a distinct contract, & he cannot retract
tho no more sign.Emerigon rather thinks the Insurer ought to be bound, after once
jutting his name, tho he still hold the pen & that [*7] there should be no
Erazure in policies.He speaks most emphatically against the incorrigible carelessness &
credulity of Insurers in signing without reading. -pa. 47.
A policy operates as a Mortgage from the date of it on the goods of
the insurer & insured, pa. 49. Sect. 7. 55. -If the Domicil of the assured
be material to the risk, as if he be domiciled with a Belligerent Power,
the fact must be disclosed to the Insurer.- The above section details particularly & with Precision what
are & what are not the essential Parts of a Policy.
Ch. 3. Of the Premium.
Sect. 2. In France there is a positive Ordinance that on a voyage out
& in, & the voyage is broken up on arrival at the foreign port, the Insurer
returns 2/3ds of his Premium.
So if the voyage exceeds the time [*8] limited, the Premium is to be
augmented in proportion. If it fall short, the Insurer still keeps his
Premium-vol. 2. 9-pa.68.69.- If the assured declare things falsely, or dissimulate one
essential circumstance, the contract is void.
Emerigon criticises Valin very justly & shews himself a clearer
judge of principles. pa. 70.
The Premium is neither to be augmented or diminished in
consequence of war or Peace happening after the making of the contract;
& yet I perceive the French government in 1748 & 1755 interfered & by
special Edicts controlled the operation of Policies & the Premiums
already agreed upon. pa. 72. 73. He condemns all such Interference with
Private Contracts, & dissents from Pothier & Valin. pa. 74.
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Emerigon speaks with resentment of the English Attack on the
French [*9] Commerce before any Declaration of war in 1755 - pa. 73.
75.
It is usual, however, in French policies to have a stipulation that the
premium shall be augmented in case of war, & the war is then to be
ascertained from the first act of hostility, be it where it may. pa. 80
Sect. 7. pa. 84. If the assured fail in paying the premium at the time
stipulated, the insurer may demand that the policy be annulled.
Sect. 8. pa. 85. Discusses the important distinctions in the law of
Set-off of the premium & the sum due for loss & when it is & is not
admissible. Emerigon cites freely & [/ros or vos/] from the civil law on
this head.
Policies are susceptible of all conditions the parties please, provided
they do not violate the Essence of the contract or the positive laws. pa.
81.
[*10] - a Premium is of the Essence of the Contract, but that
Premium need not be money. It may be goods or a part of the profits of
the voyage. - Sect. 10. pa. 89.
Pothier has very well seized the Spirit of the Contract of Insurance.
A policy without any premium would be void, as it would be
without consid[eration]. Sect 11.
Ch. 4. Who may be Parties.
Sect. 1. 95 A Minor who signs a policy is bound. So is a feme
covert.
Anciently a Gentleman was a military character and wore a sword
and was devoted to the Defense of the State. Sunt homines gentis and
formerly Traffic was forbidden to them. pa. 98.
But under Lewis 14th-Commerce was deemed so important to the
state, that great encouragement [* 11] was given to it by royal Edict, and
the Nobility were allowed to engage in it, without derogating from their
Nobility or privileges, pa. 98. 99.
See a fine & eloquent Eulogy on the Grandeur and Blessing of
Commerce - pa. 100; and the tranquil and philosophic character of the
Lawyer is interestedly displayed. pa. 107. He says the lawyer never
should turn merchant. In these two pages Emerigon has adorned his
subject with elegant description.
The civil law forbid Senators to be concerned in Trade. It was
deemed degrading.
French Consuls are forbidden to trade directly or indirectly and
consequently they cannot be Insurers. -pa. 107.
[*12] All Insurance Brokers are prohibited to insure. - pa. 113.
The multiplied abuses by Brokers in taking the Execution, the
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debtor and creditor of the contract of insurance to themselves - in
metamorphosing the Contract and substituting themselves as debtor and
creditor (and which abusers Emerigon details at large as happening at
Marseilles, his native and favorite spot) gave rise to an Edict of
Prohibitions in 1771. See Sect. 7 throughout.Sect. 8 pa.121. Freedom and Emulation are the Soul of Commerce
and give to it all the spring of which it is susceptible. Strangers may be
parties to a French contract of insurance.
Emerigon agitates here the great question - what force has the
French [* 13] Ordinance to the Subject of policies made abroad? He says
that as far as concerns the forms and order of proceeding the custom of
country is followed where the cause is litigated; and as far as respects the
decision of the controversy the lex loci contractus is to prevail.
He says a Frenchman cannot be drawn from the realm to be sued
and answer abroad, and upon the same principle, he says judgments
rendered by foreign judges have no weight in France against Frenchmen.
The cause must be there tried anew. pa. 123.But E. D. his conclusion is not well drawn from his Premises. There is no analogy between the cases. It does not follow from the same
principle.
He says it is the same of judgments [*14] rendered in a foreign
country against a stranger domiciled in France.But in France they execute foreign judgments between Foreigners.
pa. 123. He says however it is the law of nations that actor sequitur
forum rei, & in 1777 it was agreed in the Treaty of Alliance between
France & the Swiss cantons that definitive judgments in civil matters
rendered in either country should be reciprocally executed in the other.
Policies of insurance are principally governed by the law of nations.
- Pothier 9 etc.
But the foreign judgments have no authority against Frenchmen,
Proofs taken and duly authenticated abroad are admitted in France in
civil affairs concerning commerce - pa. 127.
[*15] Strangers when they sue in France, except it be foreign
merchants, are bound to give previous security to pay costs, etc. - pa.
127.
Emerigon is quite desultory, for in the 8th sect. concerning
Strangers, he quits the particular subject of insurances, and treats at large,
tho in a very interesting manner, of the rights of foreigners & of foreign
judgments in France.
Ch. 5 Of the Contracting Parties.
If the agent of the insured, inserts his name as insured and does
not say on account of another, he is presumed to be the proprietor. pa.
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134.
It is a general rule that he who contracts as agent is not personally
bound, but in commercial cases (where usage easily overturns the theory
of right) he is personally [*16] responsible. pa. 138.
The Factor who effected the insurance, can abandon. pa. 140.
The insurer may regard him in all respects as the principal. The
reasoning of Emerigon on this head is conclusive.
If a Factor does not literally follow his orders, he becomes
amenable for every act not within his strict instructions as if it were his
own. pa. 143.
If a Factor exceed his orders and inform his principal of it by
letter, unless the principal promptly contradicts the act, he is presumed to
ratify it. pa. 145.
A Factor is liable for his neglect to his principal. See sect. 7. pa.
147. where this head [*17] is luminously discussed.
The French law does not substitute the negligent Factor for the
Insurer but makes him answer and indemnify as a defaulting agent. But
quo: I think the English principle more just of giving the agent all the
benefit of being insurer by the substitution, or else there is no distinction
in the case. see pa. 148,9.
Emerigon thinks the Factor ought not himself to become the
Insurer for his principal. It leads to suspicion and abuse. 149. 150.
Ch. 6 Of the Ship.
If the name of the ship in the policy be changed, and due notice
thereof be given to the Insurer, this will not affect the policy, as the name
is not of the substance of the contract, and no more risk is incurred. Sect.
1, pa. 154.
[*18] An error in the name of the ship is not fatal to the policy.
Sect. 2. pa. 159
An error in the quali!y of the vessel is fatal to the Policy unless the
insurer knew the truth of fact. pa. 161. But this again depends upon the
question, whether the different quality of the vessel varies the risk, if it
does not, the policy remains good. pa. 163.
If the risk has once commenced there is no return of premium, if it
be mentioned that the vessel sails with convoy and she does not, the
policy is void. pa. 164-167.
A declaration of circumstances in a policy, which need not have
been made, must be true for expressio nocent; non expressio non nocent.
pa. 173. This doctrine of the [*19] English warranties.
You may insure good to be remitted in any vessel, as you may not
know the vessel they are to come in. Sect. 5. pa. 173.
If you insure goods to $1,000 to be remitted in one or more vessels
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and they came in 5 vessels to $2,000 and 3 of them taken and 2 of them
arrive safe with as much as is insured, yet the insurer must pay a loss in
proportion of 2 to 5. pa. 175.
Sect. 6 pa. 177. If goods be insured aboard of vessels from N. Y. to
N. Haven and they are sent in one vessel which perishes, Valin thinks the
Insurer must pay. LeGuidon thinks otherwise and Emerigon agrees with
the former.
A shiD is always the same altho all materials of it may be new. This
was the Roman law. pa. 180,1.
[*20] Ch. 7 Of the Captain
The specific name of the Master is not of the Essence of the
Contract. pa. 182.
The assured may change him at pleasure, if his name be inserted by
reason of the words or whosoever else may be master. If those words be
omitted, then the assured cannot change the master, but in case of
necessity, and in no case can he change so as to enhance the risk as by
taking a captain from a belligerent power. pa. 185,6.
The captain may be changed after the departure of the vessel and by
a substitution by the captain himself, provided the new one be a
competent master of the same nation. pa. 187,8. sect. 3.
The powers and duties of a captain are sketched with great elegance
and beauty pa. 192,3. Emerigon shows himself to be a scholar [*21] of
great taste as well as learning.
Ch. 8 Things Insurable.
Sect. 1. pa. 198- It is unlawful to insure life. It is a wager leading to
or inciting to crime.
But it is lawful to insure the liberty of a person. These policies are
common in the Mediterranean Voyages, and Emerigon Sect.2. pa. 199.
treats largely of the construction and operation of these policies. (See
also Pothier, pa. 171.)
Sect. 4 pa. 205. Negros are a lawful object of insurance and
regarded in many respects as property. In this sect. Emerigon gives a
Hist. of slavery among the ancients and in early France. He advocates
the Equality and Dignity of man, and proves the civil law, which was
softened by a sage philosophy, also inculcated Equality and Humanity
while it tolerated slavery. This [*22] is a learned and interesting section.
Sect. 5. pa. 210. Emerigon holds in opposition to Blackstone, that
all civil laws are binding on the conscience.
To insure goods, the trade in which is unlawful by the municipal
law, is void. The policy is null. pa. 211.
But neutrals may insure contraband of war, because that commerce
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is still to them lawful. If however Enemy Property be insured and the
neutral insured it as his own, the Insurer is not bound. pa. 212.
According to usage, Insurance upon a trade prohibited by the laws
of the friendly country to which it is directed, are valid, though in sound
theory they ought to be null. pa. 212. Pothier reasons strongly and
impressively against [*23] the validity of these contracts where aim is by
carrying on a smuggling trade abroad, to violate the foreign laws and to
make foreign subjects sin. pa. 214.
And yet France, England and we, tolerate such Insurances. see
Marshall - Emerigon admits that he does not choose to attack the
cogent and rigid reasoning of Pothier. see pa. 215.
Sect. 7. page 218,9. The assured must run the risk of 1/10th of the
goods on board in order to make him personally interested in the
preservation of the cargo. However he may infuse the whole by an
express declaration in the policy except in two cases: (1) when he is
himself on board; and (2) when he is the owner of the vessel.
Sect. 8, pa.223. Freight is [*24] not due for goods which are lost on
the Voyage and if the freight has been paid in advance, it can be
recovered back unless there be a special stipulation to allow freight at all
events.
Freight not earned is not insurable, pa. 224. The reason is because it
is an uncertain profit and may or may not arise, pa. 225.
But acquired freight is insurable, and when you abandon the Vessel,
you do not abandon the freight with it. It is insurable because put in
risque, not by the owner of the vessel, but by the freighter who pays it at
all events whether the ship arrive safe or not, and so he runs the risque of
the freight of the voyage. - In other words, Freight is insurable in France
by the Freighter who pay, but not by the owner of the ship who acquires
it. I think this an idle distinction [*25] in the French law.
There has been a good deal of difficulty in understanding the
meaning of the words acquired Freight and Emerigon seems not to be
satisfied with any elucidation. pa. 226,7,8.
It was the ordinance of the Marine that prohibited the Insurance of
Freight and it was the Edict of 1779 that relaxed as to acquired freight.
Profit like Freight, is a thing of uncertainty, and in France they
forbid to insure the expected profit of a cargo. -pa. 232.
-Tho a simple Hope is a good Basis for a sale, as if a Fisherman
sells the next cast of his net, it is no ground of Insurance, which must be
of something physical and exposed to Sea risks--do. -Seaman's wages
are not insurable, pa. 235.
[*26] He who takes up money on Bottomrv cannot insure it, for
then he would run no risk, pa. 236. -Pothier pa. 32 reasons admirably
on this point.
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He who hath lent his money on Bottomry can insure it. p. 237. but
not his maritime interest. He can only insure his capital lent, tho a
French magistrate hath given a pointed and elegant opinion against
insuring either.
The person who takes up money on Bottomry cannot himself be the
insurer of the capital of the Lender for this would destroy the Essence of
the contract, and make the borrower run the risk absolutely. pa.239.
It is lawful to insure the premium of an antecedent insurance, as this
premium is part of the outfit. And the same person who insures your
cargo may also for a new premium insure the premium you pay for the
insurance, pa. 242-245.
[*27a] The capital and the premium may both be insured in the
same policy, pa. 244.
You may insure the Premium of the premium even on to the
Extinction of the risque. This is common in time of war by reason of the
high rate of premium. pa. 245.
Reassurance is a contract entirely distinct from the primitive
Insurance; and the assurer can reassure the entire sum he hath insured
without the deduction of the premium which he had received of the part
of the first insured, pa. 248. 252.
The insured may insure the Solvency of the Insurer. But both this
and the contract of reassurance are injurious as a matter of profit to the
parties who effect them. pa. 252. See supra pa. 2.
[*27b] -Emerigon supposes you may sue the Insurer of the
Solvency of the first Insurer, after the first has delayed to pay on
Execution or a judicial demand made of him. pa. 254.
If during the course of the risk, the Insurer fails, the insured may
judicially demand a Dissolution of the contract, or liberty to make a
reassurance. Sect. 16. pa. 254.
The insurer may also insure the Solvency of the Insured as to the
Premium not yet due, or he may demand security or dissolution of the
contract in case the Insured fails beforehand. page 256.-But both Valin
and Pothier suppose this last insurance illicit.
But to insure the Solvency of a merchant before failure is injurious,
for credit is the riches [*28] of merchants.
Ch. 9. Valuation of the Property insured.
goods ought to be insured according to their just Valor, but how
ascertain their just Valor?-Things on a general average contribute to
their falling price.
To fix this Value, many different rules have prevailed.-page 261
{we mind not the value of the effects at the Time of the loss but at the
time of the lading - pa. 263}
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You may insure goods at the price they cost you, or at the current
Price at the {Time and I place of Lading. This cost is the rule adopted
by Valin and Emerigon. - pa.263 - same rule as to the ship. -do. Inf. pa.
42.
-Assurances of good beyond their value is prohibited; and if the
assured conceal any prior Insurance so as to create this excess, it is
fraudulent. pa. 264.
It is not essential that the subject insured should be valued in the
policy. If it be in, the insurer is [*29] bound, unless he himself prove the
overvaluation, if not in, the Insured must prove the value of the Subject.page 266,7.
If there be no valuation in the policy, the Insured by the Invoices,
etc. proves the value at the time and place of lading. pa.268,9.
The Insurer is at liberty to contest an overvaluation. But Le Guidon
says that Excess ought to be at least 1/4- before he be permitted in
inquire. Valin follows Guidon, and Emerigon says the Excess must be
considerable and left to the discretion of the Judge. -pa. 272.
In valuing the goods insured, you take in all the Expences of the
Outfit, duties, etc. -pa. 276.
By an Edict of 1779 all foreign money mentioned in policies is to be
liquidated by the Livres Tournois, pa. 281.
[*30] Ch. 10. Description of the Subject Insured.
It is usual to specify in the Policy only generally upon the goods and
merchandizes - or such a sum upon the body of the ship. - page 286.
Assurance upon the specified goods excludes all goods not
specified. do. 287.
You may insure the ship and goods in one Policy. - 288.
If such a sum be insured upon the ship and goods jointly, the rule is
that half is applied to the ship and half to the goods. pa. 288.
But this rule was combatted and it was finally settled that the sum
insured should be apportioned between the ship and cargo according to a
just valuation of them respectively. - pa. 290.
An insurance upon goods taken [*31 ] in and covers goods laden on
board during the course of the voyage; Expences incurred during the
same are included in a Policy on the ship. pa. 290. 292.
To insure a thing which consists in weight, Number or Measure
without designation of them or the amount in silver, Emerigon concludes
with Roccus would be void for uncertainty, pa. 292,3.
If one of two copartners insures generally goods, it is a question
whether the policy covers the goods of both. The Sages disagree.
Perhaps the best opinion is that the Insurance is good for the Portion of
Interest which belongs to the Insured, the others hold fast that the
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Insurance will cover the whole. page 293,4.
Emerigon says the general rule is that each copartner is presumed
not to insure but for himself. This is good as between each other, but
[*32] the insurer cannot set up the Partnership so as to limit the policy to
a Part of the goods. pa. 295, 6. i.e., If the Insurance be to the whole
amount of the joint interest. -You must designate the articles insured
which are subject to Leakage unless in the case of a return voyage when
you may not know the articles, pa. 296.
The waste etc. of perishable articles does not fall on the Insurer. do.
297.
An Insurance on the body of a ship, includes all its appurtenances,
as the anchor, boats, etc. -pa. 298.
An Insurance upon 100 Hides and assured has 200 - paid cost.
Authors differ. Emerigon and the French decisions say that the assured
may apply the policy to the lost Hides. pa. 298,9.
If you insure oil and the cargo put on board is soa--or you insure
wool and the cargo is cloth, here as the substantial form is changed, and
the [*33] new Species produced, the policy never attaches. - pa. 299.300.
Ch. 11. Proof that the Subiect Insured has been in risk.
The burthen of proving that the goods insured were jeopardized, lies
on the assured. -pa. 304
The proofs of the lading on board and of the loss must be exhibited
the
insurer, but the French law does not generally define what those
to
proofs shall be, but leaves it to depend on the circumstances of each case.
pa. 307,8.
A Bill of Lading is spoken of very highly, as superseding almost a
Charter Party, it being full proof of its completion. It specifies
particularly the cargo of the voyage, etc. pa. 311.
When an entire ship is chartered the whole freight belongs to the
charterer and the captain can take none.- 310.
[*34] The Bill of Lading is an authentic Instrument and valid proof
in the French law - pa. 314. It seems to be conclusive as respects the
insurer except in cases of Fraud. -do. and 315.
The Insurer is however at all times at liberty to attack it on the
Ground of Fraud, but as to the Insured, it seems to be more conclusive. pa. 316.
The Receit of the Consignee mentioned in the Bill of Lading,
discharges the Captain.A Bill of Lading has never been considered a negotiable paper-to
assign it and the effects in it then at sea, without delivery creates only a
simple right ad rem, a right of action and does not destroy the right of
Vendor to seize in transitu, nor the right of Lendor on Bottonry, nor the
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general rights of creditors in case of Insolvency of the Vendor-page
318,9.
Mem'n.-This decision is the same as that of Lord
Loughborough [*35] in 1 H. Blacks. in the Case of Lickbarrow and
MasonIt is quite enough, says Emerigon, that we have attributed the
quality of negotiable paper to policies of Insurance. -page 320.
Secrecy inspired by Sagacity, directed by Prudence and exempt
from Fraud is a very useful virtue, especially in Trade. The words On
Account in the Bill of Lading and the Policy must harmonize - pa. 320,1.
It is very usual to insure on account of A. or other whom it shall belong,
and the Factor can always claim as his own, and the Bill of Lading and
Policy are made to agree by Implication - pa. 324-7.
Bills of Lading are usually signed with this saving clause as said to
be by which the captain does not warrant the quality and quantity [*36]
of the articles -pa. 327. 328,9.
But if the Captain buy and load the vessel himself, he cannot shelter
himself from responsibility under the clause of as said to be, for he must
know his own acts. -pa.329.
The Insurers are not concluded by the Bill of Lading, but may
require the Invoices and other papers to establish the quality, quantity
and price of the things insured. -pa.329.
If it accidentally happens that there be no Bill of Lading the assured
is not without remedy. He may prove the Articles laden on board _b
other Proof. -sec. 6 pa. 330.
In case of a Re-assurance it is lawful to stipulate that if the assured
(who is the primitive insurer) produce the Receipt of Payment by him of
the loss on the first insurance, it shall be conclusive to [*37] make the
last insurer pay. But this is a dangerous stipulation of the parties as it
puts it in the Power of the first insurer to settle and pay without due
examination and to make the 2d insurer the victim of his credulity or
folly. -page 336-340.
Ch. 12 Of Maritime Risks.
Cas fortuit is an Event which no human Prudence could foresee, and
force majeur or vis major is that which cannot resist. -page 358.
Fortune de mer comprehends all the losses at sea by cas fortuit for
which the insurer is responsible. -do. 359.
Sect. 1. page 360,1. -The Insurers are responsible for all accidents
however unusual, unknown or extraordinary.
[*38] The Simplicity of Insurers, and the abuses and Impositions
they are liable to by leaving blanks to be filled up afterwards ad libitum
are strongly described. -pa. 362,3.
The Insurer is not answerable for loss arising from the fault of the
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Master and Mariners, if the same does not amount to Barratry. -pa. 364.
Loss arising from the proper vice of the article itself, or from the act
of the assured or master, is not to be reputed cas fortuit, unless otherwise
so declared in the Policy. -do.
It is against first Principles and wholly inadmissable, that the
Insurer should be holden for the act or fault of the assured. do. and 365.
A fault or error of the broker or agent of the Insured producing the
loss, equally exempts the Insurer. do. 365.
It is not necessary [*39] that the loss should proceed directly from
the act of the Insured to exempt the Insurer; if it probably occasioned the
Loss it is enough. do.
Sect. 3. pa 366,7. -Barratry, does not by the French law necessarily
include Fraud or crime, - It reaches to the imprudence or want of skill of
the Master and Mariners.
But the Italian civilians, like the English attach crime to it. do.The insurers are not answerable for the Barratry of the Master,
whom the insured themselves have appointed. -pa.368,9.
Nor are the Insurers by their engagement to answer for Barratry,
bound to answer for the acts of the captain committed in his Quality of
Factor- pa. 370.
Nor if the insured be himself the Captain, can the Insurer [*40] be
bound to answer for his Barratry.
Emerigon holds Barratry to be a Fortune of the Sea, as it is a very
great and indispensable maritime risk, and confidence must be placed. pa
371,2.
Sect. 4. 373. The Insurers are not responsible for the Master's faults
and blunders, if there be no Barratry insured.Every vessel at her departure, is presumed to be seaworthy and it
lay with the insurer to prove the contrary, but to guard against Imposition
from this rule, the French have a special rule on the subject. -pa. 374.
The Captain is bound to see that the ship is in good condition when
he sails. That she is judiciously loaded, hath good equipage, a
competent crew, and {that he} takes advice of the supercargo in
The Captain is
[*41] -pa. 377.
extraordinary cases.-pa. 373-6.
answerable for damage by rats, if he keep no cats on board.
Sect. 5. pa. 378-the Insurer is not answerable neither for the faults
of the crew, except for Barratry.
The Master is answerable for them-and this sect. gives an
interesting detail of the Powers of the Captain on board of a French
sh__p---But Emerigon says the captain would debase his character and
deserve punishment if he had the Baseness to strike his men. -pa. 380.
In case of a general revolt on board and loss therby, this is not
deemed cas fortuit and the Insurer does not pay, unless this revolt was
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forced by some just fear of Peril - pa. 382,3. But he admits that if the
Insurer was answerable for Barratry, he would have to answer. [*42] in
such case. pa. 388,9.see pa. 390. a beautiful Touch of the descriptive
Pencil on the character of a sailor.
Insurers not answerable for damage arising from the intrinsic decay
and vice of the article. -pa. 390.
So they are not answerable for the wear and tare of the Ship . pa.
393. see supra pa. 28.
Nor for the death of animals by natural sickness. do.
The revolt of Negroes in the Slave Trade is deemed a cas fortuit for
which the Insurer is liable, sect 10. pa. 394If the Captain put to sea in a bad and tempestuous time, he must
answer for the damage - pa. 398.
If he neglects to take a Pilot and is thereby shipwrecked in entry of a
port, he must answer for the damages. pa. 402. And in such a [*43] case.
the Insurer is excused. pa. 403Stranding is no cause for abandonment, if the vessel be raised again
and successfully pursue her voyage.-pa. 409.410.
The Insurer answers for the damage of the ships running foul of
each other, except the loss happened by the wrong of the Master or crew
of the ship insured, sect. 14. pa. 413.
If two vessels be sailing out of a port for Instance, the one behind
must answer for the damage they receive of running foul. -pa. 414.
Emerigon from page 413 to 419 gives a great number of positive
rules from different writers and Nations about the regulation of vessels in
PortSo he says the right of fishing in Harbor, on coast, etc. [*44] must
be subordinate to that of Navigation which is the greater and more
necessary right, and their nets, etc. must not obstruct. pa. 419-421.
If the ship be changed during the voyage without necessity and
without the consent of the Insurer, he is discharged. pa. 424.
But the Captain must in such cases answer for the evil
consequences. do. 423. And if both ships perish, still the Captain must
answer to the Freighter, since by changing ships he has deprived the
Freighter of his remedy on the Insurance. pa. 426.
- a change of Ship on the voyage from necessity by Sea Peril, does
not prejudice the Insurance. pa. 426.
Any other vis maieure will authorize the change. 427.
The captain, if the Ship becomes innavigable, is oblige to hire
another vessel, if one can be procured, and [*45] if he does not hire one,
he has only Freight pro rata - Sect. 16. pa. 427,8.
Pothier and Valin differ from Emerigon and do not suppose the
Master obliged to take up another vessel, and that if he omits to do so he

2004]

APPENDIX

1233

only loses his Freight or the whole voyage. Ibid.
If the ship becomes disabled on the voyage and the Captain hires
another ship as he is obliged to do, he does it in his quality of Factor and
he can then elect and demand his entire Freight for the voyage and then
the Freight of the ship substituted he must bear; or he may take only an
average Freight for the voyage in the first vessel, and then the shipper or
owner of the merchandize saved, must pay the Freight of the 2nd vessel.
This says Emerigon is the sound Distinction on the subject. pa. 431,2.
[*46] fire from whatever cause, unless from the positive negligence
of the Master or Crew is Peril within the policy, sect. 17. 433.
Capture authorizes an immediate abandonment - pa. 445. and it is
the same whether the Capture be just or unjust; tho Emerigon says that if
the question was res integra, he should agree that Capture attended with a
subsequent recovery, did not justify an abandonment. But the rule is
otherwise settled, and the Hope of Recovery is no obstacle to the
abandonment.
Sect. 19. pa. 446. Is a desultory Sect. on the rights of war. It gives
a History of the changes and meliorations of the French Code as to the
rights of neutral flags and territory [*47] and the generosity due to
Enemies who came into your ports by Tempests or Mistake. It is a
learned and very amusing Treatise.
Sect. 22, pa. 457,8. The act of the prince, or the unjust Judgment of
a Court is placed in the class of cas fortuit, and the Insurer is answerable
for all unjust Confiscations abroad.
A Foreign Judgment is no evidence in France against Frenchmen,
nor can the insurer plead it. pa. 458, see supra pa. 13.
If the policy be made for the account of whomsoever it may belong,
this is sufficient in wartime for to declare to the Insurer that the Effects
are not really neutral. pa. 460.
If the Captain voluntarily and without being forced by oath, declare
to the captor, the real [*48] owner of the covered property, he discharges
the Insurer -pa. 460,1.
If a Foreign Judgment-hath been executed abroad, and a
Frenchman is interested in the Execution, it then is to be received in
France as effectual. pa. 463.
Sect. 21. pa. 464,5-The captain may redeem a Prize taken, and he
does for whomsoever it belongs and in the character of agent.
He
cannot do it on his own account. If the owner be on board or near by he
cannot act without his advice. See also pa. 486.
If the vessel proceed on after the Redemption, she sails as before at
the risk of the Insurer.
But if the assured abandon, the composition and repurchase is for
the benefit of the Insurer. 468,9.
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The assured must give notice promptly if they mean to [*49] throw
the loss and repurchase on the Insurer, and the Insurer must make his
Election promptly if he means to accept and pay the composition and
take the subject to himself. -do.
If the insurer accept of the repurchase he pays the total loss and the
vessel sails afterwards at his risk as his property. pa. 470.
If the Insurer will not accept and pay the Composition he must pay
the sum insured as for a total loss. pa. 470.472. and the Insured bears the
expense of the Redemption.
A draft given to an Enemy or Pirate for the re-purchase ought to be
paidfides servanda est. pa. 472.
Vessels of war are forbidden to ransom their Prizes except in case of
necessity. pa. 476.
[*50] Emerigon agitates pretty fully this Question, a French ship is
captured by the English is ransomed and the captor takes a Hostage as a
Surety for Payment of the Ransom Bill - The ransommed ship soon
after perishes by Shipwreck, and the Hostage is detained in England
rightfully to enforce payment of Ransom Bill. Who is bound to pay the
Bill? Not the insurer on the ship unless he had accepted the ship so
ransommed. He only pays the primitive total loss. Emerigon says the
owner of the French Ship is bound to pay the Ransom Bill tho a dead
loss to them, because the captain acted as his agent and had right so to
bind him unless expressly prohibited. pa. 478 to 484. -

-

The loss of

the ransommed vessel did not affect the validity of the Ransom Bill.
[*51] Emerigon supposes that by reason of the Clause in the
English Policies "that the assured in case of loss may labor for the
recovery of the property without prejudice to the Insurance, and that the
Insurers are to contribute pro rata" the English Insurers would be obliged
to pay the ransom in the preceding case stated tho they be obliged to pay
above Cent for Cent- i.e. tho they may pay beyond the Sum insured.
Page 484.
But he says that in France there is no such clause and insurers never
pay beyond the sum insured. Do. unless they elect to take the vessel
ransommed to themselves and pay the composition and the vessel be
afterwards lost, and this is a voluntary agreement. pa.486.
According to the venerable LeGuidon, the ancient policies of [*52]
Rouen had the London Clause and the Insurer was in all cases holden to
pay the Ransom and the loss also if total and thereby pay beyond the
Subscription -pa. 485,6.
This old treatise likewise decides that the owner in the above case
stated of loss of the vessel would be obliged to pay the Ransom Bill.
Sect. 22 pa. 486,7 - a ship becomes captured and a Prize, when
carried in to Port, tho it should be afterwards released as illegally taken.
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This release does not affect the abandonment of the vessel to the Insurer,
who becomes entitled of course to the Benefit of the Vessel restored.
The Insurer, in case free of average, are still obliged to pay Expence
and Damage of reclaiming a Prize -pa. 489.
During the detention of a vessel taken and afterwards dismissed, the
wages of the [*53] crew and the Freight go on. pa. 490.
Seaman's wages go on fully, are not bound to contribute to the
Expence of getting a vessel released from capture. They only contribute
in the case of a ransom. -pa. 492,3.
Sect. 23. as to Recaptures, the old law {and the Ordinance of 1680}
was that if the Prize had been in the Enemy's hands 24 hours, the former
owner's right was gone. If not, then the former owner was entitled to the
recapture on paying the salvage of (1/3) in Value. This rule was
confirmed by an Arret in 1779 -pa. 495-498.
If the enemy's vessel with his ransom bill and Hostage on board be
taken by a Vessel of the Power to whom the Hostage belonged, the
Hostage is to be set at liberty, and the Ransom Bill becomes void. pa.
500,1.
[*54] If the Prize be abandoned and come again into the hand of the
Friends, it is like a case of wreck. The ancient owner takes it any time
before a year and a day paying 1/3 the Value for Salvage. -pa. 503 But Emerigon denies that the Salvage ought to be 1/3 -according to
Valin. That would be extravagant. It ought to be a reasonable
recompense to be settled arbitium boni viri - pa. 504.
Sect. 25 pa. 505. If a Prize be retaken by rising of the Prisoners,
they have no right to the vessel as a recaptured one nor to Salvage, tho it
is usual to allow them some compensation.To abandon a ship by reason of imminent Peril from without or
within as by a Pestilence on board, is a case of fatal accident chargeable
upon the insurers pa. 511,2.
[*55] - goods taken as Prize and sold, the purchaser has a valid
Title against the former owner in all places -pa. 513.
An ordinance of Lewis 13th in 1638 modifies and restrains this right
but the ordinance is contrary to common right, and ought to be taken
strictly. -pa. 517.
Sect. 28 -of Pirates -pa. 523 is a desultory and learned essay but has
very little to do with the subject of the work. It vindicates the ancient
and modem Inhabitants of Marseilles for the arts, commerce and probity,
and shows how universally Pirates are put out of the Pale of law.
Page 533,4 -The Insurer does not answer for simple theft, for that is
not cas fortuit but robbery is, and the Insurers answer for it.
[*56] -arrest of the prince is not an hostile act. It is done by a
friend from some necessity, and the Insurer answer for it .535,6. It is a
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force maieure put at their risque.
-all the Damages then resulting from an arrest made after the risk
commenced, are borne by the Insurer. page 538.The wages of the crew during the arrest, ought to be borne by the
Person who receives the Freight for the voyage, but if the vessel be only
Freighted by the month, these wages ought to fall on the shipper of goods
who receives during the Detention the services of the crew, and if
insured, this expence falls on the Insurer, pa. 539,540.
On the arrest the Insured may abandon after certain stipulated Times
depending on the Places where the arrest is made. -pa. 540. for
mercantile speculations demand celerity, [*57] and delay is fatal.
Sect. 31. pa. 542 - Interdictions of Commerce or War, etc. have no
Effect on Policy where the risk is already commenced. But if not
commenced when the commerce or voyage is interrupted by Prohibition,
the Policy is vacated. It is the same of Charter Parties. They are null if
the Captain has only the outer freight.The State has a right to employ all foreign ships in its Ports for the
public necessities, and this is consistent with the Law of Nations. -pa.
549.
If the cargo be seized on the Voyage by any government from
public necessity, the assured may abandon, but if they are payed the full
Price the cargo [*58] would have fetched at the place of Destination,
they have no claim on the Insurer, sect. 39. pa. 552 etc.
Sect. 35-Emerigon treats very learnedly and historically of the
necessity of a Declaration of War before hostilities - all hostile acts of
subjects without public authority are Piracies. -pa. 571.
After War Declared, the Subjects of each Power ought of right, to
have a reasonable Time to withdraw themselves and their Effects. -pa.
565,6,7.
The Confiscation of Debts in War Emerigon reprobates. pa. 567,8.
This is a learned ch. on the declaration and rights of war but it is not
easy to perceive its application to the law of Insurance.
[*59] Ch. 12. sect. 38. By the ord. of 1779 the assured cannot
abandon a vessel to the Insurer for innavigability. unless that fact be
previously ascertained by a Process-Verbal, without such report the
innavigability is presumed to arise from the proper vice of the vessel, pa.
578. In addition to this Process-verbal, it must appear that the Ship was
rendered innavigable by Perils of the Sea, before you can abandon for
that cause. -pa. 579.Valin does not think much of a Process-verbal or report of a Survey
as these Surveys are slight and in spite of them, the Insurer may prove
the Vessel not Seaworthy when she sailed. pa. 580.
The royal arret of 1779 takes great care that these surveys be made
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by experienced and impartial men, and yet Valin says they were before
very often partial or fraudulent. pa. 580,1.
[*60] An agitated question has been whether Innavigability shall be
presumed to arise from want of Seaworthiness or from Sea Perils. see
pa. 582 to 585. The arguments and cases on the side of the Insurers that
it is to be presumed unless otherwise proved to arise from want of
Seaworthiness.
On the other Hand, Emerigon relates a Series of
Decisions - pa. 585 to 591. showing that if there has been the previous
survey to the sailing of the ship, the Innavigability shall be presumed to
have arisen from Sea Peril and such no doubt, is the weight of this
opinion.
Innavigability exists where it would require almost as much time
and expence to repair, as to build a new vessel, pa. 591.
If the place furnishes not the means to repair-if the Captain has not
funds or credit to repair, tho the ship be otherwise repairable, this
becomes a case of Innavigability. pa. 591,2.
[*61] -Average means all extraordinary expence and all damage
attending the ship and goods in the course of the voyage; and if it
happens by cas fortuit, it falls on the Insurer. - sect. 39 -page 598.
Simple {or particular} average is when the damage falls on the
proprietor or Insurer of the thing damaged-gross {or common } average
when the damage is to be borne by all Parties by way of contribution -pa.
599
Emerigon then treats of gross or common average which draws
contribution. It is bottomed on the Rhodian Law in the Dig.
It occurs when part is voluntarily sacrificed for the common good in
case of imminent Peril. {see also pa. 620.1
You can only abandon according to the ordinance in case of capture,
shipwreck, stranding, arrest of Princes or entire loss of the [*62] subject.
All other damages are but average -pa. 604.
Emerigon devotes the whole 40th sect to Jettison and the rules that
apply to this extreme case. Goods put into a boat to lighten a vessel out
of a port or to save, will if lost, form a gross average, pa. 613.
It is the same if the boat also be lost, provided the boat belonged to
the same vessel, pa. 614.
There is no contribution if the vessel be lost. Contribution only
exists when the Vessel survives, do.
If the vessel really be saved by the jettison and afterwards from
some new cause be lost, still the contribution attaches - pa. 617.
The damage must be voluntarily incurred and for the common
benefit to contribute gross average -pa. 620.
If a ship is under a Necessity to go into Port to refit, the time spent
there in doing it, the Expence of unloading and reloading, the wages and
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provisions go into [*63] gross average for they are incurred for the
common good, but the Expence of the actual repairs do not, except the
excess of Price they cost. pa. 625.
Expence of convoy in the course of the voyage is gross average.
626,
Extra Expence in escaping an Enemy becomes gross average -627.
Price of Redemption from Pirates, is gross average -629.
The French Ordinance forbids Frenchmen to ransom their captured
vessels, pa. 630.
Expence, wages and Provisions in Port in attempts to reclaim a
vessel taken by force and carried into Port, go into gross average -pa. 631
The 41st sect. on gross average or contribution is very copious and
full of minute distinctions and adjudged cases. It is unnecessarily prolix
as the Principle when gross average applies is concise and well settled.
[*64] All that is in the ship contributes to the Jettison. This the
general rule. But goods not in the bill of lading do not contribute, nor if
lost by a jettison are they paid for. - Sect. 42. pa. 639.
Goods not on deck are not paid for by contribution if lost. do.-nor
is there remedy against Master, if the goods on Deck were placed there
by consent of the owner -640.
Emerigon seems to insinuate that goods on deck and a jettison
would go into a gross average, if places there by Consent of all Parties.
do.
-Effects taken on board in the course of the voyage, go into gross
average - page 641.
Instruments of war and Provisions do not contribute to a jettison,
and yet if thrown over, they shall be paid for by contribution--do--{they
do not contribute because necessary for all. }
The clothes and wages of the seamen do not contribute, for they
have already exposed their lives and that is enough. - 642. {but their
clothes are paid by contribution-}
[*65] The wages of Seamen contribute
to the Expences of
Ransom - 642.
-The baggage, clothes, jewels, etc. of the passengers contribute 643 to 645. And if thrown over they form the subject of gross average,
even the money thrown over in the chest, and you ascertain the amount
by the oath of the passenger, or as well as you can. 646.
- The price of slaves on board, also contribute, do.
In the settlement of gross average, the ship and freight each
contribute only a moiety. pa. 650.
The Effects thrown over, are to be valued in forming the
contribution as if they had not been lost. They are tested by the value of
the goods saved at the Port of Discharge. But the rule in many other
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countries is this, if the Jettison take place before the middle of the
voyage, then [*66] the value is estimated at the Port of Lading,
otherwise it is at the Port of Discharge. page 653,4.
The Freight, etc. is to be deducted from the value of the goods, but
nothing is deducted from the moiety of the Ship and Freight-654,5.
The goods contribute according to their full value and not their
weight. 655.
Sect. 44 - pa. 658-The insurer is liable for loss by Jettison and
for the contribution which the surviving goods, is to pay.
The estimation of average between insurer and insured, is founded
on the value of the goods as the time and place of departure. pa. 659.And yet it is the usage to settle the contribution with the Insurer by value
at the port of Discharge, because that being the general Estimate for the
contributing Parties, the goods thrown over and saved being all raised
equally in Value, it leaves the Insurer as well off as if [*67] the other rule
was followed - 659.

If all the goods insured be thrown over and abandonment be made,
the insurer must pay a total loss and resort over to those who are holden
to contribution; But if there be no such total loss, you can only recover of
the Insurer his contingent or proportion of the Contribution, and you
must look to those also who are held to contribute - pa. 659, 660.
There is no average if it does not exceed I per cent. pa. 660.
-The goods must be on board or put on Lighters to go on Board, or
the insurer is not answerable. -pa. 675,6END OF VOL. 1st
Ch. 13. Of the Time and Place of Risque.
To make the insurer liable, the loss must happen in the time and in
the Place or same Voyage specified in the policy - pa. 4
[*68] It is lawful insural to make insurances for a limited time - pa.
6.
It is common to insure Cruisers in this way, and the vessel during
the Time can return to Port and sail again under the auspices of the
Policy. do.
If no time be limited for a voyage to commence or proceed the
assured may take his own Time and still hold the Insurer bound. But the
Admiralty has annulled a contract where the Vessel did not sail in 10
years-Sect. 2 pa. 16. 17.
The risk on the Ship begins from her time of sailing to the anchor in
her Port of Destination and on Goods from the time they leave the Shore
in Lighters to go on board til they be landed at the Port of Discharge.
This the general law, when the Policy contains no special Provisions to
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the contrary. pa. 13.
Sect. 3-Page 20. Voyages en caravane [*69] are those little
intermediate voyages involved in the great one-They are like the E. I.
trading Voyages, and one policy will cover the whole as an entire
voyage, if the Parties choose it. The assurances on these caravane
voyages are generally only for limited time-pa. 21.
The policy generally declares the Terms a guo and ad quem - on
policies for a limited time, the two extremes of that time form the
voyage. If the voyage omit to specify the time and place or risque, it
would form a new case and you would have to search for the Intent and
in doubt to decide for the Insurer, who is the Debtor. pa. 26.27.
Sect. 5 - pa. 29 - The captain is bound to pursue the most usual and
tried iter of the voyage, with due diligence.
The French Forms generally give the Captain great latitude in
allowing to stop any where to the right or to the left, back or forwards.
But Emerigon, who so often [*70] heavily complains of the laxity of the
French Policies, holds that this Permission must be continued to be in
Subordination to the voyage insured, and to apply to Places in the Course
of that voyage. It will not allow the master to engage in a smuggling
trade, for clauses however indefinite, must be interpreted according to
good faith, and not to admit fraud or surprize. Pa. 30-35.
{- case of ailment for the risque. pa. 39. 40.}
- Goods insured from Curacao to London.
They are laden at
Martinique. The Vessel then goes to Curacao and from there towards
London and is lost. The Insurer must pay as the loss happened between
the Termini of the voyage insured. It matters not where the goods were
laden. pa. 36.
{- Substituted goods equally covered -38. 40.}
See. E. g. -pa. 44. Insurance for voyage, always refers (unless
otherwise expressed) to the most near or next voyage. - If the assured
suspends for a time the voyage insured and under [*71] takes an
intermediate voyage, he vacates the Policy. sect. 10. pa. 45.
If the voyage be broken up or altered before the vessel sails, {tho by
the act of the insured,} the policy is vacated, and the premium must be
returned saving half per cent. pa. 48. 154.
The assured is not permitted to alledge an Error or mistake in the
description of the voyage - pa. 53.
If the voyage be voluntarily lengthened by going to a more distant
place, the Insurer is discharged, but holds his Premium -pa. 54.
If the voyage be changed, or the Captain assumes voluntarily other
risques than those in the policy, the Insurer is discharged. pa. 56.7.
Voluntarily changing the route discharges the insurer, sect. 15. pa
57-60.
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It is deemed so if the captain does it to avoid a lawful Toll. do.
[*72] Deviation once voluntarily made annuls the policy, and it is
not revived tho the vessel should afterwards return safe to the Tract of
the voyage insured. Sect. 16. pa. 60.
{Of Beginning and End of Risk}
In Vessels that have to descend a river as from Bourdeaux, it is
usual that the risk commence on the Vessel from the day that she begins
to load. page 68.
Risk does not end when the Vessel is at quarantine. It continuing
until she is safely moored in the Port. The Expence of the Quarantine
does not fall upon the Insurer. - page 72.
On a Policy on a Voyage to the W. Indies, the risk does not
terminate on arrival at the first isle. It continues on the Ship until the
cargo has been all or nearly all landed. - page 72. (But quo: whether this
great duration of the risk be not owing to some special clause)
[*73] If there be two policies, one on the outward and one on the
return voyage, and part of the outward cargo only be discharged and part
of the return cargo put on board and the ship perish, which policy pays
the loss? Emerigon states Rules to settle this nice litigious question. pa.
80.
Ch. 14 Of the Proof of Loss.
Sect. 1. page 84. Is an interesting comment on the text in the Code
de Naufragiis concerning the proof of loss by Shipwreck and how the
judge is to obtain the proofsSect. 2. The French and other maratime law enjoin upon the Captain
to make a Protest as soon as possible after a loss. All the foreign laws
regulate the Solemnities of this Protest and it is held to be an authentic
Piece and Evidence of itself, the third Person may gain-say [*74] it by
contrary Protest. But the captain cannot, he is concluded by it. The
French Consul is the first officer (if present) before whom it ought to be
made. Page 88. 97, 8.
The rules about Protests are simple rules of nautical Discipline
which have no necessary relation with the contract of assurance; nor is it
necessary that the insured fortify himself with a protest, before he can
recover of the Insured. pa. 99.
But till the Protest is viewed as a regular and sure Paper-100.
and the assured has sometimes lost his cause for want of it. do. 101.The truth is that in Policy cases, the rules are not severe as to Proof.
They are more liberal than in other cases. They admit proofs such as the
circumstances afford. do. 103.
If a year lapse and no news of the Vessel in an ordinary and two
years and no news in the longest voyages, it is a presumption of [*75]
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loss and the Insurer must pay. The Time is computed from the Departure
or last news of the vessel. Sect. 4, 106,7,8.
Ch. 15 Of Insurance after the loss or safe arrival of the Subject.
An insurance of a vessel lost or safely arrived is lawful, provided
the parties were ignorant of the fact and provided the News could not
have arrived reckoning 1 1/2 leagues for every hour from the place to the
place where the policy is saved. Sect. 1. 118. also pa. 120, 121. Pothier
pa. 12. 21.
Sect. 3 - Emerigon cites numerous cases to show what
circumstances do and what do not amount to proof of such knowledge in
the one party or the other of the loss or safe arrival of the vessel as to
vacate the policy on ground of Fraud.
The law presumes the knowledge and consequently the Fraud, [*76]
if the news of the loss or of the arrival could have reached the place
where the policy was made, at the rate of 1/2 league for a hour. pa. 136.
These Presumptions of law cannot be gainsayed and statutes of
Fraud are to be liberally construed. pa 140. If the time of the Day of the
loss be not fixed, the law fixes it at Noon. pa. 139.
But this Rule about 1 1/2 league for an Hour is done away almost in
Practice by special clauses in Policies, which now require actual notice to
be brought home to the Party. pa. 143.
If at the time of the Policy, the factor who makes it knew of the loss,
the policy is equally void. pa. 148.
Sect. 8. So if the Principal is apprized in Season to revoke the
Order to insure and does not, the Policy is void. do.
[*77] Ch. 16. Of the Dissolution of the Contract.
The Italian writers hold that the assured cannot dissolve the
Contract on his part, so but that the Insurer will hold his premium, pa.
153.
Sect. 3-If the Insured sell the Subject insured, the Policy goes with
it to the purchaser, as being appurtenant. pa. 160.
In the case of the ristourne or dissolution of the Policy, the Insurer
retains half per cent. Pa. 168.
Ch. 17 of Abandonment
You may abandon the subject after it be totally lost, and you must
make it before you can demand the whole sum insured. - pa. 173.
Upon the principles of Insurance derived from the law of Nations,
the Insurer is only to indemnify for the loss, and is never obliged to
become the Proprietor, and therefore [*78] there is no abandonment of
the property. This process of abandonment comes from particular
provisions and local laws. Sect. 174. 5.
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{only} applies to loss by Capture, Shipwreck,
-abandonment
Stranding, detention of Prince, or entire loss of the subject. Pa. 176. Sect.
2. {all other cases are average}
It is always left to the option of the Insured whether or no he will
abandon-178. In the case of loss entire or almost so, there is no useInsured committing himself to an action of average and not abandoning
seeing the wreck would be valued and would make some deduction. pa.
178.
Stranding must be followed by shipwreck, before you can abandon.
pa. 180,1.
The Guidon says you may abandon when Damage exceeds one half
or the cargo is not worth the Freight or little more. pa. 183 &214.
[*79] Emerigon, Valin and Pothier differ much about the meaning
of LeGuidon and the Ordinance on this subject. pa. 183.
If a vessel be captured and then restored, still the insured may
abandon.pa. 158.
After a total loss, the insured is bound promptly to abandon. If the
news turns out to be erroneous, the abandonment is void. -Sect 5-pa.
189,197,8.
Abandonment is a complete Transfer of the Property and if the
vessel afterwards arrives safe, it will not affect the efficacy of the
abandonment. Sect. 6. pa. 194,5 -see also supra at pa. 52.
The abandonment is absolute and is not affected by the restoration
of the Vessel. do.
Even in cases of entire, actual loss, the abandonment ought still to
be made. pa. 196.
But if the insurer has refused to accept of the composition, then the
[*80] insured can sue for the whole sum and the Insurer can make no
pretence as to the Effects re-purchased. pa. 196.
abandonment has a retrospective Effect, so as to make the Insurer
Proprietor ab initio -do.
abandonment once made is irrevocable -do. But there are certain
exceptions to and modifications of this rule. -pa. 197.
Sect. 7 -It is the duty of the Insured and Captain in case of
Shipwreck to labor faithfully to recover and save the Property-The
same duty in case of arrest, and this labor does not prejudice the
abandonment. pa. 199.
The Assurers are not bound to labor or provide another vessel, etc.
They are only to pay the sum insured, and to account for the Effects
recovered, pa. 200.
Almost all Forms or Formulas of Policies contain a clause [*81]
authorizing the insured to labor at the Expence of Insurer for the
recovery of the Property left or jeopardized. pa. 203,4.
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Under this clause, the Insurer is never obliged to pay beyond the
sum insured, pa. 205. 212.213. The Surplus of Expence is to be borne by
him who orders them. do. 212.
Mr. Valin seems to be of an different opinion, and that the Insurer
under this special power to labor, etc., may be obliged to pay beyond the
sum insured, do. 213.
You cannot abandon a part only of the Subject insured by one
consolidated insurance. The abandonment must be entire. sect 8. pa.
214.
{see Pothier 134,5}
Is it necessary to abandon to the insurer on the Vessel, the Freight
also? - a decision he reports says NO. sect 9. pa. 217,8.
But Freight is accessory to the ship, and the Lender on Bottomrv
[*82] is entitled to the Freight, if the cargo in any part be saved, after the
Freight shall have paid the Salvage and the wages of the Seamen -pa.
220.
a ship diminishes in value in the Course of the voyage by ware and
tare and provisions and wages, but all this is recompensed by the Freig
which preserves to the Ship its primitive valor. That which the ship loses
on one side, it preserves on the other by the means of the Freight which
is its accessory, and if the Ship be lost just on its return, it would be
unjust for the Insured to recover the full value by the policy and also
keep the Freight. The Freight therefore passes by right of property to the
insurer on abandonment, pa. 221, 2. on this point Emerigon reasons most
beautifully and forcibly.
Emerigon then discusses the Question, whether upon abandonment,
[*83] the Freight already earned and received by delivery for instance of
part of the goods at some intermediate Port, goes with the abandonment
and is to be resumed to the insurer; and from the Principles already laid
down and because abandonment has a retrospective effect and renders
the Insurer as Proprietor for the whole voyage, he concludes that even
that Freight passes to the Insurer. sect. 9. pa. 222,3,4.
But he admits that the wages and Expences of the Vessel and the
sums lent on Bottomry are to be first deducted - pa. 224. 229. sect. 11.
Freight already earned is insurable, and does not pass by the
abandonment, says however the Ordinance of 1779-do.
It is then only the growing freight that passes by the abandonment pa. 225. under a contract founded on this ordinance. [*84] But Emerigon
considers a contract that the Freight acquired or engaged to be paid
beforehand at all Events, (and which only is insurable in France), shall at
all events belong to Insured as a kind of wages-Contract and lawful, in
vim sponsionis, non in vim assecurationis. For the nature of the contract
is unalterable. Sicut Princeps non est Dominus elementorum, ita non est
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Dominus contractuum. pa. 226,7.
Sect 11.pa. 229. When the claims of the Seamen and Assurers
come in competition, the Salaries or wages of the seamen shall have
preference as to the Freight abandoned.
So the lender on Bottomry shall have Preference to the Insurer on
the same cargo, on the Effects saved from the Shipwreck, as to his
capital only. Sect. 12. pa. 234.
[*85] An Abandonment does not affect this prior claim of the
Lender, for res transit cum onere. The reason of this preference is that
the lender contributes directly to the existence of the Effects saved, and
the Insurer is only a simple guarantee. pa. 234,5.
Emerigon thinks the Bottomry Lender ought even to have the
Preference even as to his Maratime Interest, but the Ordinance has
otherwise ordained, do. 235.
Upon abandonment, the Insurer is put in the place of the insured,
and is as if he had not existed. do.
If only part of the cargo be insured, you abandon only that part. For
the part left uncovered, the assured is considered as his own insurer, and
average is regulated between Insurer and Insured in proportion to their
interests, pa. 237. sect. 13.
He gives a diagram -pa. 238. regulating this average between the
Insurer and Insured
[*86] Ch. 18 Of Payment of the Sum Insured
If there be several Insurers in different Policies, and an average loss
be demanded, the several insurers contribute relatively without regard to
the dates of the Policies. sect. 1. pa. 248
By the French Policies, there is a bannale clause (or clause which
saves every Body) by which any Bearer of the Policy is entitled to
demand and receive the payment. pa. 249,250.
And yet the policy is not to be regarded as negotiable paper. do. It is
only imperfectly so. It is so by the bannale clause, as respect the
creditors of the grantor, but not as respects the insurer himself. do. 252.
The usual stipulation in policies is to pay in three months [*87]
after notice of the loss, but the Forms at Nantes, and usage in other cases
without the clause is to deduct 1 1/2 per cent to the insurer for prompt
payment. tho he does not pay til the end of the three months. Emerigon
does not see the justice of this. sect. 3 pa. 252.
The lien of the policy is gone by cancelling the Policy or refuse of
the subscription, notwithstanding the Insurer may afterwards give a due
Bill for the amount. The Mortgage-Effect of the policy is lost.
Sect. 4 pa. 253. Emerigon is zealous on this head, as he thinks it
enough-quite enough that a lien should be attached to such a Paper as a
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policy which however in France is publicly registered. The House of a
Merchant ought to be full of justice and good faith, for good faith is the
Basis of Commerce. -pa. 256.
Money paid by error in fact or in law is recoverable [*88] back,
unless the payment was due by Equity, as of a debt barred by the Stat. of
Limitations. pa. 257.
Ch. 19 Of Prescription
The Ordinance of 1681 requires abandonment and all Demands in
execution of the policy to be made in short Periods from 6 weeks to two
years, or the assured loses his remedy. pa. 265.
See pa. 277. the rules of construing new laws innovating on
common law strictly.
This whole ch. of Prescriptions or the Limitations of Suits on the
Head of Insurance is full of local and positive laws, and of the rigor and
Injustice and Difficulties of many of them.
[*89] Ch. 20 Of Judgments
As a general rule, personal and mixed actions ought to be
commenced before the judge of the domicil of the debtor without regard
to the place of the contract or the place of payment. sect. 2 pa. 331.-But
this question of Venue is subject to a great many positive rules and
distinctions in France, as see Sect 2d.Maratime matters ought to be judged with celerity velo levato
[levato velo in Emerigon's original text] according to the Code. i.e., by a
metaphor with a raised or spread sail so as to arrive quickly to the place
of destination. This he thinks the meaning of those words. pa. 338.
The French laws allow of personal arrest for debt under some
limitations, pa. 361,2.
[*90] This last or 7th sect. treats of the remedies against the Body
and Property of the debtor.
[This ends the first part of Kent's notes on Emerigon's Treatise]
[*91] NOTES FROM EMERIGON ON BOTTOMRY CONTRACTS
Ch.

1.
This contract was known to the Roman law. See Examples in s. 1.
The Roman law states this case: A loans money to B, charged on a vessel
and B hypothecates not only that vessel but his goods on board of others.
If the vessel which is the object of the contract perishes, the money is
gone also, and A cannot resort to the goods on board the other vessels the
Peril of which he did not assume. pa. 382.
If the risk was never run, the Lender has his money but not with
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nautical interest. So the nautical interest ceases as soon as the risk
ceases. pa. 393. 406.
This maratime interest receives no diminution, altho [*92] the
Vessel makes no return Voyage or perish during the Voyage, the Effects
on which the money was lent on Bottomry, were landed before the loss
or were put on board of another Vessel - pa. 414.
A land interest runs of course as soon as the maratime risk has
ceased and the Borrower delays to fulfil this obligation. - do.
4. Of the Action Exercitoire.
The owner or Charterer of a Vessel was called in the Roman law an
Exercitor because he exercised commerce.
As a general rule he is held for the acts of the Master of the Vessel.
do. - 422.
But he is not responsible for those acts if done before the Vessel
sails and while the captain is in the Port of the owner. It is not now
necessary he should be, and therefore, without the owner's consent, the
master cannot [*93] bind the owner in a Bottomry Contract in the Port
where the owner resides. pa. 425.
The owner is only liable for these Acts of the Master which have
relation to the voyage, pa. 439.
A Bottomra Contract must expressly state the Object of the loan,
and that it is for the voyage and necessities of the ship, or it would be
null as such as contract. - do. - 434,5. - 439. - 403.
The subsequent fraudulent misapplication of the money by the
Captain will not affect the validity of the contract. do. - 441, 2.
The Captain hath power to bind the ship by Bottomry though
previously prohibited by owner. - pa. 443.
If after the Money is taken up on Bottomry and the voyage is not
entered on, nor risk run, the [*94] lender must be content with this
Princiapl and the legal interest whether the voyage be broken up by vis
major or the mere pleasure of the Borrower. - pa. 493 &c.
It is sufficient to free the Borrower on Bottomry or Respondentia
that at the Time of the total loss he had aliment of risk on Board to the
amount of the Bottomry Bond.-pa. 501.
Ch.

[This ends Kent's notes on Emerigon]

